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C. I. Lewis:The A Priori and the Given


Sheffer, Lewis, and the “Logocentric Predicament”Early Work of Sheffer and Lewis (1908-1918)Huntington’s Postulate Theory, Royce, and Absolute PragmatismSheffer’s Dissertation (1908): “Neutral” Logocentric PhilosophyLewis’s Dissertation (1910): “The Given” and LogicSheffer’s Development of Logocentrism (1920-1926)Sheffer’s Approach to “Notational Relativity” (1918-1920)Sheffer on Order-Invariance and the Foundations of Logic (1922)Sheffer on the Unanalyzability of “Implies” (1922)Sheffer Quantifies Over Possible Universes (1922)Sheffer on Lewis Carroll’s Paradox of Implication and “Strange" Logics (1922)Sheffer’s Objection to Linear Notation (1923-1935)NotesStrict Implication and the Pragmatic A PrioriImplication in Russell’s Conception of LogicMaterial vs. “Ordinary” Implication; the Uses of ImplicationMore Russellian PragmatismKnowledge of the Propositional Axioms of PrincipiaRoyce’s Absolute PragmatismToward the Pragmatic A PrioriNotesReferencesAims and Claims of C. I. Lewis’s Conceptual PragmatismC. I. Lewis on the Kantian Solution to the Problem of the A PrioriThe Impossibility of the Kantian SolutionThe Superfluity of the Kantian SolutionThe New Problem of the A PrioriThe Humean ChallengeLewis’s Response to the Humean ChallengeMind and the World Order and Kant’s Third CritiquePluralism and PragmatismConcluding Remarks: C. I. Lewis’s LegacyNotesReferencesC. I. Lewis on the Intersubjective and the Constitution of ObjectivityCartesian and Kantian Skepticism4Lewis’s Analysis of ExperienceMediation by “Activity of Mind”The Pure ConceptNotesReferencesRelocating the Myth of the Given in Lewis and SellarsLewis’s Characterizations of the Given Element in ExperienceKnowledge by Acquaintance? Phenomenalism? Foundationalism ?Sellars on Lewis as Falling Afoul of the Myth of the GivenThe Myth in Relation to Sellars’s Own Views on Sensible QualitiesNotesReferencesSpontaneity, Sensation, and the Myth of the GivenWatkins’s and McDowell’s Characterizations of the MythWatkins’s Objection to McDowellSpontaneity, Self-Determination, and Being Responsive to ReasonsThe Rational Significance of SensationsConclusionNotesReferencesGoodman and the Given: What Goodman Inherits From C. I. LewisWhat Does Goodman Inherit From Lewis?1Appearance and RealityExplaining Our Knowledge as We Possess ItUnderstanding the Relation of Language to What It DescribesIntrinsic Repeatability of Qualia in QuestionConclusionNotesReferencesC. I. Lewis: The Red and the GoodEmpirical KnowledgeThe GivenTheory of ValueImmediate ValueObjective ValueAesthetic ValueNotesReferencesList of Contributors and Editors
 
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