Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction - Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction -

Preface About This.Book Acknowledgements Epistemology of Time Theoretical Time is Not Folk Time A World Without Time Is Not a World We Understand Folk Time Objects and Events Temporal Properties and Relations Independent Time Substantivalism Relationalism Objection: A Frozen World is Possible Objection: We Can Have Indirect Knowledge of Substantival Time Frozen Worlds Objection 1: We Do Not Know There is a Global Freeze (Other Explanations Available)Response: Inference to the Simplest Explanation Objection 2: Time in an Unchanging World Still Needs the World Objection 3: Shoemaker-Style Arguments Do Not Suit Lived Experience Scepticism about Time Kant’s Antinomies Thesis: Time Has a Beginning Antithesis: Time Has No Beginning Elapsing Time and Temporal Passage Idealism or Scepticism?Sextus Empiricus Scepticism about Change Objection: This Argument Is Against the Reality of Change Against Time’s Divisibility Or Indivisibility The Argument Against Time As Past, Present, and Future Objection 1: We Cannot Suspend Beliefs About Time Objection 2: Scepticism Depends On One’s Metaphysics of Time Knowledge of Time Through Perception The Causal Truth-Maker Principle Temporal Order Cannot Cause Belief Suggested Readings Metaphysics of Time I: Time and Change McTaggart’s Paradox The Two Main Concepts of Events in Time A-series B-series McTaggart’s Argument Solution 1: A-Series Positions Are Determined By A-Series-B-Series Positions Indexicals Objection: The B-Series is Not Enough For Change Objection 1: The B-Series Does Not Provide Real B-Series-a-Series Positions Objection 2: The B-Series Does Not Capture Real Change Motion and A-Series Change Indexical A-Series Change Objection: This is Not Real Change Analogy Between a Fundamental A-Series and Absolute Space Tense Theory Temporal Passage The Unique and Real Present Real Present and Temporal Passage Real Present and the Real A-Series Time Defined By Events and a Static A-Series Kinds of Tense Theory Presentism Presentism is Intuitive Presentism Solves Mctaggart’s Paradox Objection 1: No Real A-Series Objection 2: Presentism Lacks Truth-Makers For Truths About the Past Objection 3: Presentism and Physics Eternalism The “moving Spotlight”Objection: Events Must Change The Growing Block Theory Tenseless Theory Change, Static and Dynamic R-Theory Metaphysics of Time II: Change and Persistence in Objects Concrete Particulars An Object Exists in Space Spatial Parts An Object Exists in Time Endurantism: An Object is at Each Time it Persists Being Wholly Present Objection: Endurantism Has No Spatial Analogue The Persistence of Objects Through Change Hinchliff’s Four Conditions of Change Objection: There is No Analogy For Specific Properties Leibniz’ Law Numerical Identity Relations-to-Times: Temporal Location is Not a Property Adverbialism The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics Intrinsic Properties Temporary Intrinsic Properties Endurantism Relations-to-Times and Adverbialism Temporal Parts: A Different Object is at Each Time An Object Persists Objection: Objects Are Continuants Response 1: An Object Can Have Infinite Parts Response 2: This Objection Requires Continuous Time Perdurance: The Ordinary Object is the Persisting Object Exdurantism (Stage Theory): The Ordinary Object is the Object at Each Time Intuitions About Persistence Notes Suggested Readings Philosophy of Physics and Time Physics Without Time Substantivalism and Early Physics Relative Simultaneity Relative Frames Relative is Neither Private Nor Subjective Relative Time The Constant Speed of Light Inertial Frames Possible Absolute Simultaneity and Temporal Order Minkowski Space-Time Relative Temporal Order STR and Relative Temporal Order Objection: There is Absolute Temporal Order in Str Response: Not All Earlier Events Are Causally Related to Later Events Causal Order and Perceived Temporal Order Causal Order and the Intuition of Temporal Order Backwards Causation Entropy Bardon’s Entropy Account of Perception Objections to Relative Time Bergson’s Objections to Relative Time Objection 1: Real Time is Continuous Objection 2: Relative Time is Merely Imagined Time Objection 3: Experienced Time Requires Absolute Time Tense Theory Objections Tense Theory and Temporal Order Tense Theory and Relative Simultaneity Presentism Privileged Frames of Reference The Ether Objection: We Cannot Detect the Privileged Frame Tenseless Theory Suggested Readings Philosophy of Language and Time Time and the Linguistic Turn Metaphors of Temporal Passage Objection: Metaphors of Passage Have Meaning Merely Apparent Metaphysical Meaning Modifiers Temporal Properties of Linguistic Expressions Tokens Propositions Truth-Makers and Facts Truth-Makers For Propositional Variation in Truth-Value Objection: Propositions Are Abstract and Not in Time Truth-Makers and Tokens Implicit Context Token-Reflexive Truth-Conditions Linguistic Responses to Mctaggart’s Paradox Irreducible Tense Tense Language and Tokens Objection 1: Propositions Cannot Change Truth-Value in Tense Theory Response: Tense is a Modifier Objection 2: Tense Tokens Are Not Merely Linguistic Entities Response: The Tokens Only Undermine Mere Linguistic Solutions Tenseless Facts Objection: Some Tensed Propositions Cannot Have Tokens Response: Date-Reflexive Theory Tense Logic Logical Operators and Truth-Value Tense Logic and the Metaphysics of Time Objection 1: We Talk as if Tense Are Properties, Locations, or Facts Objection 2: Tense Logic Assumes Presentism Objection 3: Tense Operators Do Not Need An Unreal Past and Future Philosophy of Mind and Time Time is Only in the Mind: St Augustine’s Argument Objection 1: Time is Unreal Not Mind-Dependent Objection 2: The Past and Future Are Real Objection 2: The Present Can Have Duration Tense Theory Tenseless Theory Temporal Experience The Appearance of Time in the World Time We Do Not Experience Time We Do Experience Objection: Time-Lag Response: Apparent Time Apparent Reality Phenomenological Presentism Appearance of Actual Times Duration Temporal Order Experiences of Change Perceived Change Perceived Change and Philosophical Theories of Time Temporal Passage Illusionists and Veridicalists Phenomenological Models of Time Retention Theory: The Tripartite Structure of the Phenomenology of Time Physical Time and Phenomenological Time Primary Impressions in Husserl’s Retention Theory Protentions and Retentions Objection: Nesting Response: Descriptive Abstraction Perceptual Experience and Retention Theory Extensionalism Objection 1: No Succession Response: Diachronic Co-Consciousness Objection 2: Diachronic Co-Consciousness Does Not Connect Different Experiences Response: Overlap Theory Objection 3: The Overlap is Not Explained Objection 4: Time-Consciousness Must Have a Tripartite Structure Notes Suggested Readings Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Time The Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC)Reasons For NCCs NCCs and Causation The Relationship Between the Temporal Structure of Consciousness and NCCs Isomorphism Heteromorphism Timing The Ncc Has No Relation in Time to the Experience Objection 1: Causation is Not Possible Across Different Time Series Objection 2: We Cannot Know From Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens The Ncc is Earlier or Later Than the Experience Objection 1: Denies the Possibility of Mind-Brain Identity Theory Objection 2: It is Difficult to Know From Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens The Ncc is Simultaneous With the Experience The Timing of Free Will Measuring the Timing of the Will Objections Response: We Should Assume That Apparent Simultaneity is actual Simultaneity Rejoinder 1: Phenomenology is Not a Theoretical Constraint Rejoinder 2: Apparent Simultaneity and Absent Duration Limited Experience in Time Simultaneity Thresholds Temporal Illusions Examples of Temporal Illusion The Cutaneous “Rabbit”The Flash-Lag Effect The Phi Phenomenon Illusions of Simultaneity and Temporal Order Illusions Are Evidence of Heteromorphic Representation Objection: Hidden Time Illusions of Simultaneity Illusions of Temporal Order and Duration Philosophical Positions On Time Presentism and the Growing Block Theory Eternalism Tense Theory Tenseless Theory Rationality of Time Rational and Irrational Temporal Bias Present Bias (P-Bias)Future Bias (F-Bias)Parfit’s Surgery The Rationality of Tense Bias Reality is More Important Than Unreality Objection: This Only Works For Presentism and Present Bias We Have Control Over the Future Objection: There Are Significant Uncontrollable Future Events Biases Give An Evolutionary Advantage Objection: Evolutionary Explanations Are Neutral With Respect to the Rationality of Beliefs Near Bias (N-bias)Reality of the Near Over the Far Objection: We Often Want Unpleasant Things Sooner Rather Than Later, and Pleasant Things Later Rather Than Sooner Persson’s Explanation of Temporal Bias Perceptual Bias The Mechanism of Spontaneous Induction (MSI)Imagining Sequences From the Present Into the Future Persson’s Proposal to Overcome Temporal Bias Temporal Neutrality Event Neutrality Death The Symmetry Argument Tense and Death Death and F-Bias Note Suggested Readings Philosophy of Art and Time Temporal Art Objections Rejoinder: What Defines An Artwork in Only Some Cases requires Time (or Space)Sauvage’s Concepts of Temporal Artwork Objection: We Can Infer Time Through All Artworks Temporal Artwork As Constraining Imagination Formal Properties of Temporal Artwork Instant God Art’s Representation of Time Realist Painting Painting and Time Movement Temporal Art and Time Deleuze’s Direct Cinema Time Cannot Self-Represent The Movement in the Image Ephemeral Art Philosophical Theories of Time and Temporal Art Music is Inexplicable Given Four-Dimensional Four-Dimensional-Space-Time Art, Bergson, and Relativistic Physics Relative Time and Temporal Art Philosophy of Time Travel Defining Time Travel Time Travel and Space Travel Space Travel By Leaving the Previous Space Time Travel By Leaving the Previous Time Forward Time Travel Skipping Backward Time Travel Personal Time Causation in Time Travel Epiphenomenal Travel Causal Travel Causal Loops Self-Creating and Uncreated Objects The Time Machine Instruction Manual Wear and Tear Paradox Feynman’s Time-Travelling Particle Changing the Past The Grandfather Paradox Multiple Timelines Objection 1: The Past is Not Changed Response: The New Timeline is Created Objection 2: A Created Timeline Has the Same Problems As the Grandfather Paradox Pseudo-Time Travel Parallel Universe Travel Causation Between Parallel Worlds Back to the Future Time Travel Satisfying Regret Notes Suggested Readings Bibliography