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Aquinas’s theory of perception: an analytic reconstruction


The Lacuna in Aristotle’s De AnimaPhantasm and the Vis CogitativaSetting the Problem History and ContextPerception Theory and Analytic PhilosophyAquinas and Teleology: A Naturalist ReconstructionFrom Ontology to the Philosophy of MindAquinas as Dependent upon yet Distinct from AristotleNeo-scholastic Philosophy and Recent Work in Perception TheoryRecent Work in Aristotelian Perception TheoryAquinas on IntentionalityHistorical and Contemporary AntecedentsIntentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind‘Intentional’ is Not Identical with or Reducible to ‘Spiritual’The Principles of Intentionality in Aquinas’s Philosophy of MindPrinciple A. An act can only he an act of some ‘X’ or other that has a potencyPrinciple B. A potency as such can only he affected by some ‘X’ or other that is in actPrinciple C. A potency of any ‘X’ must be specified or properly disposed in order to receive any given actPrinciple D. An act remains ‘specifically’ the same but it may have different embodiments or exemplifications in different potenciesThe Act/Object DistinctionA Brief InterludePrinciple E. A form is, by definition, an actPrinciple F. An ‘X’ is knowable only insofar as it is in actAquinas and Empiricism From Aquinas to Brentano and BeyondAquinas as an EmpiricistReid, Gibson, and Aquinas: Epistemological Naturalism RevisitedDirect Realism in AquinasAquinas and Causal Theories of PerceptionHaldane and Putnam on Formal Cause: Connections with AquinasIntentionality and the Curse of RepresentationalismThe Return to FormFrom Ontology to the Philosophy of MindAquinas on TruthEpistemological Dispositions Causal Powers and the Human PersonThe Empedoclean PrincipleAquinas’s Modification of ‘Like Knows Like’On Potency and ActConceptual DispositionsA Revised Set of TermsDispositions and Substantial FormThe Importance of DispositionsOn Innate Cognitive StructuresAgainst PhysicalismBeyond PhysicalismThe Intensity of a PerfectionPerceptual DispositionsThe Need for the Intellectus AgensObjects and Faculties Teleology in SensationThe Priority of ObjectTeleology and MetaphysicsObjects of SensationThe Directly Perceivable and the Indirectly PerceivableSensation as a Generic TermNon-veridical AwarenessThe Common Sensible and the Incidental Object of SenseCausality of ‘Kind’ and Causality of ‘Mode’Organ and FacultyOrgan as VehicleThe Incidental Object of Sense and the Vis CogitativaPreconditions of Visual Awareness. Object and MediumSight and Its ObjectColour as Essentially VisibleColour and SightThe Need for a MediumThe Necessary Conditions for Perception. A Triadic RelationThe Triadic RelationThe Intentional Awareness in SensationThe Rose-Coloured Glasses ObjectionThe Causal Aspects of Aquinas’s Theory of PerceptionTwo Senses of Intentio: From the Active Power to the Cognitive FacultyThe Bounds of SenseDirect Realism in Aquinas’s Theory of SensationThe Sensus Communis. The First of the Internal Sense FacultiesCognitive Possibility and the Internal Senses in ThomasThe Four Internal SensesAquinas versus AvicennaThe Function of the Sensus CommunisThe Sensus Communis as the Root of SensationThe Object of the Sensus Communis is not the Common SensibleThe Power of ReflectionThe Sensus Communis and the PhantasmThe Sensus Communis and the External SensoriumThe Three VentriclesThe Ventricle System and Aquinas’s Cognitive Theory of Inner SenseThe Imagination and Phantasia. A Historical MuddleWeinberg and Stump on Aquinas and PhantasiaWolfson on the Internal Senses in Medieval PhilosophyJohn of St Thomas on Distinctions in AquinasThe Mental Act of the Vis ImaginativaImagination and Early Modern PhilosophyImagination as ‘the Master of Falsity’The Vis Cogitativa. On Perceiving the IndividualThe Awareness of IndividualsThe Awareness of the Individual as of a KindPrimary Substance and the Vis CogitativaMoving Beyond Empiricism: Intentiones Non SensataeSeven Summary PropositionsOntological RealismThe Sense MemoryBack to Aristotle’s De AnimaThe Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 1Direct Realism ReduxThe Sense Data or ‘Qualia’ PositionThe Sensus Communis and the External SensoriumAquinas’s Texts on PhantasmThe Image Account: Position AThe Image Account: Position BAquinas and the Concept of ‘Imago’The Three Categories of SimilitudoThe Role of Phantasms in Inner Sense Part 2PhantasmsPhantasm-1Phantasm-2Reid ReduxThe Phantasm and the Vis CogitativaPhantasm-3The Vis Cogitativa and Primary SubstancePhantasm-3 and the Intellectus AgensIntellectus Agens as an Efficient CauseConcluding Observations: Eight Summary PropositionsConcluding Propositions: The Mental ActA Final ObservationSelect Bibliography
 
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