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Civil-military adaptation in hybrid orders

The study of military change in ‘developing nations’ is not new (see Janow- itz 1988; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Cawthra and Luckham 2003). The link between the military and democracy or nation-building in Pakistan has been examined in the literature so far (see, for example, Shah 2002, 2003, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Cohen 2004, 2011; Nasr 2004; HaqqanI 2005; Staniland 2008; Adeney 2015; Fair 2014; Lenze 2016; Chaudhry 2019a, 2019b). However, the strategic underpinnings and determinants of civil-military interactions, under the auspices of global governance, have not been yet sufficiently systematic explored.1 To address this gap, and to contribute to theoretical advancements, this book proposes a theory of civil-military adaptation in hybrid orders, applying a conceptual framework informed by the theories of civil-military relations and global security governance.

While measuring the causal impact of civil-military interactions is extremely difficult, this book explores whether those involved in such synergies, from civilians to ex-military officers, perceive that through such democratic engagement, promotion of good governance principles, advocacy and monitoring, CSOs can contribute to the democratisation of security governance, even though they are not at this time able to achieve ‘democratic control’. Non-state actors are anticipated to potentially perform four functions: increase input and output legitimacy (quality of democratic governance), diagonal accountability (monitoring) or ‘elite pacting’, i.e. bridging the gap between civilian and military institutions (see also Baciu 2019). In insecure and conflict environments, local actors are anticipated to have limited capacity to pursue democratic control strategies over the armed forces or mechanisms establishing a robust system of checks and balances assuring civilian control over the military and good governance of the security sector (Pantev 2005: Part X; Lambert 2011: 157). They can nonetheless work as observers of the military’s policies and enterprises and signal breaches of human rights, democracy and rule of law. While the existing literature states that “only civilians elected to positions of political authority can actually decide on institutional change” (Croissant et al. 2013:45), this book explores whether non-state actors can be seen as a factor building the capacity of society and ultimately of the state in the enterprise of establishing civilian control. Particularly in emerging and new democracies, state apparatuses lack adequate capacities to efficiently and democratically “manage the security sector” (Croissant et al. 2012: 54). Through building awareness, CSOs can enhance the democratic political culture of both citizens and institutions, and thus empower them to develop more democratic preferences and exert their ‘sanctioning’ capacity. As a result of social learning processes, citizens and institutions will become aware of their accountability responsibilities and the attributes of the military, being more able to discern where the ‘red- lines’ for the military intervention in politics should be.

The book assumes that a significant variation can occur in civil-military interactions due to contextual or structural determinants. Actors operating in a hybrid order in which power relations are not fully established or institutionalised but rather fluid, and who are in a genuinely weaker position than other actors, can pursue specific strategies in order to seek to co-opt more powerful actors. As the “successful stabilization and institutionalization of civilian control” is expected to “ultimately depend on domestic governments, institutions, and civilian actors” (Croissant et al. 2013: 205; see also Serra 2010: 241), the government capacity to offer a favourable environment for CSOs to positively contribute to the democratisation of civil-military relations and of security governance is also anticipated to influence the nature of interaction. In this regard, political parties and media are expected to play the role of intervening factors and either favour or hinder civil-military cooperation. The book will seek to identify the varied forms of interaction and to analyse how they are perceived by the informed expert sources.

To this end, this book explores whether the empirical analysis requires an expanded theory of civil-military adaptation that can better explain the nature of democratic civilian influence (control) in hybrid orders. In post-military regimes, armed forces are anticipated to tend to perpetuate their power and infrastructure. However, under pressure from international actors and CSOs, the military can be ‘trapped’ to undergo endogenous processes of normative change to maximise its utility gains. Due to changes in domestic political culture and enhanced strategic engagement with international actors, such as the EU or the United States, a military directly intervening in politics will have potential diplomatic and possibly economic costs. Adopting a new identity, that of a pseudo-democratic military, which formally accepts elections, political parties and a freer media, can be associated with greater utility gains than a formal coup d’etat. Thus, the military can continue to further expand its economic and political power. While under the aforementioned exogenous types of pressure the military can become more constrained in its choices, strategies and preferences, its infrastructure and power will nonetheless continue to develop. The transformation of military roles towards development and human security domains, while simultaneously empowering and transferring power and resources to civilian security institutions (e.g. police), could result in a change in the civil-military balance of power in the long run. Checking power and transparency are essential elements for establishing civilian oversight in hybrid orders. Both checking power and formal transfer of military power and resources to civilian institutions require an appropriate degree of institutionalisation at a macro-level and sufficient implementation capacity. The implementation of oversight of the military is assumed to be realised by appropriate institutional structures, operationalised as “a set of human-made operational rules and organisations that regulate, constrain, and enable the behaviour of civilians and the military on a day-to-day basis” (Kuehn 2016: 7; see also North 1990; Os- trorn 1990: 50-5; Hall and Taylor 2016: 948). In hybrid orders however, the level of rule of law and the government institutional capacity (statehood) are anticipated to be limited. Thus, civilian actors might lack the capacity to formally exert accountability of the military (checking power). Building their power to do so would be the first step to checking power in more formal and institutionalised ways. Local actors, including those funded by international organisations and actors, could play a role in altering the preferences of citizens, political parties and public opinion and building power and will for democratic change.

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