Statebreaking from below
Recognising the state in wartime rebellions1
In many ways, rebellions seem to be the opposite of statebuilding. Statebuilding research narrates how the state came to be, by establishing a monopoly of violence over a given territory, and institutions to cope with administrative and organisational challenges; statebuilding is about creating order. Rebellions, on the other hand, are events that rip that order apart. How then are we to understand rebellions in relation to the statebuilding process? Coping with this problem, historians have pointed to rebellions’ role as catalysts for change within a regime. But although this argument is persuasive, it fails to accurately capture how peasants engaged in the statebuilding process through rebellions. These events were not only translated by the elite into organisational change but could also challenge the process at its core; they had the potential of being statebreaking activities.
In the following, I first discuss how researchers have understood the links between rebellions and the statebuilding process. I then present a rebellion that took place in the province of Ostergotland, Sweden. At the end of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), a large group of peasants tried to break with the Swedish state and hand themselves and their territory over to the Russian tsar. The rebellion failed, and the peasants were convicted for treason, although later pardoned. The events did not obviously contribute to the statebuilding process as this is currently understood: it did not result in institutional change. At first glance, its mark on the Swedish state therefore seems too insignificant for it to be included in the statebuilding narrative. Still, the peasants’ actions were political and had the potential of affecting the entity of not one, but two early modern states. I suggest that the tendency of statebuilding research to omit events like this from its narrative should lead us to question not the statebuilding quality of the event, but the underlying definitions of state and statebuilding in the current line of research.
The case study then serves as a stepping stone to the main purpose of this essay: to propose a new model for analysing statebuilding from below. Previous interpretations of how rebellions affect statebuilding rest on a definition of the state that locks our understanding of the statebuilding
Statebreaking from below 77 process into teleological observations. To better capture the fluctuating disposition of early modern states, I propose that we should investigate to what degree states were recognised by their subjects. The concept of state recognition, modified for historical research, allows us to appreciate the early modern state’s adaptability and complexity, even in the short run. Moreover, it acknowledges the fact that statebuilding took place in an international arena, and that peasants’ actions were not necessarily limited to a single state.
The proposal should be taken for what it is: a proposal, not a fully developed theory. Moreover, it is not meant to replace the current understanding of statebuilding, or even statebuilding from below, but rather to supplement it. I believe this is needed, because as I will shortly demonstrate, the current strand has a blind spot when it comes to certain political actions of the peasants, especially pertaining to international relations. Peasant actions are translated into elite-initiated change, because the focus is solely on the development of the state structures that have survived until today. In this essay, I argue that statebuilding was not only concerned with those state structures.
Rebellions in statebuilding research
From a European perspective, the early modern period was not only the era of statebuilding, but also the era during which large-scale peasant rebellions slowly disappeared. In a study of peasant revolts from the early 16th to the end of the 18th century, Winfried Schulze has argued for a juridification of social conflicts. Political disputes were increasingly channelled towards political and judicial institutions, while dissent was criminalised and violence monopolised.2 Schulze’s conclusions have been supported by several studies since; revolts promoted an institutionalisation of negotiation between the royal power and the peasant community. ’ Rebellions thus acted as catalysts for change.
Schulze’s explanation places the initiative for change within the elite. Other researchers have focused on the political agency of local communities. For example, Wayne Te Brake shows how the statebuilding venture was dependent upon rulers aligning themselves with local power holders.4 In a similar vein, Andy Wood points to the dynamics within parishes and argues that local elites during the early modern period gradually changed their loyalties. The juridification of social conflicts was thus dependent upon the consent and initiative of local elites, resulting in fractures within local communities.' David Martin Luebke makes the same observation but stresses that both elites and poorer factions adapted these new elements to their own purposes. Moreover, not all peasants embraced the juridification of political culture. By claiming their traditional right to talk directly to their king, they could challenge the system as such. Rather than seeing this as an expression of a ‘naive monarchism,’ Luebke argues that we should appreciate how this type of argument could justify resistance against all authorities, even the king.6
Similar perspectives on the effects of peasant revolts have been dominant in statebuilding research in the Nordic countries. In Sweden, a turbulent 16th century forced rulers to create new arenas for interaction with the peasantry. The Swedish Diet (riksdag), which incorporated the peasant estate, underwent remodelling and became the main arena for negotiations. Combined with physical force, the riksdag, local arenas, and petitions worked to inhibit the escalation of local dissent. They also ensured that the peasantry had actual political influence, as shown in several studies.7 When rebellions nevertheless took place, they were quickly subdued, and peasants were urged to use the correct channels for their grievances.8 Moreover, as their European counterparts, Swedish peasants argued in favour of their king against supposedly evil councillors, but this argument was also used to strengthen their position against opponents on all levels.9
The long-term effects of rebellions on the statebuilding process are thus thoroughly investigated, and the same results can be seen all over Europe: Rebellions forced the ruling elite to concessions to the peasantry, creating judicial and political institutions for negotiation and interaction. Convincing as these results are, they have a blind spot. They fail to take into account rebellions occurring when judicial and political institutions had broken down: wartime rebellions.
While wars in a longer perspective can be said to have escalated the statebuilding process, in a short perspective they caused part of this process to be put on hold, at least in certain places and at certain times. If a war was fought within a state’s borders, for example, its territorial integrity was lost, and its claim for a legitimate monopoly of violence failed. Wars thus signified the breakdown of the sovereign state, temporarily or permanently.
During 1600-1721, Sweden was officially at war for 99 years. As notable as this is, it was not exceptional; this was the period of the Thirty Years’ War, the Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Spanish Succession, involving all major European powers. More often than not, countries were at war. This condition made demands on European populations, who were subjected to heavy taxes and/or military recruitment; Sweden being a prominent example. Despite a heavy tax burden and extensive conscriptions of the peasant community, major open protests against the royal power were practically non-existent in Sweden during the 17th and early 18th century. This was due to an efficient proto-bureaucratic system which coupled negotiation with deterring features.10
Everyday resistance, however, figured prominently, suggesting that peasants might not have been too keen on the statebuilding venture. Difficult as it is to speak about the intentions of historical actors, if we listen to James C. Scott, peasants were rather trying to escape it - by whatever means possible.11 Evidence of poaching, pilfering, and flight - what Scott terms hidden transcripts - abound in the early modern period, in Sweden and elsewhere.12
Furthermore, although major revolts were absent in Sweden, small-scale rebellions were quite common. Many of these rebellions occurred during wartime, when the peasant community’s burdens and responsibilities were stretched to the limit, and legal channels for complaints had collapsed.13
What do these rebellions tell us about the statebuilding process, and the nature of the early modern state? I argue that wartime rebellions challenged the state’s claim for sovereignty and legitimacy and signalled the breakdown of the sovereign state, at least temporarily. The peasants’ actions lead us away from the long-term perspective on statebuilding and show us how short-term instability was dealt with from below.
The case of Ostergbtland
At the end of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Sweden’s resources were heavily drained. After a first successful decade, Sweden’s military success had turned for the worse after the battle of Poltava. Periods of pestilence and crop failure contributed to weakening the Swedish defences as Russian armies conquered first the Swedish territories along the Baltic coast (Ingria, Livonia, and Estonia) in 1709-1710, then Karelia and Finland in 1710— 1714. The lack of Swedish preparation for this troop movement contributed to its military success.14 In July 1719, the Russian fleet turned east, burning and pillaging port cities and settlements along the Swedish east coast. The Swedish army concentrated on defending the main military settlements but was unable to protect the countryside and other cities. Norrkoping in Ostergbtland, south of Stockholm, was one of the cities afflicted; burnt to the ground on July 30th.15
Two days later, on Saturday, August 1st, a rumour spread among the peasants living in Vikbolandet, a peninsula east of Norrkoping. According to the rumour, the Russians were going to burn and pillage the area the next day. However, those who were willing to meet with the Russians, beg for mercy and pay for protection (brandskatt, literally ‘fire tax’) would be spared. Early on Sunday morning, a large group of peasants gathered outside Norrkoping to appoint representatives.16 The representatives went on board the Russian ship anchored outside of the city and asked for a parley.17
The source material for this event consists of letters between a special commission sent to investigate the matter at the end of the month, the Royal Council, and the Governor of Ostergbtland, Count Gustaf Bonde, as well as records of the commission and the Council, the sentence issued on 29 August 1719, and records from the Judiciary Inspection on 18 January 1720, when the remaining peasants were pardoned.18 All material was produced by the authorities, and even when the peasants’ voices are heard in the judicial records, it is likely that they filtered their answers to further their interests in the specific situation. But if the records are silent on why the peasants acted as they did, they speak louder on how they acted.
The meeting between the Russians and the Swedish peasants was successful. On board, the peasants were offered a document containing an oath of allegiance to the Russian tsar in exchange for protection. According to the peasants’ confession, they had first been offered a document written in Russian, with Cyrillic letters. Even though they were offered the services of a translator, who could tell them what the document stated, they demanded a document written in Swedish. With this document, they returned home to their fellow peasants, after promising to return in a few days with signed papers.19
There are no surviving records of the peasant meeting where the document was discussed. According to later testimonies, it took place at the vicarage of Kuddby. The vicar tried to persuade the peasants to write a new petition without an oath, to no avail. The names were signed, and a large group of peasants set out to deliver the document to the Russians. However, the Russians had already left; the peasants were captured by Swedish troops, and put on trial.20
In their defence, most of the peasants claimed to have had no knowledge of the events, even though their names were written on the oath document. Some claimed that the instigators must have signed their names for them, as they themselves would never have signed such a document. Others claimed not to have understood what they signed, either because of ignorance or because of their lack of reading skills. Others yet claimed to have been tricked into signing. Whether these claims were truthful or not, they were mostly accepted by the authorities, who only punished a selected few for the revolt.21 Sven Bengtsson, assumed to be the leader of the rebellion, was sentenced to death; others, selected by lottery, were sentenced to corporal punishments of different sorts. Most of these culprits were later pardoned by the queen.22
The oaths of loyalty signed in Ôstergôtland 1719 never reached the Russian tsar, and Vikbolandet never became a Russian territory. However, the event shows a different side to statebuilding than usually meets the eye in research on the early modern period. Here, peasants held negotiations with representatives of another state about which kingdom they were to be part of. They claimed the right to decide about their farms, their territory, and in essence their statehood. The peasants’ attempt to make political decisions concerning their belonging stands in stark contrast to the idea of the sovereign state.
In fact, it can be questioned whether the territory of Vikbolandet at this time belonged to any state at all. During the early modern period, the idea of a political contract was well established. King and people entered into a (tacit) agreement with each other, in which the people promised to obey the king and pay their taxes, and the king promised to protect them from enemies. In Sweden as in many other countries, these promises were formalised in the oaths sworn between king and people at coronations.23
During rhe Great Northern War, the Swedish royal power could not fulfil its obligation of protection. Russian troops disembarked as they pleased and sacked rhe countryside at will. As the royal power broke their side of the deal, the contract between king and people can be said to have been dissolved. The peasants, in trying to become the subjects of the Russian tsar, no longer seem to have considered themselves bound to the Swedish queen regent. The fact that they chose to swear an oath of allegiance, even though a promise of protection taxes might have sufficed, indicates that they asserted their right to break free from a state that could not protect them, and to seek other protection.
Several other similar events during the early modern period support this argument. Peasants in the region of Jamtland were on trial for swearing oaths of allegiance to the Danish-Norwegian king during a war in 1658 and defended themselves in the following way:
[T]hat they had thought of their duty of fidelity to his Royal Majesty and the Crown of Sweden with the utmost zeal, and would thus gladly have behaved as faithful and truthful subjects, if only his Royal Majesty of Sweden most graciously would have seen fit to defend them against their and the fatherland’s enemies with any considerable military power.24
Had the king defended his subjects, they would have upheld the contract, abided by their oaths and stayed loyal. As he did not, they argued that they were entitled to procure other protection. In 1613, the peasants of Jamtland used the same claim towards the Danish king, after they had sworn themselves to the Swedish king during wartime.25 In a similar vein, peasant living around Uppsala who refused to pay taxes to the Swedish crown during the Great Northern War argued that the crown did not defend them. They were therefore entitled to use their means to defend themselves.26 In another rebellion, also during the Great Northern War, peasants claimed that they had no king, which suggests that they too considered their contract to be broken.27 The same argument was used across Europe when peasants and elites tried to defend their actions against accusations of treason and rebellion.28
The right to rebel was fiercely debated during the early modern period; scholars such as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and Samuel Pufendorf all adressed the matter. While all agreed that rebellions were unlawful, they also agreed on a right to resist tyrants. The question was how to draw the line between legitimate resistance and illegal rebellion.29 In the above-mentioned cases, the crown did not argue against the peasants’ right to rebel if the crown broke the contract; instead, they argued that the contract in this instance had not been broken by the crown, but by the peasants. Even though the crown had done everything in its power to protect its subjects, the peasants had unlawfully rebelled.30
Directly after the rebellion in Ôstergôtland 1719, the council took the peasants’ actions and arguments most seriously. Afraid that the insubordination would spread, the council tried to contain information on the event and publicly asserted their ability to defend the country.’’1 Still, in a longer perspective, it is hard to discern any direct impact; state structures changed radically during this period in Sweden, but this was due to the dissolution of absolutism after the death of Charles XII, not the rebellion in Ôstergôtland. How then are we to understand these events from a statebuilding perspective?
It seems plausible that wartime rebellions did not result in the same modification of state structures as peacetime rebellions, as the existing state structures had not failed - they had only been temporarily suspended. When the war ended, they could be activated again and continue to channel discontent into the preferred institutions. Considering how scholars have previously understood rebellions’ effect on statebuilding measures, rebellions are best described as parentheses to the statebuilding process: Temporay upheavals of the emerging order in early modern Europe.
This is where the current view on statebuilding in historical research fails. As temporay upheavals, wartime rebellions did not affect state structures. But this does not mean that they did not affect the statebuilding process. In the next section, I argue that the blind spot for statebuilding research pertains to its continuous focus on how the present-day European state structures came into being. In fact, a challenge for statebuilding research in general is to acknowledge other possible trajectories than those who were actually followed. To do this, we need to confront the teleological definition of a state that still guides our inquiries and open the floor to other questions.
Recognising a state
Modern definitions of a state often reference Max Weber’s famous assertion that, ‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’32 But as pointed out in the introduction of this book, this definition implies a clearly defined state territory as well as a central administration able to legitimately exercise power, control, and violence. These factors were still in the making during the early modern period, prompting researchers to emphasise the processual nature of early modern states.33
Even though there is no agreement on the definition of a state, there are certain conditions which figure more frequently, such as a geographic sovereign political entity, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.34 The conditions are based on the Westphalian sovereign state system, codified in 1648 but generally understood as implemented gradually during the 17th and 18th centuries. A problem with defining an entity as a state as long as
Statebreaking from below 83 it checks enough boxes, is that the boxes are fixed. As Stephen D. Krasner argues, the Westphalian sovereign state system may have been an ideal in international relations for some time, but it has rarely been the practice. The autonomy of states is, and always has been, temporary at best; states are in flux. They consistently challenge each other’s sovereignty, in wars, disputes, settlements, and words.3' Historians, dealing with change and continuity, require a definition that acknowledges and problematises this transformational nature of the international order.
As indicated by Charles Tilly, there is another definition of states more seldom picked up by early modern historians: an entity is a state if it is recognised as such by other fellow-states.36 The idea of recognition as an integral part of statehood is commonly referred back to Friedrich Hegel, who in 1820 argued that, ‘[t]he state has a primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the eyes of others, i.e. to be recognized by them.’37 In present-day international politics, state recognition refers to a legal procedure through which states are officially recognised. Scholars of international relations have studied on which grounds such recognition is granted and its implications for states and systems. In the early modern period, state recognition was not an institutionalised practice, and its legal implications are less clear. Still, some researchers trace the lineage of state recognition back to the treaties of the Westphalian Peace (1648), where European states recognised each other’s domestic sovereignty and agreed on a principle of non-interference.38 Jens Bartelson goes even further and argues that it was developed within the discipline of natural law during the 16th and 17th centuries, such as in the writings of Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) and Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546).39
Recognition has proven to be a useful analytical tool in research on international relations, as it places the state in a complex network of other entities acting on a global scale.40 The concept has been used to explain why states interact, both during peace and war. But despite the long history of the concept itself, historians have been reluctant to use recognition to understand the statebuilding process. I propose that the concept can be used to challenge the perception of states as sovereign and continuous entities and highlight challenges made towards the statebuilding process. The frequent wars during the early modern period imply that even though states increasingly acted as and were recognised by others as sovereign entities, this recognition was simultaneously and repeatedly withheld in practice. In particular, border territories were subjected to practices of non-recognition. As state functions broke down during war, legal as well as legitimate possession and authority was contested, both by foreign enemies and residents. In such areas, the statebuilding process took the form of a struggle for recognition: The emerging state fought to be recognised as sovereign once again.
In this essay, however, I want to use the concept in a slightly different way. In international relations, political theory, and identity studies, recognition helps researchers to understand not only how states act towards eachother, but also the struggle for recognition by emerging states, non-state agents, peoples, or groups. Political recognition provides an actor or group with the (legitimate) ability to take political action and can therefore be used to study and explain these actors’ room for manoeuvre.41 At the same time, Nancy Fraser stresses that as it reifies a group, it also simplifies something that might be highly complex. Recognition risks hiding differences to the point of inhibiting them.42
From this point of view, the juridification of social conflicts can be read as a process during which the state increasingly recognised its subjects as political agents, a recognition that provided them with a legitimate ability to take certain political actions. An object for further study is whether this also worked to homogenise the subjects and hide differences among them, as Fraser suggests, or rather provided ground for accentuating differences between subjects, as the research of Wood and Luebke seems to indicate.
Furthermore, recognition allows us to focus on the other side of the political relationship: the subjects’ recognition of their state. Most of the time, subjects’ recognition of their state was implicit, much like an agreement with the social contract. However, recognition must not be confused with contractual theory. The contract can be broken, and under certain circumstances, this legitimises the other party to protest and rebel. Recognition, on the other hand, cannot be broken but withheld. If it is withheld, the other party’s ability to protest and rebel may be severely circumcised. As recognition establishes the ability to take political action and thus to enter into a contract, without recognition, a person or a group is not necessarily outside of a political community but has no voice in it.43
Only on certain occasions was subjects’ explicit recognition of the state demanded; coronations and other state ceremonies are cases in point. The subjects’ recognition enabled the state’s political agency and authority, and state structures and control functions ensured the same despite minor turbulence such as rebellions. To be sure, rebellions did not necessarily mean that subjects withheld their recognition of the state; peasants could, for example, demand lower taxes while still recognising the state’s right to exact them. But one aspect of the type of rebellion studied here indicates that the peasants’ recognition had in fact been withdrawn in these cases. As seen from Ostergotland in 1719, the peasants not only rebelled against the Swedish crown, but they also turned to a foreign power to negotiate surrender. This demonstrates the peasants’ withdrawal of recognition of Swedish authority, not only over the peasants themselves, but also over the territory in question.
Furthermore, it was not only the peasants who withdrew their recognition of Swedish authority over this area. In waging war, and negotiating with the peasants, the Russians did the same. During wars, states engage in a struggle for recognition.44 Erik Ringmar shows that the struggle could concern how a state wanted other states to perceive its role in the international arena. During the Thirty Years’ War, Sweden strived to be recognised as a major protestant player and was greatly
Statebreaking from below 85 offended when others failed to do so.45 As seen from the example of Ostergotland, wars could also imply that recognition of sovereignty over specific areas was withheld.
After the rebels had been arrested, recognition had to be regained. The trial and verdict against the peasants of Vikbolandet were part of this form of statebuilding. The Swedish state claimed sovereignty by convicting the peasants, an act directed as much towards the culprits as towards the rest of the society. In discussing the punishments, the council clearly stated that the rebels had to be quickly but carefully subdued so as not to encourage similar behaviour from other areas.46 But the crown also showed its authority by pardoning the peasants afterwards. In that way, it could regain recognition from the rebels themselves and affirm its willingness to protect its subjects.
Not all statebuilding measures were meant to build the state as we know it today. If we are to fully acknowledge the agency of peasants in the statebuilding process, we need to keep an open mind. To do so, the concept of the state has to be loosened up and provided with an alternative; if we start with the end result, it constrains us to only seeing initiatives taken in that direction. In this essay, I propose a more flexible definition based on the concept of recognition: An entity is a state if it is recognised as such by others. Besides being well suited to an early modern context, it also places the state in an international context and thus fights the risks of state-centrism.
From this perspective, wartime rebellions had the potential of thwarting the statebuilding process as peasants withdrew their recognition of the state. By instead recognising another authority - in the case of Ostergotland the authority of the Russians - peasants demonstrated that state sovereignty was temporary at best. Under certain circumstances, it was possible to break free from the state. Furthermore, the proposed definition places the actions of the peasants in a bigger, international perspective. In rebellions during wartime, peasants interacted with foreign armies. They participated in decisions on borders and belonging. In breaking one state, they could effectively help to build another.
As I signalled in the beginning of this essay, the model for statebuilding from below presented here is a proposal, not a fully developed theory. There are still questions to sort out. For example, how does the concept of state recognition relate to the juridification of social conflicts, and the decrease in peasant rebellions during the early modern period? Does subjects’ recognition of their state become increasingly implicit over the years, or are the procedures for making it explicit simply changing? And how does recognition relate to the growth of state structures traditionally perceived of as statebuilding? That said, I believe that it manages to shed new light on old questions of how the state came to be, as well as taking seriously the fact that the state never simply is.
Riksarkivet, Sweden (RA):
Riksrädets protokoll (RP): vol. 129
Aldre kommitteer (ÄK): vol. 44, 48
Kollegiers m.fl., landshövdingars, hovrätrers och konsistoriers skrivelser till Kungl.
Justitierevisionens besvärs- och ansökningshandlingar (JBA): Verdict 1720-01-18
Vadstena District Archive (VDA):
Länsstyrelsen i Östergötlands län, Landskansliets arkiv (LOLL): Alla vol. 35; Dla vol. 244, 245
Härnösand District Archive (HDA):
Gävleborgs Ians landskanslis arkiv (GLLA): Al vol. 2
Letter from Bonde to the queen, 1719-08-04, in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35.
See letters from Jacob Burenskiold to Queen Ulrika Eleonora 1719-08-15, 08-19 and 08-23, in RA (Sweden), AK48. See also the discussion in the royal council 1719-08-05 in RA (Sweden), RP vol. 129, p. 749, 753.
On the execution of Sven from Tomta, see letter from Bonde to captain Wen-nerstedt 1719-08-31 and passport for Sven Bengtsson 1719-09-05, both in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35. On the other’s sentences, see verdict 1719-08-29 in VDA, LOLL Dla vol. 244. On the pardon of most of the culprits, see Queen Ulrika Eleonora’s resolution 1719-09-04, in VDA, LOLL Dla vol. 244; Letters from Bonde to commanding officer Giote 1719-09-08 and 1719-09-26, both in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35; Letter from Stierncrona to Bonde 1719-09-07 in VDA, LOLL Dla vol. 244; Letter from Bonde to Queen Ulrika Eleonora 1719-09-08 in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35; Letter from Bonde to Queen Ulrika Eleonora 1719-09-26 in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35; Letter from Bonde to Queen Ulrika Eleonora 1719-10-17 in VDA, LOLL Alla vol. 35; 1720-01-18 in RA (Sweden), JBA.
On this contract, see, for example, Glete 2002, p. 54; Harnesk 2003; Moore 1978; Nauman 2014. On political oaths in early modern Sweden, see Nauman 2017 passim.
‘[D]he swarade och foregoffwe, att dhe medh hogsta nijt och answar haffwa betrachtadt dheras tronetsplicht emot hans Kongl. May:t och Swerigis Crono, och saledes gierna skola funnidt sigh sasom trogne och uprichtige undersatare, sa frampt hans K. M:t Swerige allernadigast hade behagadt medh nagon anseenlig krigsmacht dhem forfachta och forswara emoth dherass och faderneslandsens fijender [...]’. Trial against the farmers of Jamtland, 1658-05-18, HDA, GLLAAIvol. 2.
Secher 1885, p. 478. See also Nauman 2014, pp. 203-205.
Asa Karlsson 1994, pp. 222-223.
This happened in a rebellion in Vadsbo county 1710, see Letter from Bengt Larsson 1710-03-15 and Protocol p. 195, both in RA (Sweden), AK44.
See, for example, Arnade 2008, pp. 304-327; van Gelderen 1992, pp. 146— 160; Jones 1999, pp. 104-227; Edward Vallance 2005, pp. 82-102.
Baumgold 1993; Skinner 1978, pp. 189-348; Sommerville 2011, pp. 577-583. See, for example, how the council discussed the matter in 1719-08-05, in RP vol. 129, pp. 743-754, RA (Sweden).
1719-08-05 in RP vol. 129, pp. 723-728, 734-754, RA (Sweden). 1719-08-17 in ibid, p. 1075f.
Weber 1946, p. 78.
See references in the introductory chapter of this anthology. See also Gustafs-son 1998; Egnell & Halden 2013, p. 5f.
See the discussion in the introduction to this volume.
Krasner 1999, p. 223.
Tilly 1992, p. 2.
Hegel 1991 , p. 367f. Emphasis in original.
See discussion in Coggins 2016, pp. 14-26.
Bartelson 2016, pp. 307-313. See also Hegel 1991 , p. 366f.
See, for example, Fabry 2010; Geis et al. 2015, p. 9f; Ringmar 2007; Talmon 2001, pp. 21-43.
Bartelson 2013, pp. 111-114.
Fraser 2000. See also Fraser 8c Honneth 2001.
On the effects of lack of recognition, see Honneth 1995, pp. 131-139.
See Bartelson 2016, pp. 316-319.
1719-08-06 in RA (Sweden) RP vol. 129, pp. 758-766.
88 Sari Nauman
Almbjär,M., (2019):'The Problem With Early-Modern Petitions: Safety Valve or Powder Keg?’, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 26 (6): 1013-1039.
Aminoff-Winberg, J., (2007): Pd flykt i eget land. Internflyktingar i Sverige under stora nordiska kriget, Âbo: Âbo Akademis förlag.
Arnade, P.J., (2008): Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bartelson, J., (2013): 'Three Concepts of Recognition’, International Theory, 5 (1): 107-129.
Bartelson, J., (2016): 'Recognition: A Short history’, Ethics & International Affairs, 30 (3): 303-321.
Baumgold, D., (1993): 'Pacifying Politics: Resistance, Violence, and Accountability in Seventeenth-Century Contract Theory’, Political Theory, 21 (1): 6-27.
Blickle, P., (1986): ‘The Criminalization of Peasant Resistance in the Holy Roman Empire: Toward a History of the Emergence of High Treason in Germany’, The Journal of Modern History, 58 (Supplement: Politics and society in the Holy Roman Empire): S88-S97.
Coggins, B., (2016): Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Egnell, R. and Halden, P., (2013): 'Introduction: The Need for New Agendas in Statebuilding’, in Egnell, R. and Haldén, P. (eds), New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History, London: Routledge: 1-10.
Fabry, M., (2010): Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Forssberg, A.M., (2014): 'The Final Argument: War and the Merging of the Military and Civilian Spheres in 17th-Century Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 39 (2): 170-184.
Fraser, N., (2000): 'Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, 3 (May-June): 107-120.
Fraser, N. and Honneth, A., (2001): Redistribution or Recognition? A Philosophical Exchange, London: Verso.
Geis, A., et al., (2015): 'Gradual Processes, Ambiguous Consequences: Rethinking Recognition in International Relations’, in Daase, C. et al. (eds), Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 3-26.
Glete, J., (2002): War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660, London: Routledge.
Griesse,M.,(2013):'Aufstandsprävention in der Frühen Neuzeit: Länderübergreifende Wahrnehmungen von Revolten und Verrechtlichungsprozesse’, in De Benedictis, A. and Härter, K. (eds), Revolten und politische Verbrechen zwischen dem 12. und 19. Jahrhundert: Rechtliche Reaktionen und juristisch-politische Diskurse, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 173-208.
Gustafsson, H., (1998): 'The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern Europe’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 23 (3-4): 189-210.
Hallenberg, M., (2013): 'The Local Adaptation of Centralizing Politics: Hybrid Statebuilding in Sixteenth-Century Sweden’, in Egnell, R. and Haldén, P. (eds), New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History, London: Routledge: 122-142.
Hallenberg, M. and Holm, J., (2016): Man ur base: Hur krig, upplopp och förhand-lingar pdverkade svensk statsbildning i tidigmodern tid, Lund: Nordic Academic Press.
Harnesk, B., (2003): ‘Konsten art klaga, konsten art kräva. Kronan och bönderna pà 1500- och 1600-talen’, in Harnesk, B. (ed), Maktens skiftande skepnader. Studier i makt, legitimitet och inflytande i det tidigmoderna Sverige, Umeà: Institutionen för historiska studier, Umeà universitet: 42-74.
Härter, K., (2013): ‘Revolten, politische Verbrechen, rechtliche Reaktionen und juristisch-politische Diskurse: Einleitende Bemerkungen’, in De Benedictis, A. and Härter, K. (eds), Revolten und politische Verbrechen zwischen dem 12. und 19. Jahrhundert: Rechtliche Reaktionen und juristische-politische Diskurse, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 1-13.
Hegel, G.W.F., (1991 ): Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holm, J., (2016): ‘The Lost Political Uprisings’, in Koskinen, U. (ed), Aggressive and Violent Peasant Elites in the Nordic Countries, c. 1500-1700, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 171-188.
Honneth, A., (1995): The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Jones, D.M., (1999): Conscience and Allegiance in Seventeenth Century England: The Political Significance of Oaths and Engagements, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Karlsson, Ä, (1994): Den jämlike undersdten. Karl XITs förmögenhetsbeskattning 1713, Uppsala: Acta Universitaris Upsaliensis.
Karonen, P. and Hakanen, M., (2017): ‘Personal Agency and State Building in Sweden (1560-1720)’, in Karonen, P. and Hakanen, M. (eds), Personal Agency at the Swedish Age of Greatness 1560-1720, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society: 13-44.
Katajala, K., (2004): ‘Conclusions: Peasant Unrest and Political Culture’, in Katajala, K. (ed), Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society: 258-269.
Koskinen, U., et al., (2016): ‘Conclusion: Resisting, Cooperating, and Fighting’, in Koskinen, U. (ed), Aggressive and Violent Peasant Elites in the Nordic Countries, c. 1500-1700, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 216-272.
Krasner, S.D., (1999): Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kujala, A., (2000): ‘The Breakdown of a Society: Finland in the Great Northern War 1700-1714’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 25 (1-2): 69-78.
Lazer, S.A., (2019): State Formation in Early Modern Alsace, 1648-1789, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Linde, M., (2000): Statsmakt och bondemotstdnd. Allmoge och överhet under stora nordiska kriget, Uppsala: Acta Universitaris Upsaliensis.
Luebke, D.M., (1997a): His majesty’s Rebels: Communities, Factions, and Rural Revolt in the Black Forest, 1725-1745, Ithaca, NY/Londom Cornell University Press.
Luebke, D.M., (1997b): ‘Naive Monarchism and Marian Veneration in Early Modern Germany’, Past & Present, 154 (1): 71-106.
Mann, M., (1986): The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, B., (1978): Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York, NY: Sharpe.
Nauman, S., (2014): ‘Winning a War with Words: Oaths as Means in Military Conflict in Early Modern Scandinavia’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 39 (2): 198-211.
Nauman, S., (2017): Ordens kraft: Politiska eder i Sverige 1520-1718, Lund: Nordic Academic Press.
Nauman, S., (2019): ‘Flyktingmottagandet i Uppsala domkapitel 1710-1719’, in Upplands fornminnesförenings ärsbok: 49-65.
Ringmar, E., (2007): Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, M., (1967): Essays in Swedish History, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Sahlins, R, (1989): Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Schulze, W., (1980): Bäuerlicher Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der frühen Neuzeit, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
Scott, J.C., (1990): Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, London: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C., (2013): Decoding Subaltern Politics: Ideology, Disguise, and Resistance in Agrarian Politics, New York, NY /London: Routledge.
Secher, V.A., (1885): Judicia placiti Regis Danice justitiarii. Sämling af Kongens Rettertings Domme 1605-1614, Kobenhavm Gad.
Sennefelt, K., (2001): Den politiska sjukan. Dalupproret 1743 och frihetstida politisk kultur, Hedemora: Gidlunds förlag.
Skinner, Q., (1978): The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Vol. 2: The Age of Reformation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sommerville, J., (2011): ‘The Social Contract (Contract of Government)’, in Klosko, G. (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 573-583.
Talmon, S., (2001): Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in exile, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Te Brake, W., (1998): Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500-1700, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Tilly, C., (1992): Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Oxford/ Cambridge: Blackwell.
Vallance, E., (2005): Revolutionary England and the National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism, and the Political Nation, 1553-1682, Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK/Rochester, NY: Boydell Press.
van Gelderen, M., (1992): The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, M., (1946): ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, C. (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, NY: Oxford University Press: 77-128.
Wood, A., (2002): Riot, Rebellion and Popular Politics in Early Modern England, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Wood, A., (2006): ‘Subordination, Solidarity and the Limits of Popular Agency in a Yorkshire Valley c. 1596-1615’, Past & Present, 193 (1): 41-72.
Wiirgler, A., (1995):‘Das Modernisierungspotential von Unruhen im 18. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung der Politischen Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland und der Schweiz’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 21: 195-217.