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Home arrow Political science arrow After Ethnic Conflict : Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia

A short course of lectures
«After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia»

From Accommodation towards De-ethnicisationMacedonia 1991–2001: Towards Democracy and SovereigntyMinority Education Policy in MacedoniaCase 1: Establishing State-level Ministry of Defence (2002–2003)Macedonia 1991–2001: Simmering Ethnic TensionsMedia SourcesDe-ethnicisation of policiesHistorical Legacies in DecentralisationIII What Makes Post-conflict Politics WorkImplementation of adopted policiesApproaches and Concepts: Institutions and ElitesBefore 2001Decentralisation in Macedonia: Designing Municipal Maps and FundsPolice in Post-conflict Security in Bosnia and HerzegovinaDecentralisation Policy in MacedoniaYugoslav Communism (1974–1990)Unintended Effects from Education ReformPolice Reform in Bosnia: Ethnicity above EfficiencyOn Ethnic AccommodationHistorical Legacies in Minority Education PolicyBook StructureBibliographyExplaining Success in Establishing State Military CapacityCase 2: Lajčak's Reform Proposal (2007–2008)External ActorsIV Continuing Challenges: Persisting Ethnic tensionsBeyond Formal InstitutionsOhrid Framework Agreement – Bringing Power-sharing BackDefining Political ElitesOfficial Documents and Reports:External Actors and InfluencesInstitutional Framework: Post-conflict InstitutionsWhat Happens at the Policy Level?From Contestation towards AccommodationBosnia 1991–1995: Break-up of InstitutionsCase 2: Compulsory Macedonian in Primary SchoolsCase 1: Tetovo University – Establishment and LegalisationContext: Post-conflict EthnicityPolicy Case SelectionA Second Failure: Lajčak's ProposalBosnia's Track Record after DaytonSecurity and Politics after DaytonUnderstanding Persisting Ethnic ResistanceInterviewsMilitary Reform in Bosnia: A Single Joint ArmyEffects of Federal Power-sharingThe Post-conflict Political ArenaWhy Institutions Matter in Post-Conflict StatesBosnia 1991–1996: From Communism to Ethnic ConflictCase 1: Ashdown Reform Proposal (2004–2005)Larger PerspectivesMacedonia and Bosnia: Prospects and ChallengesAfter 2001Power-sharing Institutions in YugoslaviaMapping the Field: Ethnicity, Violence, InstitutionsDrivers of Decentralisation ReformCritical Decisions: Pre-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990–1995)Understanding Persistent EthnicisationArticles, Chapters and BooksPolice Reform after the ConflictActors: Political ElitesMilitary Reform in Post-Dayton BosniaCase 2: Increasing Funds for Municipalities (2005–2009)Government CrisisDayton Bosnia – Institutions and Policy-makingInformal practicesYugoslav Communism (1974–1990): Ethnicity and IdeologyExplaining Ethnic AccommodationCase 1: Empowering Local Government 2002–2004II Historical and InstitutionalPost-conflict Power-sharing: The Dayton AgreementMinority Education in Macedonia: Recurring Ethnic TensionsPolitical Elites and Ethnic AccommodationUnity, Continuity and Ethnic IdentityAfter Ethnic Conflict: Why Look at Post-conflict Recovery?Why the Ashdown Proposal FailedPower-sharing mechanismsMacedonia's Track Record after 2001Voting patternsMethodology of ResearchData Collection and AvailabilityCase 2: A Single Army (2004–2006)
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