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Brother, can you spare a billion? : the United States, the IMF, and the international lender of last

PREFACETHE PUZZLETHE ARGUMENTPLAN OF THE BOOK AND FINDINGSThe ILLR in Theory and PracticeAN INTERNATIONAL LLR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONCEPTThe ILLR and the HegemonThe ILLR and the IMFTHE IMF’S LIMITATIONS AS AN ILLRThe Problem of UnresponsivenessThe Problem of Resource InsufficiencyTHE UNITED STATES’ ILLR MECHANISMSThe Mechanics of Currency SwapsSpeed and IndependenceLending CapacityDivision of LaborCONCLUSIONSThe United States Invents Its Own ILLR, 1961-1962MORE DOLLARS, MORE PROBLEMSFrom Dollar Gap to Dollar GlutTwo Threats: The “Gold Drain” and SpeculationIN SEARCH OF AN ILLRThe General Arrangements to BorrowAN ALTERNATIVE ILLR: CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY SWAPSThe Fed’s Novel IdeaWho Needs the IMF?How the Swap Lines Protected US InterestsWhy Did Europe Cooperate?CONCLUSIONSThe Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990sTHE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUNDGLOBAL BANKING AND THE DEBT CRISIS: 1980SThe IMF’s “Concerted Lending” Strategy and the Problem of UnresponsivenessThe ESF and “Bridge Loans”: Correcting for the Problem of IMF UnresponsivenessPORTFOLIO FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES: 1990SCapital Account Crises and IMF Resource InsufficiencyThe ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource InsufficiencyCONCLUSIONSWho’s In, Who’s Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bail Out, 1983-1999US FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND ESF BAILOUT SELECTIONAN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ESF BAILOUT SELECTIONRESULTSCONCLUSIONSUS International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990sCASE SELECTIONTHE CASESMexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1982-1983Argentina, 1984Poland, 1989Mexico, 1995Thailand, 1997Indonesia and South Korea, 1997Declining Use: The ESF Is Put Out to PastureCONCLUSIONSThe United States as an ILLR during the Great Panic of2008-2009BACKGROUND: “A NOVEL ASPECT” OF THE GREAT PANIC OF 2008US FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND THE FED’S ILLR ACTIONSAN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FED SWAP LINE SELECTIONTHE INTEREST-RATE THREAT AND THE FED’S ILLR ACTIONSTRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF FOMC MEETINGSThe Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007-December 2007Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008-August 2008Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008-October 28, 2008Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008CONCLUSIONSTHE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AS AN ILLRPOLICY IMPLICATIONSFINALTHOUGHTSBIBLIOGRAPHY

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