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After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia

After Ethnic Conflict: Why Look at Post-conflict Recovery?Introduction: Post-conflict Ethnically Divided SocietiesMapping the Field: Ethnicity, Violence, InstitutionsWhat Happens at the Policy Level?Approaches and Concepts: Institutions and ElitesWhy Institutions Matter in Post-Conflict StatesPolitical Elites and Ethnic AccommodationVoting patternsImplementation of adopted policiesDe-ethnicisation of policiesMethodology of ResearchPolicy Case SelectionData Collection and AvailabilityBook StructureExplaining Ethnic AccommodationIntroductionActors: Political ElitesDefining Political ElitesUnity, Continuity and Ethnic IdentityContext: Post-conflict EthnicityInstitutional Framework: Post-conflict InstitutionsPower-sharing mechanismsInformal practicesExternal Actors and InfluencesII Historical and InstitutionalBosnia 1991–1996: From Communism to Ethnic ConflictIntroductionYugoslav Communism (1974–1990): Ethnicity and IdeologyPower-sharing Institutions in YugoslaviaCritical Decisions: Pre-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990–1995)Bosnia 1991–1995: Break-up of InstitutionsPost-conflict Power-sharing: The Dayton AgreementDayton Bosnia – Institutions and Policy-makingBosnia's Track Record after DaytonMacedonia 1991–2001: Simmering Ethnic TensionsIntroductionYugoslav Communism (1974–1990)Effects of Federal Power-sharingMacedonia 1991–2001: Towards Democracy and SovereigntyOhrid Framework Agreement – Bringing Power-sharing BackMacedonia's Track Record after 2001III What Makes Post-conflict Politics WorkMilitary Reform in Bosnia: A Single Joint ArmyIntroductionSecurity and Politics after DaytonThe Post-conflict Political ArenaMilitary Reform in Post-Dayton BosniaCase 1: Establishing State-level Ministry of Defence (2002–2003)Explaining Success in Establishing State Military CapacityCase 2: A Single Army (2004–2006)Conclusion: Explaining the Success of Military ReformDecentralisation in Macedonia: Designing Municipal Maps and FundsIntroductionDecentralisation Policy in MacedoniaHistorical Legacies in DecentralisationDrivers of Decentralisation ReformCase 1: Empowering Local Government 2002–2004From Contestation towards AccommodationCase 2: Increasing Funds for Municipalities (2005–2009)From Accommodation towards De-ethnicisationIV Continuing Challenges: Persisting Ethnic tensionsPolice Reform in Bosnia: Ethnicity above EfficiencyIntroductionPolice in Post-conflict Security in Bosnia and HerzegovinaPolice Reform after the ConflictCase 1: Ashdown Reform Proposal (2004–2005)Why the Ashdown Proposal FailedCase 2: Lajčak's Reform Proposal (2007–2008)A Second Failure: Lajčak's ProposalUnderstanding Persisting Ethnic ResistanceMinority Education in Macedonia: Recurring Ethnic TensionsIntroductionMinority Education Policy in MacedoniaHistorical Legacies in Minority Education PolicyCase 1: Tetovo University – Establishment and LegalisationBefore 2001After 2001Unintended Effects from Education ReformCase 2: Compulsory Macedonian in Primary SchoolsGovernment CrisisUnderstanding Persistent EthnicisationConclusionsPost-conflict Bosnia and MacedoniaPower-sharing ArrangementsBeyond Formal InstitutionsExternal ActorsLarger PerspectivesOn Ethnic AccommodationMacedonia and Bosnia: Prospects and ChallengesBibliographyArticles, Chapters and BooksOfficial Documents and Reports:Media SourcesInterviews
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