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Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory

Electoral Promises in Formal Models “Read my lips, no new taxes” and “end welfare as we know it”Contributions and implications Two voles of electoral promises Electoral promises as a commitment device Electoral promises as a signal Electoral promises with vague words Summary Related studies Electoral promises as a commitment device Electoral promises as a signal Endogenous candidates Valence Political ambiguity Causes of political ambiguity Definitions of political ambiguity Future work Notes Bibliography Electoral Promises as a Commitment Device Introduction The model Setting Policy implemented by the winner Candidates with symmetric characteristics Platforms Comparative statistics: cost of betrayal Position of the platforms and a probabilistic model Candidates with asymmetric characteristics Equilibrium Winner of an asymmetric election Asymmetric ideal policies Asymmetric costs of betrayal Asymmetric political motivations Functional example Applications Maturity of democracy Endogenous cost of betrayal Seniority of candidates Decisions to run Symmetric two-candidate equilibrium Asymmetric two-candidate equilibrium Application: the Social Democratic Party of Japan Summary Appendix: proofs Notes Bibliography Electoral Promises as a Signal Introduction The model Setting Policy implemented by the winner Pooling equilibrium Definition and proposition An extreme type’s choice Beliefs The existence of the pooling equilibrium Semi-separating equilibrium Definition and proposition Each player's choice Voters A moderate type An extreme type The existence of the semi-separating equilibrium Discussions Other equilibria Separating equilibrium in which a moderate type wins Separating equilibrium in which an extreme type wins Other pooling and semi-separating equilibria Differences from past papers Assumptions Universal divinity Applications: Turkey, Japan, and the UK Turkey Japan The U.K.Summary Appendix: proofs Notes Bibliography Electoral Promises with Vague Words Introduction Deterministic voting Discrete space Continuous space Probabilistic voting Settings Equilibrium with convergence Equilibrium with divergence Application: the constitutional reform in Japan Summary Appendix: proofs Notes Bibliography

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