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Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory
Electoral Promises in Formal Models
“Read my lips, no new taxes” and “end welfare as we know it”
Contributions and implications
Two voles of electoral promises
Electoral promises as a commitment device
Electoral promises as a signal
Electoral promises with vague words
Summary
Related studies
Electoral promises as a commitment device
Electoral promises as a signal
Endogenous candidates
Valence
Political ambiguity
Causes of political ambiguity
Definitions of political ambiguity
Future work
Notes
Bibliography
Electoral Promises as a Commitment Device
Introduction
The model
Setting
Policy implemented by the winner
Candidates with symmetric characteristics
Platforms
Comparative statistics: cost of betrayal
Position of the platforms and a probabilistic model
Candidates with asymmetric characteristics
Equilibrium
Winner of an asymmetric election
Asymmetric ideal policies
Asymmetric costs of betrayal
Asymmetric political motivations
Functional example
Applications
Maturity of democracy
Endogenous cost of betrayal
Seniority of candidates
Decisions to run
Symmetric two-candidate equilibrium
Asymmetric two-candidate equilibrium
Application: the Social Democratic Party of Japan
Summary
Appendix: proofs
Notes
Bibliography
Electoral Promises as a Signal
Introduction
The model
Setting
Policy implemented by the winner
Pooling equilibrium
Definition and proposition
An extreme type’s choice
Beliefs
The existence of the pooling equilibrium
Semi-separating equilibrium
Definition and proposition
Each player's choice
Voters
A moderate type
An extreme type
The existence of the semi-separating equilibrium
Discussions
Other equilibria
Separating equilibrium in which a moderate type wins
Separating equilibrium in which an extreme type wins
Other pooling and semi-separating equilibria
Differences from past papers
Assumptions
Universal divinity
Applications: Turkey, Japan, and the UK
Turkey
Japan
The U.K.
Summary
Appendix: proofs
Notes
Bibliography
Electoral Promises with Vague Words
Introduction
Deterministic voting
Discrete space
Continuous space
Probabilistic voting
Settings
Equilibrium with convergence
Equilibrium with divergence
Application: the constitutional reform in Japan
Summary
Appendix: proofs
Notes
Bibliography
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Related topics
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