Desktop version

Home arrow Sociology

  • Increase font
  • Decrease font


Behavioural Public Finance: Individuals, Society, and the State

I. Theoretical considerations on behavioural public financeBehavioral public finance in a populist worldIntroductionDo individuals act rationally?A tutorial role for governments?Use of nudges in authoritarian governmentsConcluding commentReferencesSmart decision-makers, institutional design and x-efficient (real-world optimal) public financeIntroductionDifferent modelling perspectivesTax complianceThe Lucas CritiqueBehavioural public finance and the theory of the firmBehavioural labour and public policyConclusionsAcknowledgementsReferencesBehavioral economics and public policyIntroductionBehavioral economics and public policy perspectivesBehavioral economics and public health policyBehavioral economics and educationConclusionsReferencesII. Behavioural responses to regulationsFinancial decisions and financial regulation: Three concepts of performance-based regulation Economics and behavioural economics and the performance of financial services and productsBehavioural economics: theory and dataDominated choices — measuring confusionBehavioural economicsEmpirical methodsThree sources of data — three conceptsAlternative conventional measuresThree concepts of performance-based regulationConcept 1: Using existing data — what have customers chosen in the past?Description o f the conceptNatural experiments: how would “confusion audits” work?What would a “confusion auditor” look like?Observations on limitations, risks, and challengesConcept 2: Laboratory experiments — simulated choices using real-world communication and online servicesDescription of the conceptExtension: surveying participants’ understanding of productsWhat would a “confusion auditor” look like?Observations on limitations, risks, and challengesConcept 3: Randomised controlled trials or field experiments — mystery shoppersDescription o f the conceptField experiments: how would “confusion audits” work?What would a “confusion auditor” look like?Observations on limitations, risks, and challengesIllustration and discussion: credit cards, savings, and insurance productsCredit cardsSavings productsDetailed case study: savings productsInsurance productsDiscussionWhat works for which market?Naming confusion auditsRegulation and confusion auditsConclusionsReferencesBehavioral biases and political actors: Three examples from US international taxationIntroductionThe Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) (1980)Cognitive heuristicPoliticians’ own biasesThe exit tax on US citizens who expatriate (2008)Cognitive heuristicPoliticians’ own biasesThe enforcement of withholding tax on dividend equivalents (2010)Cognitive heuristicPoliticians’ own biasesConclusionReferencesVarieties of general anti-avoidance legislationIntroductionCategories of tax minimisationMitigationAvoidanceEvasionExample of tax avoidance: Bowater Property DevelopmentsProblems with the analytical frameworkSecond example of tax avoidanceSpecific anti-avoidance rulesGeneral anti-avoidance rules (GAARs)Fictional transactionsAbuse of lawOperation and history of GAARsQuestionable qualities of GAARsThe “Investor” example of tax avoidanceInternational tax planningFictions in the Investor (plus Parent Company and Subsidiary) exampleSpecific anti-avoidance regimes revisitedGAARs and economicsAn example from the common law: Australia and New ZealandOther examples of similarities and dissimilarities between GAARsLength and complexity contrasted with concisenessContrasts between GAARs of common law jurisdictionsSignificance of the criterion of economic substanceConclusion: lessons from differences between GAARsReferencesIII. Tax compliance behaviour: CasesPolitical economy of tax compliance behavior: An analysis of three cities in Turkey M. Mustafa Erdogdu and Osman GeyikIntroductionThe political economy of tax compliance behaviorCommon needs, collective goods, and reciprocityFairness perception of tax burden, social norms, and attitudesTrust in governing institutions and the level of corruption perceptionsEffective use of tax revenues and satisfaction from public servicesAn empirical examination of tax compliance behavior in TurkeySurvey designResultsTaxpayers’ feelings of social responsibility and their quest for reciprocityPerceptions of respondents regarding the fairness of the Turkish tax system, their burden, and their emotionsTrust in government and perceived levels of corruptionPerceptions of public service quality and decent use of tax revenuesPolitical interactions and attitudes towards taxes: how are cities different?Concluding remarksAcknowledgmentsReferencesIncidental emotions, integral emotions, and decisions to pay taxesIntroductionWhat are emotions?How do emotions influence decisions?Empirical study (1): incidental emotions and tax complianceEmpirical study (2): the role of integral emotions on tax compliance decisionsEmpirical investigationone: qualitative focus group studytwo: quantitative survey studyDiscussionGeneral discussionConclusionsAcknowledgmentReferencesMoral concerns and personal beliefs regarding tax evasion: Empirical results from Germany, Romania, Turkey, and the United KingdomIntroductionBrief account on tax evasion-related actsMethodParticipantsMaterialsProcedureResultsMoral concerns regarding tax evasionPersonal beliefs regarding tax evasionDiscussion and concluding remarksReferencesPaying is caring?: Prosociality and gender in fiscal complianceIntroductionLiterature reviewSocial Value Orientation and tax complianceGenderHypothesesExperimental designResultsSVO is positively correlated with the average compliance rate overall.Women are significantly more tax compliant than men overall and in each individual country; however, whether women are more prosocial depends on the country in which the experiment was conducted.Individual level modelsMediation analysisConcluding remarksAcknowledgmentsReferencesTax compliance theories and fiduciary taxes: Do the shoes fit?IntroductionTax compliance theoriesFiduciary taxesTax compliance theories and organisationsConclusionsReferencesHow to tax the powerful and the sophisticated?IntroductionA very brief history of taxationRecurrent taxationIncidental taxationSeigniorage taxTribute taxAccounting-based taxesHow were plutocrats taxed in the past?A reflection on today’s plutocratsHow does modern tax avoidance work?Back to tributes?ConclusionsReferencesStarbucks and media allegations of tax avoidance: An examination of reputational lossIntroductionReview of prior literature and development of our hypothesisStarbucks — the backgroundReputational lossThe relationship between reputational loss and tax avoidanceStakeholder theoryResearch method and data collectionChoice of methodsShare return analysisThematic analysisEmpirical resultsStarbucks’ share returnsThematic analysisStarbucks’ response to the crisisSummaryConclusionReferencesThe effect of media on tax compliance: Hypothetical scenarios studyIntroductionTax Compliance ModelsMethodologyResultsConclusionReferences

Related topics