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Aquinas’s theory of perception: an analytic reconstruction
The Lacuna in Aristotle’s De Anima
Phantasm and the Vis Cogitativa
Setting the Problem History and Context
Perception Theory and Analytic Philosophy
Aquinas and Teleology: A Naturalist Reconstruction
From Ontology to the Philosophy of Mind
Aquinas as Dependent upon yet Distinct from Aristotle
Neo-scholastic Philosophy and Recent Work in Perception Theory
Recent Work in Aristotelian Perception Theory
Aquinas on Intentionality
Historical and Contemporary Antecedents
Intentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind
‘Intentional’ is Not Identical with or Reducible to ‘Spiritual’
The Principles of Intentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind
Principle A. An act can only he an act of some ‘X’ or other that has a potency
Principle B. A potency as such can only he affected by some ‘X’ or other that is in act
Principle C. A potency of any ‘X’ must be specified or properly disposed in order to receive any given act
Principle D. An act remains ‘specifically’ the same but it may have different embodiments or exemplifications in different potencies
The Act/Object Distinction
A Brief Interlude
Principle E. A form is, by definition, an act
Principle F. An ‘X’ is knowable only insofar as it is in act
Aquinas and Empiricism From Aquinas to Brentano and Beyond
Aquinas as an Empiricist
Reid, Gibson, and Aquinas: Epistemological Naturalism Revisited
Direct Realism in Aquinas
Aquinas and Causal Theories of Perception
Haldane and Putnam on Formal Cause: Connections with Aquinas
Intentionality and the Curse of Representationalism
The Return to Form
From Ontology to the Philosophy of Mind
Aquinas on Truth
Epistemological Dispositions Causal Powers and the Human Person
The Empedoclean Principle
Aquinas’s Modification of ‘Like Knows Like’
On Potency and Act
Conceptual Dispositions
A Revised Set of Terms
Dispositions and Substantial Form
The Importance of Dispositions
On Innate Cognitive Structures
Against Physicalism
Beyond Physicalism
The Intensity of a Perfection
Perceptual Dispositions
The Need for the Intellectus Agens
Objects and Faculties Teleology in Sensation
The Priority of Object
Teleology and Metaphysics
Objects of Sensation
The Directly Perceivable and the Indirectly Perceivable
Sensation as a Generic Term
Non-veridical Awareness
The Common Sensible and the Incidental Object of Sense
Causality of ‘Kind’ and Causality of ‘Mode’
Organ and Faculty
Organ as Vehicle
The Incidental Object of Sense and the Vis Cogitativa
Preconditions of Visual Awareness. Object and Medium
Sight and Its Object
Colour as Essentially Visible
Colour and Sight
The Need for a Medium
The Necessary Conditions for Perception. A Triadic Relation
The Triadic Relation
The Intentional Awareness in Sensation
The Rose-Coloured Glasses Objection
The Causal Aspects of Aquinas’s Theory of Perception
Two Senses of Intentio: From the Active Power to the Cognitive Faculty
The Bounds of Sense
Direct Realism in Aquinas’s Theory of Sensation
The Sensus Communis. The First of the Internal Sense Faculties
Cognitive Possibility and the Internal Senses in Thomas
The Four Internal Senses
Aquinas versus Avicenna
The Function of the Sensus Communis
The Sensus Communis as the Root of Sensation
The Object of the Sensus Communis is not the Common Sensible
The Power of Reflection
The Sensus Communis and the Phantasm
The Sensus Communis and the External Sensorium
The Three Ventricles
The Ventricle System and Aquinas’s Cognitive Theory of Inner Sense
The Imagination and Phantasia. A Historical Muddle
Weinberg and Stump on Aquinas and Phantasia
Wolfson on the Internal Senses in Medieval Philosophy
John of St Thomas on Distinctions in Aquinas
The Mental Act of the Vis Imaginativa
Imagination and Early Modern Philosophy
Imagination as ‘the Master of Falsity’
The Vis Cogitativa. On Perceiving the Individual
The Awareness of Individuals
The Awareness of the Individual as of a Kind
Primary Substance and the Vis Cogitativa
Moving Beyond Empiricism: Intentiones Non Sensatae
Seven Summary Propositions
Ontological Realism
The Sense Memory
Back to Aristotle’s De Anima
The Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 1
Direct Realism Redux
The Sense Data or ‘Qualia’ Position
The Sensus Communis and the External Sensorium
Aquinas’s Texts on Phantasm
The Image Account: Position A
The Image Account: Position B
Aquinas and the Concept of ‘Imago’
The Three Categories of Similitudo
The Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 2
Phantasms
Phantasm-1
Phantasm-2
Reid Redux
The Phantasm and the Vis Cogitativa
Phantasm-3
The Vis Cogitativa and Primary Substance
Phantasm-3 and the Intellectus Agens
Intellectus Agens as an Efficient Cause
Concluding Observations: Eight Summary Propositions
Concluding Propositions: The Mental Act
A Final Observation
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