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Science, Freedom, Democracy

I: Academic Freedom and Other Values in Science and SocietyMichael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Philosophical Vision of Science and SocietyIntroductionCrossing Disciplinary Boundaries: A Brief Overview of Polanyi’s Life and ThoughtPrimary Social Values and Practices Required for the Flourishing of the Scientific Enterprise and a Modern Society Shaped by SciencePolitical Philosophy: Polanyi’s Middle PositionDeeper Roots of Social OrderPolanyi’s General Models of Modern Social OrderDemocracy, Law, and Public LibertyProblems of the Modern Mind: The Coupling of Skepticism and Moral PassionRe-conceiving Knowing, Scientific Knowledge, and Scientific PracticePolanyi’s Comprehensive Vision of Science and SocietyNotesReferencesThe Ethos of Science and Central Planning: Merton and Michael Polanyi on the Autonomy of ScienceIntroductionMerton and Polanyi: Their Intellectual Relationship and Parallels in their ViewsMerton on the Values and Autonomy of SciencePolanyi’s Case Against Totalitarianism and the Central Planning of SciencePolanyi’s Vision of Free Society: Its Problems and Contemporary RelevanceConclusionsNotesReferencesScientific Freedom and Social ResponsibilityIntroductionFreedom vs. Responsibility (1945-2000)Freedom with ResponsibilityMaking it Work in PracticeConclusionsNotesReferencesBacon’s PromiseThe PromiseA Peek at the Way Science Has BeenA Peek at the Way Science Can BeThe Take-Home MessageNotesReferencesII:Democracy and Citizen Participation in ScienceWhich Science, Which Democracy, and Which Freedom?IntroductionWhich Science?Which Democracy?Which Freedom?NotesReferencesParticipatory Democracy and Multi-strategic ResearchIntroductionRepresentative Democracy and Decontextualizing ResearchRepresentative DemocracyScience in Representative DemocraciesWeakened Democratic Institutions and Commercially Oriented TechnoscienceThe Importance of Multi-strategic ResearchParticipatory Democracy and Multi-strategic ResearchConcluding RemarksNotesReferencesPublic Opinion, Democratic Legitimacy, and Epistemic CompromiseIntroductionEpistemic Vulnerability and Epistemic ExploitationSEE and Democratic LegitimacyMitigating SEE in Liberal InstitutionsConclusionNotesIII: Freedom and Pluralism in Scientific Methodology and ValuesAre Transparency and Representativeness of Values Hampering Scientific Pluralism?IntroductionScrutinizing Elliott’s First Condition: TransparencyThe Transparency Condition in GeneralThe Transparency Condition in Political ScienceConcerns about the Transparency ConditionSocial-Epistemic Practices and the Hampering of Scientific Pluralism: Ensuring Important Questions Can Be AddressedScrutinizing Elliott’s Second Condition: RepresentativenessGeneral Questions about the Representativeness ConditionThe Representativeness Condition in the Social SciencesSocial Epistemic Practices and the Hampering of Scientific Pluralism: (Epistemically) Productive Interaction between ApproachesDemocratic Models of Scientific PluralismThe Importance of Agonistic ChannelsScientific Pluralism and Agonism in Political ScienceConclusionNotesReferencesMax Weber’s Value Judgment and the Problem of Science Policy MakingIntroductionLevels of EvaluationValues as the Method and Subject of Scientific InquiryPractical Value JudgmentsThree Dimensions of Science as VocationModels of Science Policy MakingConcluding RemarksNotesReferencesList of contributors

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