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Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory

Electoral Promises in Formal Models“Read my lips, no new taxes” and “end welfare as we know it”Contributions and implicationsTwo voles of electoral promisesElectoral promises as a commitment deviceElectoral promises as a signalElectoral promises with vague wordsSummaryRelated studiesElectoral promises as a commitment deviceElectoral promises as a signalEndogenous candidatesValencePolitical ambiguityCauses of political ambiguityDefinitions of political ambiguityFuture workNotesBibliographyElectoral Promises as a Commitment DeviceIntroductionThe modelSettingPolicy implemented by the winnerCandidates with symmetric characteristicsPlatformsComparative statistics: cost of betrayalPosition of the platforms and a probabilistic modelCandidates with asymmetric characteristicsEquilibriumWinner of an asymmetric electionAsymmetric ideal policiesAsymmetric costs of betrayalAsymmetric political motivationsFunctional exampleApplicationsMaturity of democracyEndogenous cost of betrayalSeniority of candidatesDecisions to runSymmetric two-candidate equilibriumAsymmetric two-candidate equilibriumApplication: the Social Democratic Party of JapanSummaryAppendix: proofsNotesBibliographyElectoral Promises as a SignalIntroductionThe modelSettingPolicy implemented by the winnerPooling equilibriumDefinition and propositionAn extreme type’s choiceBeliefsThe existence of the pooling equilibriumSemi-separating equilibriumDefinition and propositionEach player's choiceVotersA moderate typeAn extreme typeThe existence of the semi-separating equilibriumDiscussionsOther equilibriaSeparating equilibrium in which a moderate type winsSeparating equilibrium in which an extreme type winsOther pooling and semi-separating equilibriaDifferences from past papersAssumptionsUniversal divinityApplications: Turkey, Japan, and the UKTurkeyJapanThe U.K.SummaryAppendix: proofsNotesBibliographyElectoral Promises with Vague WordsIntroductionDeterministic votingDiscrete spaceContinuous spaceProbabilistic votingSettingsEquilibrium with convergenceEquilibrium with divergenceApplication: the constitutional reform in JapanSummaryAppendix: proofsNotesBibliography

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