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Tensions and Contradictions within Shrieval Accountability

The political thinking Richard of Ely described at the Exchequer finds its practical expression in the intensity and manner in which the English crown focused on sheriffs’ fiscal accountability increasingly from the late twelfth century through at least to the second baronial rebellion of 1258—66. This focus seems to have prevented the crown from fully conceptualizing or addressing other aspects of shrieval conduct. That double bind in no small way contributed to the complaints about sheriffs’ extortions and misconduct that were so major a feature of the baronial and knightly rebellions of 1214—16 and 1258—66.[1] Even when the crown was supposed to be championing the honestum against the fiscally utile one can see an important ambivalence. Something of these tensions is visible right from the beginning of the period addressed here in the 1170 inquest of sheriffs.

In March 1170, after four years’ absence and a dreadful sea crossing from Normandy, Henry II held an Easter council celebrating the coronation of his son and the ‘statutes of his kingdom’. He then ‘dismissed almost all the sheriffs of England and their bailiffs because they had badly treated the men of his kingdom’. The sheriffs and bailiffs, says Roger of Howden, then swore to ‘offer redress to the King and to the men of the kingdom as they ought to offer redress for their exactions’. Gervase of Canterbury describes how Henry ‘gathered all of his best men and fixed the abbots and clerks, the earls and knights who would tour the land [circuier- ent terram] giving them the written form which they were to observe’. Meanwhile those in the regions swore to tell the truth about what these men had done. They were particularly to recount, said Howden, ‘what and how much the sheriffs and their bailiffs had taken from them, and what with due judgement, and what without, and for what sorts of infringement’. Unexpectedly we are then told, ‘But from this the people of England suffered a great injury, because after the inquisition, the King replaced a number of those sheriffs in their places, and these same people showed themselves to be much crueller than they had been previously’.[2] This holding to account does not seem to have produced an equitable effect.

The mechanics of who went in and out of the sheriffs in 1170 have been well analysed.[3] Only three shires seem to have experienced a long-term change in their administrators (Hampshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Northumberland).[4] The years 1159/60 and 1163/4, furthermore, saw a greater number of sheriffs removed for those years as a whole, without any of 1170’s fanfare.[5] The Gesta regis Henrici secundi presents the inquisitio as taking a broader view of sheriffs’ conduct in its account. There is a reference in the articles of inquiry to how ‘the land and the men have been oppressed’. But the principle concern of the modus inquisitionis is to rectify this with respect to losses suffered by the King, not to reduce the overall burden on the kingdom.[6] Damage and loss from the King’s perspective is the main focus. A comparable pattern is visible in Richard’s 1194 eyre following his return from captivity at Durnstein. Originally this was conceived as a broader inquisitio into prises and payments ‘of all the bailiffs of the lord king, both justices and sheriffs and constables and foresters, and their servants’ since Richard’s coronation. The inquisitio in these terms though was postponed on Hubert Walter’s order. What was left focused on the interests and dues of the crown.[7] The utile created more pressing demands than the honestum for Richard. Naturally this cannot but have ethical overtones, but those are not what dominate the articles of the inquiry.

There is no mention at all of what will happen to sheriffs found wanting in relation to the terms of the 1170 inquest. Having specified in detail the fourteen headings (a modern invention) that the itinerant barons are to investigate, the fifteenth simply says, ‘And after they have been inquired into, my sheriffs are to be set to my other business and swear that they will legally look into the inquisitions to be made into the lands of the barons.’209 Inspectors may inspect inspectors, but it is implied that notwithstanding any shrieval failings identified by the barons, the sheriffs may well carry on regardless.

The extant (financial) returns to the inquiry unsurprisingly read mainly as a set of taxable liabilities, not as a broader evaluation.210 Grievances are audible. In Worcester the sheriff was alleged to exact an unaccustomed castle-guard service and avoid taxes due on his burgage land.211 In Ely, during the illness of the Bishop (and therefore during its de facto administration by Richard of Ely) the farm of the hundred of Milford and the half hundred of Dereham was increased to ‘?8 by reason of which the men were so heavily burdened that, unless it be amended they will all be paupers’.212 On the Earl of Arundel’s land, Matthew of Candos had had 405 sheep driven off by the Earl’s servants for debts they alleged. Matthew blamed the Earl, who accepted the debts were unfair and blamed his steward.213 At Docking, unfair dues had been extorted when, ‘in the time of King Henry [I] they paid nothing except a just rent’.214

The inquest of sheriffs is explicable if its objective was to give sheriffs a bit of a fright, to let them know that other parts of the Angevin machine could well mobilize to keep an eye on them and discourage them from pulling a fast one on the crown. That aim was not trivial, nor was the publicity of the venture coincidental. But there may have been limits to how far such an inquest could put a general stop to shrieval insolence of office.215 Rather few sheriffs seem to have been seriously disciplined. It seems reasonable to interpret the inquest of sheriffs as an exercise in a fiscal accountability of a familiar sort, and which echoed some wider ideal of rectification. But that rectification was essentially expedient and appears to have been mostly in the fisc’s interest. Other senses of accountability can be heard only dimly, expressing fairness financially as they must.

it was an initiative of Richard’s. See also 270 and Heiser, ‘Richard I and his Appointments’. The Norman Exchequer official, Abbot Robert of Caen, was commissioned in 1196 to review the English Exchequer’s practice, but died before he could carry this out. Hubert Walter, said Newburgh, was opposed to this review too. See Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, ii. 464—5 (§5.19). On the investigation, John Gillingham, ‘The Historian as Judge: William of Newburgh and Hubert Walter’, EHR 119 (2004), 1275-87 at 1283-4.

  • 209 Select Charters, 178.
  • 210 Red Book of the Exchequer, ii. App. A to Preface, cclxvii-cclxxxi, trans. EHD ii. #49; James Tait, ‘A New Fragment of the Inquest of Sheriffs (1170)’, EHR 39 (1924), 80-3.
  • 211 Tait, ‘New Fragment’, 83. 212 EHD ii. #49, 447. 213 EHD ii. #49, 442.
  • 214 EHD ii. #49, 448.
  • 215 Bisson’s view that the inquest ‘surely stirred the English masses while jolting their masters as never before’ (Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 383) seems exaggerated. Marc Bloch, La Societe feodale (Paris, 1994 edn.) took the same view.

Contemporaries’ impressions of royal attitudes are important here, and some thought comparatively. Newburgh’s obituary of Henry contains a relatively benign picture of regal supervision of officials. ‘In extracting money [Henry] was a little excessive—but the growth of this evil beyond measure in the times which followed excused [justificavit] him in this respect, and showed that it had been within decent limits under him.’[8] Henry ‘imposed no serious burden on the kingdom of the English or his overseas lands until that most recent Tenth because of the expedition to Jerusalem [i.e. the ‘Saladin Tithe’ of 1188]’.[9] These were observations about sheriffs and their officers, since it was they who extracted the money. Newburgh had identified that officials extracting improper dues was a problem at the start of Henry Il’s reign.[10] But if Henry was bad, Richard was worse.[11] The Cistercian Ralph of Coggeshall—happy to praise Richard elsewhere—said ‘no age can remember nor history tell of any past kings, however long they reigned, who demanded and took so much money from his kingdom as this king extorted and amassed within the five years after his return from his captivity’ (i.e. 1194—9).[12] Newburgh’s comparison was sharper still. ‘The present experience of evils [i.e. under Richard] created a memory of [Henry II’s] goodness, and the man who had been hateful to almost everyone in his own time [i.e. Henry], was declared an extraordinary and useful prince.’[13] Faced with such political amnesia, Newburgh’s judgement on the English is that ‘this stupid people is thrashed now by scorpions with less complaint than in those years past when it was thrashed with whips’ by Henry II.[14] The stings Newburgh and Coggeshall must have had in mind doubtlessly included the English contribution to Richard’s ransom (150,000 marks), and that of the Norman campaign—but also of the shrieval expedients Richard initiated.

From Richard’s return in 1194, the crown became increasingly preoccupied with sheriffs’ fiscal accountability, pressurizing them as never before, and necessarily pressurizing other aspects of shrieval conduct.[15] Lands that had escheated to the crown were now accounted for by crown-appointed escheators, not sheriffs, in an attempt to increase the value drawn from these assets. New increments were added to nine county farms, increasing the amount sheriffs had to account for, or forcing them to fine in order to pay the lower, lesser rates. Up-front gifts for appointments to shrievalties declined in value, but incremental increases more than compensated the

Exchequer. The emphasis was shifted from candidates’ ability to pay on entry to sheriffs’ ability to get more money out of shrieval farms.224 Sheriffs, however, could not cope with the new increments, and Barratt’s analysis shows the declining yield to the crown.225 As with Richard, so with John, and the attempt to muster resources for Continental reconquest after 1204 focused John’s attention back on England, prompting him to increase exploitation there.226 From 1204 a system of ‘custodian’ sheriffs was introduced, tax-gatherers who simply accounted for all revenues that passed through their hands, not the simple total of the farm they previously held responsibility for.227 Increased shrieval accountability went in uneven tandem with the complex decline of the curial sheriff—reducing the attractiveness of the office and the status of incumbents.228 Thirteen shrievalties changed hands in 1204, nine being handed on to lesser men more pliable to Exchequer pressure.229 From 1207 individual debtors’ debts were aggregated at the Exchequer so a global total could be seen, and managed, more clearly.230 Sheriffs’ fiscal accountability at the Exchequer was under pressure as never before. From 1194 to 1215 the income from the county account drops below ?20,000 only in 1196—7; between 1208 and 1212 it averages ?39,354, more than three times as much as the 1189 county total of ?11,363.231 The pressure on other debtors is staggering. In 1204 ?523 of debt was called in. In 1205, ?1,398, and a similar figure in 1206; between 1207 and 1210 an annual average of ?4,685 was taken; and between 1210 and 1212, ?10,513, 16 per cent of the annual average revenue for 1210—12 of ?63,939 (in 1200 it was 6 per cent of annual revenue).232 As Barrett argues, ‘John’s attempts to maintain his financial position in this period represent the greatest level of exploitation seen in England since the Conquest.’233 Such a single-minded focus on fiscal accountability could only hamstring any efforts to take a broader-minded conception of shrieval office. In part Magna Carta was the effect.234 (Oxford, 1987), ch. 2, esp. 66—92 and Stacey, ‘Agricultural Investment and the Management of the Royal Desmesne Manors, 1236—1240’, Journal of Economic History 46 (1986); Cassidy, ‘Adventus Vicecomitum.

  • 224 Heiser, ‘Richard I and his Appointments’, 14—16.
  • 225 For data and analysis Nick Barratt, ‘The English Revenues of Richard I’, EHR 116 (2001), 635—56, Table 8 and 650.
  • 226 Holt, Northerners, 148, 152—3.
  • 227 Carpenter, ‘Decline of the Curial Sheriff, 3 n. 2, 21 n. 3.
  • 228 Carpenter, ‘Decline of the Curial Sheriff, 9—10.
  • 229 See Lists of Sheriffs for England and Wales.
  • 230 pr 1207, e.g. 81, 82 on Roger de Montbegon; discussion: Holt, Northerners, 170—1.
  • 231 Using financial year (29 September—29 September) figures from table 2 of Barratt, ‘English Revenues of Richard I’ and table 2 of Nick Barratt, ‘The Revenue of King John’, EHR 111 (1996), 835—55. While these tables are not completely comparable (e.g. for escheats), on this axis they appear to be. Inflation needs to be factored in, but doing so makes clear that John’s revenues were powerfully expanding whichever way the data are looked at (Barratt, ‘Revenue of King John’, table 6.2 and discussion). See also Barratt, ‘English Revenues of Richard I’, 653—4.
  • 232 Figures are calculated from tables 2, 4 of Barratt, ‘Revenue of King John’. Using table 5.1, which has only debts associated with the country pipe roll totals, would reduce these figures. Some of these calculated totals differ from Barratt’s since he (legitimately) seems to exclude credit revenue from some of his calculations. Barratt’s comment on these figures, 851.
  • 233 Barratt, ‘Revenue of King John’, 855.
  • 234 Magna Carta, caps. 4 (shrieval answerability for handling of wardships), 9 (non-seisin of capital while a debtor is solvent nor of his sureties if he is solvent), 25 (return to the old farm rates), 28, 30—1

Henry III did not radically diverge from the pattern and well-known changes in 1236 to shrieval tenure pushed this further.235 ‘Cleverly packaged and proclaimed as reforms to meet the aspirations and grievances of county society’, twenty-two of twenty-seven counties were made custodial shrievalties: instead of answering for a fixed farm, sheriffs were to answer for all their profits.236

The effect was to exacerbate the manipulability of sheriffs. Further, the changes glossed over the fundamentally extractive nature of the shrieval office by appealing to good behaviour. But the longer-term problem was structural: on weaker men heavier demands were being placed. The best recent evaluation is that by 1250/1 counties were expected to produce 16.4 per cent more than in 1241/2 and a further 5.3 per cent by 1256/7 (to ?4,689). The increase lay overwhelmingly in the incremental profit demanded of the sheriff outside the county farm’s income. Here the increase was 75 per cent between 1241/2 and 1256/7.237

Such a commitment to royal fiscality did not preclude good intentions. On 7 October 1250 Henry III famously spoke at the Exchequer to ‘all the sheriffs of England then in post’. The sheriffs were to maintain the liberties of Holy Church, those of wards, orphans, and widows and ‘bring them swift justice’. They were to deal with blasphemers and not distrain peasants for their solvent masters’ debts. They should ‘diligently and rightly inquire into how the magnates conduct themselves towards their men [. . .] and correct their transgressions in so far as they can’. If they ‘cannot fully correct them, then they should bring these same transgressions before the lord king’. They were to shop short-weighting merchants to the King. They were ‘not to sell on the right to hear complaints in hundreds, wapentakes or other bailiwicks unless it is to someone who will treat the people with justice’.238 Other requirements stipulated the terms on which they hold pleas. There was no explicit mention of the fiscal aspects of their job. The attention given to other matters is very different from the priorities attended to at the Exchequer, making the choice of location symbolic as well as practical. Six years later the picture was a very different one when Henry again spoke at the Exchequer. This time it was in reaction to sheriffs and accountants failing to appear at the Michaelmas 1256 account.239 The object of this second royal intervention was simple fiscal accountability. Those who do not appear are to be fined ?5 daily up to five days when the fine will be ‘ad voluntatem domini regis’. All elevated talk has evaporated.

  • (restrictions on sheriffs’ exactions), 45 (demand for local men as sheriffs), 48 (order for investigation into evil customs of sheriffs and other officials), ed. in Holt, Magna Carta, App. 6.
  • 235 Stacey, Politics, Policy, and Finance, 52—66; Carpenter, ‘Decline of the Curial Sheriff7, passim.
  • 236 Carpenter, ‘Decline of the Curial Sheriff7, 17. See Mabel H. Mills, ‘Experiments in Exchequer Procedure, 1200—1232’, TRHS 4th ser. 8 (1925), 151—70; Mills, ‘Reforms at the Exchequer, 1232— 1242’, TRHS 4th ser. 10 (1927), 111—33; Cassidy, Adventus Vicecomitum’; Cassidy, ‘Bad Sheriffs’.
  • 237 Using figures in Richard Cassidy, ‘The 1259 Pipe Roll’, 2 vols. (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2012), i. 104—6. I am very grateful to him for discussion and a copy of this very important thesis. He is preparing an edition for the Pipe Roll Society.
  • 238 Edn. in Michael Clanchy, ‘Did Henry III Have a Policy?’, History 53 (1968), 203—16 at 216.
  • 239 D. A. Carpenter, ‘Matthew Paris and Henry III’s Speech at the Exchequer in October 1256’, in his Reign of Henry III, 137—50, printing the text and Paris’s account at 149—50.

It would be easy to be censorious about the crown’s failure to balance the need for equitable and fiscally successful officers. The crown did express a concern with sheriffs’ behaviour, but that expression was intermittent, hampered by John and Henry’s underlying, ongoing inability to modify their financial needs. Like his father, Henry was forced to do so in 1258—66 by a baronial and knightly uprising.

The baronial council’s sheriff’s oath of October 1258 demonstrates the centrality of shrieval equity to thirteenth-century politics.[16] The 1258 oath contrasts sharply with the Exchequer sheriff’s oath as can be reconstructed for the twelfth century. This seems only to have concerned his thorough investigation of debts due to the king and his own claim that he had accounted correctly.[17] It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the 1258 change may have owed something to the manorial treatises’ expectations of those officers’ conduct (pp. 76—80). Extant in French, but issued in Latin and English too, the oath is very long. Limitations and restrictions on the hospitality he could expect, ceilings on the size of his entourage, stipulations on the quality of these men, bans on the sub-farming of jurisdictions, warnings of punishment to those making illegal exactions, bans on bribes, instructions that only reasonable expenses will be met, and a strict one-year limit on terms of office: all these are set out in the letter that was to be sent out to all counties and read out by their sheriffs (presumably at the county court). The 1258 oath is the serious assertion of the concerns articulated in 1236 when the great curial sheriffs were removed and more manipulable sheriffs installed.[18] It went alongside widespread dismissals of sheriffs and Exchequer officials and a principled and applied attempt to marry solvency with equity.[19] As custodians the 1258/9 sheriffs had no profit target but had to account for all their ‘workings’ in submitted particule.[20] When ‘farmer’ sheriffs were reintroduced in 1259/60 their targets were (somewhat) reduced to 80 per cent of those of 1256/7.[21]

The dynasty’s longstanding problem in taking both money and conduct seriously with respect to sheriffs is clearly brought out in the 1264 dossier presented to Louis IX. (On Edward I’s attitude see pp. 122, 126, 128, 133.) In January Louis was trying to settle the dispute between the barons and his brother-in-law. The barons were absolutely clear about the structure of the problem with respect to sheriffs. The pre-1258 shift from ‘a fixed and moderate farm’ to ‘recently imposed permanent increments’ ‘with ongoing increases’ was a major complaint.[22] The attempt to make sheriffs bureaucratic publicans was also alleged to have failed since ‘the sheriffs and bailiffs, seeking their profit at the expense of others, each schemed to outbid the other, and thus, not being able to pay otherwise the payments thus imposed and so frequently increased, of necessity had recourse to illicit extortions and rapine, thus reducing the whole land to an incredible state of poverty’.247 The problem was precisely that which Aquinas advised the Duchess of Brabant would probably result from the sale of offices when ‘those are offered for sale at so great a price that the holders cannot recoup the cost without damage to your subjects’.248 In England, there was no means of redressing such abuses ‘on account of the protectors whom the oppressors had at court as partners in their ill-gotten gains’. Furthermore, the sheriffs were not ‘prudent and knowledgeable knights of the counties, as was of old custom, but men coming from far away and utter strangers in the counties’.249 The complaints parallel many from Magna Carta.250 As a whole, the heading of the 1264 dossier effectively summarizes a century’s worth of resentment about sheriffs. It was precisely responsiveness to these aspects of shrieval behaviour that had been fudged in 1170 and abandoned in the county inquisitio of 1194. The utile created more pressing demands than the honestum for Richard on his return from the Crusade. John had started to take them seriously in 1213, but too late.251 Any reformist dabbling of Henry’s was overwhelmed by his need for money, latterly connected with his Sicilian crusading ambitions for his son Edmund.

Two thirteenth-century rebellions forced the Angevins to express a less faltering interest in shrieval conduct writ large. They had failed to do so themselves almost by definition since the fiscal stress of shrieval accountability at least between 1194 and 1258 precluded it. Further, it was attempts to tweak the sheriff’s office so that it was more of a professional and less or a curial position that ended up making it more offensive between 1236 and 1274 (when Edward returned to England).252 As a less powerful local figure he was less responsive to local concerns and more wholly accountable to those of the Exchequer. Increased fiscal liability, reduced social standing, plus possibly worsened financial wherewithal sustained or exacerbated sheriffs’ interest in extracting money from the counties.253 The problem with sheriffs’ accountability was that its stress on the fiscally utile undercut county concern about the honestum. Some comparisons with Continental European ‘shrieval’ officers sheds further light on England and enables reflection on wider interpretative frameworks.

  • 137—50, arguing that C precedes B, where C is the baronial summary of events and royal wrongs that B continues, going on to to rebut the king’s grievances as stated in A.
  • 247 DBM#37c at 275, cap. 6, eds.’ trans.
  • 248 ‘De regimine judaeorum’ in Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P. dEntreves, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1974), 88.
  • 249 dBm#37c cap. 6 at 275—7, eds.’ trans. 250 See n. 234.
  • 251 See the Barnwell Chronicler’s account, Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria, ed. William Stubbs, RS, 2 vols. (London, 1872—3), ii. 214—15; Holt, Magna Carta, 212—16.
  • 252 For Edward’s 1274—8 reforms, Maddicott, ‘Edward I and the Lessons of Baronial Reform’, 19-28.
  • 253 e.g. the May 1258 Petitio Baronum, DBM #3 at 82, cap. 16; Ridgeway, ‘Mid-Thirteenth Century Reformers’, 61.

  • [1] Holt, Northerners, 152-6, 228-33; Holt, Magna Carta, 61-7, 212-15; Maddicott, ‘MagnaCarta and the Local Community’; Cassidy, ‘William Heron’; Hershey, ‘Success or Failure’.
  • [2] Roger of Howden, Gesta regis Henrici secundi Benedicti abbatis, ed. William Stubbs, RS, 2 vols.(London, 1867), i. 4—5; Gervase of Canterbury, The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury, ed.W. Stubbs, RS, 2 vols. (1879—80), i. 216—19, quote at 216.
  • [3] Boorman, ‘The Sheriffs of Henry II’. Complementary comment in Amt, ‘Reputation of theSheriff.
  • [4] Boorman, ‘The Sheriffs of Henry II’, 274.
  • [5] Boorman, ‘The Sheriffs of Henry II’, 258-67.
  • [6] Text of the headings for investigation in Select Charters and Other Illustrations of EnglishConstitutional History from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward I, ed. W. Stubbs, rev. H. W.C. Davis, 9th edn. (Oxford, 1913), 175-8. An extant set of instructions for those witnessing atthe inquests is in The Letters and Charters of Gilbert Foliot: Abbot of Gloucester (1139—:8), Bishop ofHereford (1148—63), and London (1163—87), ed. Z. N. Brooke, Adrian Morey, and C. N. L. Brooke(Cambridge, 1967), App. VII #5 at 523^.
  • [7] 208 Roger of Howden, Chronica, iii. 262-7, and repr. Select Charters, 252-7 at cap. 25, also Rogerof Howden, Chronica, iii. 241. John Gillingham, Richard I (New Haven, Conn., 1999), 276, argues
  • [8] Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, i. 280 (§3.26).
  • [9] Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, i. 282 (§3.26). See Gillingham, ‘Historian as Judge’, 1275—87.
  • [10] Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, i. 102 (§2.1).
  • [11] Note, however, the remarks of Ralph Diceto stressing Henry’s attempts to find good judges tolook into shrieval actions in 1179, Radulfi de Diceto Decani Londoniensis, Opera historica, ed. WilliamStubbs, RS, 2 vols. (London, 1876), i. 434—5.
  • [12] 22° Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. Joseph Stevenson, RS (London 1875), 93.Further, Gillingham, Richard I, 332, 342^. David Carpenter argues convincingly that Coggeshall’saccount of 1195—1200 was written in 1201: D. A. Carpenter, ‘Abbot Ralph of Coggeshall’s Account ofthe Last Years of King Richard and the First Years of King John’, EHR 113 (1998), 1210—30.
  • [13] Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, i. 283 (§3.26).
  • [14] Newburgh, Historia, in Chronicles, i. 283 (§3.26), echoing 2 Chron. 10: 11.
  • [15] 223 For the following changes see Heiser, ‘Richard I and his Appointments’; Carpenter, ‘Declineof the Curial Sheriff’; Holt, Northerners, 152—7; Brian E. Harris, King John and the Sheriffs’ Farms’, EHR 79 (1964), 532^2; Robert C. Stacey, Politics, Policy, and Finance under Henry III1216—1245
  • [16] Printed, DBM #8. Copies: BL Cotton MS Vespasian E. III, fos. 85v—86 (= Annales monas-tici, i. 453—55 from Burton; CPR 1247—1258, 655—6); BL Add. MS 15668 fo. 32r; variant TNA E159/32 m. 2. See Brand, Kings, Barons and Justices, 25—6; Lachaud, Ethique du pouvoir, 486—9. Cf.Konstitutionen Friedrichs II. fur das Konigreich sizilien, caps. 1.62.1, 1.62.2.
  • [17] 241 See p. 108 and DS, I.v, II.xii—xiii, xiii, xvii, xxviii, at 21, 106—7, 109, 113—14, 124, 126.
  • [18] Paris, Chronica majora, iii. 363.
  • [19] See Provisions of Oxford (DBM #5, esp. caps. 16, 17), order for inquiries (#6), Provisions ofWestminster (#11, cap. 4, #12, caps. 5, 7, 9, 20), provisions for inquiries (#13), 1264 justificationsto Louis IX (#37b, caps. 7—8, 10—12); Paris, Chronica majora, v. 719—20, vi. 397—400. Cassidy, 1259Pipe Roll, i. 127—8 is more reserved.
  • [20] Jobson, ‘John of Crakehall’, 93—4; Cassidy, ‘1259 Pipe Roll’, i. 92—103; Cassidy, ‘Bad Sheriffs’.
  • [21] Using Cassidy, ‘1259 Pipe Roll’, i. 110—12. See also his ‘Bad Sheriffs’.
  • [22] DBM#37c at 274, cap. 6. For a convincing argument about the correct ordering of DBM#37a—bsee Robert C. Stacey, ‘Crusades, Crusaders, and the Baronial Gravamina of 1263—1264’, TCE 3 (1991),
 
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