Aquinas’s theory of perception: an analytic reconstruction - Aquinas’s theory of perception: an analytic reconstruction -

The Lacuna in Aristotle’s De Anima Phantasm and the Vis Cogitativa Setting the Problem History and Context Perception Theory and Analytic Philosophy Aquinas and Teleology: A Naturalist Reconstruction From Ontology to the Philosophy of Mind Aquinas as Dependent upon yet Distinct from Aristotle Neo-scholastic Philosophy and Recent Work in Perception Theory Recent Work in Aristotelian Perception Theory Aquinas on Intentionality Historical and Contemporary Antecedents Intentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind ‘Intentional’ is Not Identical with or Reducible to ‘Spiritual’The Principles of Intentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind Principle A. An act can only he an act of some ‘X’ or other that has a potency Principle B. A potency as such can only he affected by some ‘X’ or other that is in act Principle C. A potency of any ‘X’ must be specified or properly disposed in order to receive any given act Principle D. An act remains ‘specifically’ the same but it may have different embodiments or exemplifications in different potencies The Act/Object Distinction A Brief Interlude Principle E. A form is, by definition, an act Principle F. An ‘X’ is knowable only insofar as it is in act Aquinas and Empiricism From Aquinas to Brentano and Beyond Aquinas as an Empiricist Reid, Gibson, and Aquinas: Epistemological Naturalism Revisited Direct Realism in Aquinas Aquinas and Causal Theories of Perception Haldane and Putnam on Formal Cause: Connections with Aquinas Intentionality and the Curse of Representationalism The Return to Form From Ontology to the Philosophy of Mind Aquinas on Truth Epistemological Dispositions Causal Powers and the Human Person The Empedoclean Principle Aquinas’s Modification of ‘Like Knows Like’On Potency and Act Conceptual Dispositions A Revised Set of Terms Dispositions and Substantial Form The Importance of Dispositions On Innate Cognitive Structures Against Physicalism Beyond Physicalism The Intensity of a Perfection Perceptual Dispositions The Need for the Intellectus Agens Objects and Faculties Teleology in Sensation The Priority of Object Teleology and Metaphysics Objects of Sensation The Directly Perceivable and the Indirectly Perceivable Sensation as a Generic Term Non-veridical Awareness The Common Sensible and the Incidental Object of Sense Causality of ‘Kind’ and Causality of ‘Mode’Organ and Faculty Organ as Vehicle The Incidental Object of Sense and the Vis Cogitativa Preconditions of Visual Awareness. Object and Medium Sight and Its Object Colour as Essentially Visible Colour and Sight The Need for a Medium The Necessary Conditions for Perception. A Triadic Relation The Triadic Relation The Intentional Awareness in Sensation The Rose-Coloured Glasses Objection The Causal Aspects of Aquinas’s Theory of Perception Two Senses of Intentio: From the Active Power to the Cognitive Faculty The Bounds of Sense Direct Realism in Aquinas’s Theory of Sensation The Sensus Communis. The First of the Internal Sense Faculties Cognitive Possibility and the Internal Senses in Thomas The Four Internal Senses Aquinas versus Avicenna The Function of the Sensus Communis The Sensus Communis as the Root of Sensation The Object of the Sensus Communis is not the Common Sensible The Power of Reflection The Sensus Communis and the Phantasm The Sensus Communis and the External Sensorium The Three Ventricles The Ventricle System and Aquinas’s Cognitive Theory of Inner Sense The Imagination and Phantasia. A Historical Muddle Weinberg and Stump on Aquinas and Phantasia Wolfson on the Internal Senses in Medieval Philosophy John of St Thomas on Distinctions in Aquinas The Mental Act of the Vis Imaginativa Imagination and Early Modern Philosophy Imagination as ‘the Master of Falsity’The Vis Cogitativa. On Perceiving the Individual The Awareness of Individuals The Awareness of the Individual as of a Kind Primary Substance and the Vis Cogitativa Moving Beyond Empiricism: Intentiones Non Sensatae Seven Summary Propositions Ontological Realism The Sense Memory Back to Aristotle’s De Anima The Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 1 Direct Realism Redux The Sense Data or ‘Qualia’ Position The Sensus Communis and the External Sensorium Aquinas’s Texts on Phantasm The Image Account: Position A The Image Account: Position B Aquinas and the Concept of ‘Imago’The Three Categories of Similitudo The Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 2 Phantasms Phantasm-1 Phantasm-2 Reid Redux The Phantasm and the Vis Cogitativa Phantasm-3 The Vis Cogitativa and Primary Substance Phantasm-3 and the Intellectus Agens Intellectus Agens as an Efficient Cause Concluding Observations: Eight Summary Propositions Concluding Propositions: The Mental Act A Final Observation Select Bibliography