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From rivalry’ to rapprochement (1953-1958): how common enemies forge a family

With the aggravation of the immediate threat by radical republicanism led by Nasser’s Egypt, rapprochement between Jordan and Iraq resulted in the formation of the AFU and the rapprochement with other monarchies, including Saudi Arabia.

Structural similarities

Although the intricacies of the political systems have not changed in a major way since the states' independence, the consolidation of the state and its borders have contributed to an increased similarity as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan became full-fledged states on the basis of a defined territory, population, and monopoly of violence rather than tribal fiefdoms on the basis of allegiance rather than territory. And set against the rising threat by communism, both the Hashemite and Saudi kingdoms were firmly based on capitalist economic principles, leading to further structural convergence.

Salience: constraints and catalysts for ingroup identification

The share of republics in the system became a majority by the early 1960s. Adding to the decreasing share of monarchies was the dramatically surging republican threat, and divisive ideology among monarchies declined significantly. With the demise of King Abdallah of Jordan and with the imminent common threat toward monarchies, Hashemite irredentism waned significantly. While Saudi Arabia had long accepted extant Jordanian borders to the south, Hashemite claims to the Hijaz also waned, never to return. This meant that all relevant conditions heightened the salience of monarchy that supported the emergence of an ingroup.

The coup revolutions of 1952 and 1958 were followed by those in Yemen in 1962 and in Libya in 1969, which all gave birth to revolutionary anti-monarchical and anti-Western regimes, emphasizing the fragility and anachronism of the monarchy as a viable political system. The Egyptian revolution caused the remaining monarchies to change their priorities regarding unity: "Henceforth, the goal of the monarchs was to preserve their Hashemite thrones and their conservative regimes against pressure from the radical Arab governments” (Simon 1974, 321).

The revolution also strengthened the individual monarchic identity of the states, which led to greater identification with other "similar” systems. Saudi Arabia’s “close and cordial relations with Egypt over a considerable period inevitably produced at first a reaction of sympathy and concern for the fallen dynasty and its leading personalities, who had all been actively associated with the king and his government” (Philby 1955, 354).

Despite the new catalytic threat by Gamal Abd al-Nasser's pan-Arab republicanism, the formation of a concept of monarchic identity was slow. The establishing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 did not stifle King Saud’s fears of Hashemite domination ambitions and led to an intense period of Saudi-Egyptian cooperation, culminating in their joint effort to prevent Jordan from joining the pact despite British and Iraqi pressure (Podeh 1995, 89). Despite this new Saudi-Egyptian friendship, the kingdom could not help but recognize the adverse effects of Egyptian antiroyalist propaganda and Nasser’s turn away from the West to the Soviet Union. Egyptian bids at leadership resonated increasingly among other Arab republics and the populace in the monarchies and formed a major domestic threat to the existence of the monarchic regimes. As early as in 1955, the Saudis uncovered their own "Free Officers” movement, which plotted a coup à la égyptienne, having been educated in Egypt or trained by Egyptians. A movement of "Saudiyyun al-Ahrar” (“the Free Saudis”) agitated in the country, called for strikes and trade unions, and railed against the American presence in the kingdom (Patai 2015, 60).

The announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, which provided for a possible military reaction of the United States to any "armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism” served as convenient grounds to form a royalist coalition. Nuri al-Said recognized that removing Saudi Arabia from the Egyptian sphere of influence was crucial to the survival of the Iraqi regime that was heavily damaged by its links to the United Kingdom. British Ambassador Wright succinctly summed up the situation and the common threat perception that aligned worldviews and aims and led to a stronger perception of similarity:

Among the motives of the Iraq government in making this sustained effort were the appreciation that the Royal Families of Iraq, Jordan and Saudi

Arabia have a common interest in opposing Communist subversion in the Middle East, an interest so strong as to require the composition of past differences between the Hashemite Family and the Rulers of Saudi Arabia; the desire flowing from this, to open the eyes of Saud to the reality and danger of co-operation between Nasser and Communist Russia, not least in terms of the situation in Syria, and to try and detach Sa’ud from Nasser, and the hope of securing at least the benevolent acquiescence of Sa'ud in Iraq's membership [in] the Baghdad Pact, thereby diminishing the relative isolation of Iraq in the Arab World.

(cited in: Podeh 97-98)

The 1958 revolution and the elimination of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq served as a further unifying driver for Saudi Arabia, the remaining Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Social processes of ingroup identification

In contrast to the previous period, the second was marked by mutual recognition and increasing interaction between royals and other high-ranking representatives of the three countries. Between the Hashemite kingdoms, kinship bonds led to a more pronounced shared identification.

Once Abdallah was out of the way, Jordan could directly recognize Saudi Arabia, which de facto happened with Talal’s royal visit to Saudi Arabia in November 1951 - his first. He made up for his father’s 1948 omission by visiting the Hijaz, symbolically recognizing the legitimacy of Saudi rule (Gelber 2004, 223; Maddy-Weitzman 1990, 69-70). Reciprocity and reconciliation were achieved in June 1954 by Ibn Saud's son and successor King Saud's first royal visit to King Hussein of Jordan, the grandson of his father’s greatest rival. Although the conflict with (Trans)Jordan was personal and easily mended with King Abdallah’s demise, the successions in Saudi Arabia and Iraq did not serve as clear-cut occasions for rapprochement, though they eased the personal rivalry as a basis for tensions. King Saud attempted to step out of the larger-than-life shadow of his father. In Iraq, Faisal's inexperienced and young son Ghazi came to power for a short time, followed by the even younger Faisal II, who took over the reins from his uncle Abd al-Ilah when he came of age in 1953 - although he could not escape the elder's influence. Abd al-Ilah, who was the son of Ali, the eldest son of Sharif Hussein (and the one pushed out of the Hijaz by Ibn Saud), still harbored vaguely Greater Syrian designs for both Damascus and the Hijaz (Podeh 1995, 88).

Nevertheless, stronger engagement with each other followed. After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, Baghdad saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between Riyadh and Cairo by moving the former into its own orbit. Nuri al-Said dispatched Amir Zaid, Iraqi ambassador to the United Kingdom and the last surviving son of Sharif Hussein, to Riyadh, to usher in a new era between the two dynasties. He arrived there on August 26, 1956 (Podeh 1995, 92-93). The meeting was successful, and King Saud even voiced some guarded approval of the Baghdad Pact. A meeting of the two monarchs was prepared for September 20,

1956, in Dammam. Abdallah al-Damluji, a former advisor of Ibn Saud and later Iraqi foreign minister, was sent to Riyadh. It proved productive: King Saud promised not to impose an oil boycott and to refrain from other anti-Western actions (Podeh 1995, 94).

Although figures close to King Saud remained staunchly pro-Egyptian. such as Crown Prince Faisal and the king's two senior advisors, the meeting proved a turning point in Saudi-Iraqi relations. The two leaders revived their earlier mutual recognition. The next day after the meeting, Saud reluctantly received the Egyptian and Syrian presidents to offset the Iraqi offensive. In response, Nuri al-Said informed Saud of Iraq’s intentions to send troops to Jordan in case of an Israeli attack and floated the idea of a meeting of the three kings during Saud's scheduled visit to Amman in November 1956 that would symbolize the new "conservative-royalist axis in the Arab world”. This failed to come to fnution, because of the outbreak of the Suez War in October (Podeh 1995, 96). The war temporarily obstructed the development of a monarchic community and alliance because it boosted Nasser’s prestige and raised the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. King Saud was left with no choice but to cut diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Iraq had cut relations with France but refused to do the same with Britain. But the development of monarchic identification and solidarity had just begun. Saudi-Iraqi meetings in Washington initiated a new stage in the rapprochement and marked the termination of the conflict. The relationship between Jordan and Saudi Arabia was also ameliorating and even resulted in military cooperation (Shlaim 2009, 127).

The first official Saudi royal visit Saudi-Iraqi to Hashemite Iraq was conducted by King Saud on May 11, 1957, who had concluded that Nasser was a greater threat than the Hashemites from the Suez conflict the previous year (Shlaim 2009, 136-137). A series of visits by King Saud to Jordan and King Hussein to Iraq followed in June 1957 (Podeh 1995, 99-100).

Personal relations were of prime importance in the diffusion of the rivalry of the kingdoms. In many ways, the rapprochement in Jordanian-Saudi relations was a monarchic and a (royal) family affair: Queen Mother Zain, a Hashemite, seeing the threat for the conservative monarchies from Arab nationalism, arranged a meeting in Medina in mid January 1957 between her son, King Hussein, and King Saud, who offered financial support (Shlaim 2009. 127). Despite the opportunity, Jordan was not yet ready to join the royalist coalition, due to its pro-Egyp-tian government at that time. That obstacle was removed after an alleged coup attempt by the army’s chief of staff, Ali Abu Nuwar, who fled to Damascus. In reaction and after cabinet actions challenging the royal prerogative. King Hussein in April 1957 dismissed the country’s first democratically elected govermnent (Shlaim 2009, 132-133).

Especially the two sister Hashemite monarchies were linked via kinship and friendship ties, particularly between the cousins Hussein and Faisal. Avi Shlaim describes their close relationship: “Hussein and Faisal had been the best of friends: they were born the same year, and were at Harrow together; their fathers were first cousins and best friends; their grandmothers were sisters; and they became kings on the same day” (Shlaim 2009,165). Faisal was also a witness at Hussein's wedding (Shlaim 2009, 92). It is therefore not surprising that Faisal’s killing by the coup leaders in July 1958 was “one of the heaviest blows” (H. King of Jordan 1962, 197) for King Hussein, as he relays in his memoirs:

Throughout our short lives we had been so close, united in many ways. Our grandfathers had also been closely bound. On my side was King Abdullah; on his, Abdullah's brother, the first King Feisal, who played a major role in the Arab Revolt and on whose side Lawrence of Arabia had served. As boys we had played together - hadn't Feisal given me my first bicycle? - and later at Harrow, we had discussed so often the problems which would one day face us. Now that he is lost, I believe many, many Iraqis, for or against the monarchy, feel a deep sense of guilt for the brutal assassination.

(H. King of Jordan 1962, 198)

The deep, personal bonds between the monarchs gave the fate of the Iraqi monarchy a personal meaning for Hussein, making him identify with the Iraqi monarch more than he would have with another "friendly” regime and shaping his persona as a monarch and head of state.

Such a deep connection was not yet present between Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite monarchies, which differed in their institutions and intensity of connection to Britain - although the Saud also started sending their sons to Sandhurst and elsewhere (Hurewitz 1969, 251). But both shared a pro-Western outlook and an anti-communist and conservative stance. The basis for a community had slowly formed between the independent monarchies and was now strengthened, articulated and reified by rituals and ceremonies more openly.

By the 1950s, the Saudi-Hashemite relationship had transformed from an enmity that would have rather seen the other disappear to a rivalry that still aimed to weaken, but not destroy, the other, because their fates were linked. Even during Ibn Saud’s anti-Hashemite agitation in 1951, Ibn Saud also made his hope clear that the British (and Americans) would protect the rights of Abdallah's heirs, indicating that he was aware that the fall of one monarchy might spell doom for his as well (Maddy-Weitzman 1990, 69-70).

Coronation ceremonies marked significant occasions for the affirmation of shared monarchism. At the beginning of the second period, however, they were an ambivalent sign. Then-Crown Prince Saud was coolly received at Iraqi King Faisal's coronation in 1953, and the Iraqi representatives were notably absent from the funeral of Ibn Saud and the coronation of his son (Podeh 1995, 88). On the one hand, these are indications of tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. On the other hand, absence could be seen as an affront only if royal presence were expected and an existing protocol were in place. This means that certain monarchic rules of engagement and behavior had already been established among the monarchies. Also, especially the coronations were specifically monarchic rituals that they shared, thus cementing a shared belonging and an equality of royal status despite conflict while excluding republics from these ceremonies.

Increasingly, the belonging to a joint “club” became apparent and was voiced more openly by the royals themselves. In a meeting between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in late 1956, King Saud, in clear recognition of the common club membership of the royal regimes, asserted that he rejected supporting "dictators and presidents” and would rather cooperate “with the fellow monarchy of Iraq” (Podeh 1995, 94). This meeting was so successful that it brought about the idea of another, this time including three kings (Saud, Faisal, Hussein), during Saud’s scheduled visit to Amman in November 1956. The constellation was not an accident but rather a conscious inclusion of fellow monarchies meaning to symbolize the new "conservative-royalist axis in the Arab world” (Podeh 1995, 96).

Foreign policy restraint

The salience of monarchism has helped tone down some of the most hostile interactions in the second period. Only one MID (display of force) is recorded for the Saudi Arabia-Jordan dyad (there are no recorded MEDs for the Saudi-Iraq dyad), in 1956. This is the highest point of escalation and the only militarized dispute of the dyad after World War II, and it falls well short of military action (“display of force”, hostility level 2 out of 5). Military restraint prevailed in this period.

1956 was a disruptive period in Jordanian history with massive popular unrest caused by the Baghdad Pact, and protesters in the southern city of Ma'an called for annexation to Saudi Arabia. In other parts of Jordan were calls for Syrian annexation (Patai 2015, 60). Amid the unrest, a Saudi force of 1500-2000 troops moved toward the border. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden warned the Saudi government against aggression and the force withdrew (Shlaim 2009, 89). While British disapproval was clearly important, it is unclear whether the Saudis would have advanced in the face of a British acquiescence. In any case, the confrontation was short-lived and quickly de-escalated, and there was no actual clash.18

Alliance patterns changed abruptly with the rising threat from Nasserism. During the Suez War, just a few months after the border saber rattling, Saudi Arabia even dispatched an army contingent to Jordan as a sign of solidarity and support. A meeting in Cairo on February 25, 1957, marked the formation of Saudi Arabia-Jordan axis against an Egyptian-Syrian one vis-à-vis the Eisenhower Doctrine (Shlaim 2009, 127).

The second period rarely witnessed attempts to subvert or delegitimate the royal opponent, although these methods were extensively used against republics (as detailed in Chapter 3). There was little rhetorical or political escalation, and disagreements were voiced not in terms of general incompatibility but as differences of opinion.

King Saud initially supported the anti-government protests in Jordan, cozying up to Nasser, mainly to prevent Hashemite closeness at his expense. However, the alliance crumbled as the threat of republicanism hit ever closer to home, with the coup attempt a particularly visible marker of Egyptian subversion. It was after Nasser’s September 1956 visit to Saudi Arabia to promote a union between Egypt,

Syria, and Saudi Arabia that Saud realized the differences were unsunnountable. The short-lived friendship dissipated completely after the establishment of the UAR and after Saud's attempt to arrange Nasser's assassination in March 1958 came to light, forcing him to cede his position to his brother Faisal (Al-Rasheed 2010, 111-112).

The tamed rivalry between the three kingdoms stood in sharp contrast to the existential conflict between the monarchic and the republican camp. Reciprocal subversion attempts, including coups and assassinations, indicate a hostile relationship beyond mere disagreements and show the difference in scale between intra-monarchic conflict and conflict between monarchies and revolutionary republics. Evidently, Baghdad's disagreement with Riyadh over the Baghdad Pact never took an as shrill and polemic a tone as that between Baghdad and Cairo; to the contrary, there was an informal understanding to cease the propaganda war, though it was later breached. The US ambassador supported the two monarchies’ rapprochement attempts that were in US interests in balancing against the Soviet Union and Nasser (Podeh 1995, 90).

While a clash of Jordan and Saudi Arabia was prevented in early 1956, in March 1958, Jordanian and Syrian troops clashed along the border, while al-Said plotted to topple the republic in Syria and replace it with a monarchy (headed by Abd al-Ilah). He tried to get the British and Americans on board as well (Shlaim 2009, 157). In the 1950s, Iraqi Regent Abd al-Ilah actively tried to undermine the Syrian republic (Seale 1965, 136-141).

Saud’s support base in the royal family had been crumbling for a while, leading his brother and Crown Prince Faisal to assume the premiership. Faisal’s pro-Egyptian stance, however, did not lead to a withdrawal from the monarchic coalition, and the revolution in Iraq a few months later forced Jordan and Saudi Arabia even closer together (Podeh 1995, 85-108).

In contrast to the first period, the second saw not only a cold peace and restraint against military campaigns against the royal neighbor but also first signs of mutual support and solidarity by virtue of belonging to the same community of fate. The Saudis and the Hashemites sat in the same boat in a storm fired up by revolutionary ideology.

Although the forming alignment was not as obvious as the one between the Hashemite sister kingdoms that was about to be institutionalized in the AFU. the monarchic club began extending toward Saudi Arabia as well. During the Suez War, Saudi Arabia had dispatched an army contingent to Jordan as a sign of solidarity and support, mere months after the near-clash at the border. To counteract Nasser, King Saud also offered his support in form of two brigades put at Jordanian disposal and a subsidy of £5 million in May 1957 (Shlaim 2009, 127, 136-137). This shows a commitment toward the other that affirms the verbal rapprochement was not merely rhetorical. The new alignment that took shape in the mid and late 1950s now included Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan but also Lebanon and to a lesser degree Morocco, Libya (both monarchies at that time), Tunisia, and Sudan. The key decision makers of these countries frequently visited each other (Podeh 1995, 99-100).

This liaison went beyond a mere convergence of interests, although the aim of weakening the revolutionary republican bloc initially brought them together. Charles Johnston, the British ambassador in Amman, describes the visit by Saud to Jordan in 1957 as a union based on shared interests (anti-communism, anti-Nasserism) as well as shared institutions and values:

further step towards the new alignment in the Arab world by which Jordan is linked with Saudi Arabia, and less strictly with Iraq and the Lebanon, in opposition to Egypt and Syria. The new ‘Arab caravan' is a much more homogeneous collection of animals than the group which came together with such enthusiasm last January and February and disintegrated so spectacularly in April and May. More narrowly, King Hussein and King Sa'ud have in common their crowns, their anti-communism, and their distrust of Colonel Nasser, and for the time being these factors are more than strong enough to lay that antique Middle Eastern ghost, the traditional rivalry between the Hashemite and Saudi dynasties. I hope that the new association will continue, and I see no reason why it should not.

(cited in: Podeh 1995, 100-101)

With the backing of its royal friends, the Jordanian government felt emboldened to openly accuse Egypt and Syria of plotting the overthrow of all the Arab Kings -of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya - and of recruitment attempts of Jordanians to assassinate royal family members by the Egyptian military attaché in Amman (Patai 2015, 71).

The emerging community did not spell the end to intra-royal conflict and mistrust. King Hussein hoped to include Saudi Arabia and other conservative countries in this plan of an Arab Union, after uniting the two Hashemite dynasties. Early contacts between Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia had already been made in November 1957, but Saud was wary of financial entanglement and association with the controversial Baghdad Pact and preferred to remain in an arbiter position, although with a "tilt to the monarchist side” (Podeh 1995, 101; Shlaim 2009, 154). Saudi ambivalence was not completely distinguished, meaning that the AFU would not expand to include more monarchies than the two Hashemite ones. Nuri al-Said tried to pressure Kuwait into participating but failed. King Saud made clear that Saudi Arabia also had no intention to join in the near future on the occasion of a visit by the two states' foreign ministers at the end of February, but congratulated them on the union. Saud, a mediator rather than proactive leader, was still concerned with his perceived neutrality in the Arab World, feeling that noninterference in inter-Arab conflicts would best serve the country's territorial integrity. The strong pro-Egyptian sentiments in his own administration were another constraint (Shlaim 2009, 157).

Iraq's King Faisal arrived in Aimnanon February 11,1958, to discuss the union, and it was established three days later, on February 14, among the two Hashemite states as the Arab Federation (or Arab Union, al-ittihad al-arabi), 13 days after the announcement of the UAR. the opposing United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt, on February 1, 1958. The third attempt at Hashemite unification, it had jurisdiction over foreign and defense affairs, the establishment and management of the armed forces, diplomatic representation abroad, customs, currency, educational policy and curricula, and transportation and communication. Unlike the 1951 attempt, it was not supposed to merge the two crowns and was therefore more successfill as a loose confederation of two sovereign monarchies (Maddy-Weitzman 1990, 72).

The key difference between the two mergers (the UAR and the AFU), especially concerning the conception of the AFU as a "royal club” were clear to observers. It was ultimately detrimental for regime stability, as Simon notes: "Regarded as the union of two monarchs rather than true Arab unity, this last attempt by 'Abdul-Ilah at regional unity was to be a major contributory factor in the revolution which occurred in Iraq in July of the same year” (Simon 1974, 321). This bolsters the view that monarchic identification rather than cold, rational cost-benefit calculations were driving the institutionalization of alliance.

Even without Saudi participation, the AFU marked a peak in monarchic cooperation, the importance of which was underlined by the 1958 revolution. Alliance commitments were tested soon after the formation of the federation. After the coup attempt against pro-Western President Camille Chamoun in Lebanon, King Hussein of Jordan asked Iraq for troops for help, and an Iraqi brigade was to be sent to its sister monarchy on 13 July, the day before the coup in Iraq by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif took place. On hearing the news of the coup at 7:00 a.m. the next day, Hussein ordered an expeditionary force to Baghdad and took over the presidency of the Arab Union, in a doomed attempt to restore the monarchy (Shlaim 2009, 159-161).

The consequences of the revolution would reverberate throughout the monarchic club and further push them together in later years. Initially, however, it also showed that the monarchic club was not yet fully formed and that other monarchies were reluctant to take big risks for others that seemed doomed to collapse. While the British and Americans immediately reacted to King Hussein's call for support and Israel facilitated their actions, Saudi Arabia initially refused overflight rights for critical oil shipments to the US after an initial agreement, citing inter-family discord (Shlaim 2009, 157-164).

King Hussein's memoirs give an inkling into the sense of personal betrayal he felt from the Saudis when he talks about the “cowardice of our Arab brethren” and the disdainfill references to “our Arab friends”.19 But the actual explanation to him is clear: Saudi Arabia had meekly given up on Jordan, whose fall seemed imminent (H. King of Jordan 1962, 203).

The implications of ingroup identification mean first and foremost nonviolence inside the group. Stronger and more-demanding norms of intergroup solidarity call for a stronger bond. The monarchic club, still in its developing period, was not consolidated enough to deliver it.

The Saudis thus preferred to cut a doomed Jordan loose, in a time that was marked by a sense of monarchic ephemerality. It is embodied by King Hussein's comment on his cousin's murder: "They were kings in an age of republicanism;

Arabs in a century of Arab impotence; Anglophiles in the last days of British supremacy; Moslems among agnostics; traditionalists amid constant change” who described his family history as a "caravan of martyrs” (quoted in: Shlaim 2009, 168). Especially Jordan's demise seemed imminent and probable to most foreign observers and Jordanians themselves (Shlaim 2009, 168).

After the immediate threat had subsided and it had become clear that Jordan would not collapse, Saudi-Jordanian relations began to heal again and were fortified during the Arab Cold War. During the civil war in Yemen, sparked by the coup in 1962, as the republics of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon recognized Yemeni revolutionaries and Egypt started to provide financial and military support to them, Saudi Arabia and Jordan jointly supported the royalists, as Malcolm Kerr states, “out of dynastic solidarity” (Kerr 1971,40-41). The strong Saudi-Jordanian relationship persists without major disruptions (the aforementioned Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 as the only exception) to this day (cf. Partrick 2013).

Ingroup identification

The final period of the rivalry is marked by the slow formation of an ingroup identification, ushered in by the deaths of the rivals Abdallah in 1951 and Ibn Saud in 1953. A sense of monarchic solidarity was catalyzed in the years 1956-1958, when the Iraqi Hashemites were overthrown and their Jordanian brothers almost followed their path. Following the 1958 coup in Iraq, the rivalry between the two remaining rivals finally dissipated completely (Podeh 1995, 85). A monarchic club had emerged, even if it was still far from transformation into a more formal arrangement, indicated for instance by the Saudi reluctance to join the AFU or to support Jordan in the wake of the coup in Iraq in 1958.

Although the balance of power between the two countries was always unequal and tensions at the regime level were frequent, the

maintenance of monarchical systems of government in an area dominated by radical regimes is one of the chief factors which has cemented Jordanian -Saudi Arabian relations together for so long. In particular this relationship is often only explicable by the common thread of monarchy pushing otherwise natural rivals together in a region of populist nationalist regimes.

(Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009, 105)

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