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Generalized Microeconomics
FOREWORD
THE GENERALIZED PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HOMO ECONOMICUS PARADIGM
MINIMIZATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC EXTINCTION
PARETO DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
FIRST-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
SECOND-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
GENERAL PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
MODELLING RISK AND HEDGING AGAINST IT
PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR INCOME AS A RANDOM VARIABLE
FOR MULATION OF THE LENINGRAD CASINO PROBLEM
MODEL OF THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
ADVERSE SELECTION
MORAL HAZARD
APPLICATION OF GENERALIZED MICROECONOMICS: MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
THREAT TO THE AGENT DUE TO EXTINCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL
ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
MORAL HAZARD IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
COMPARISON OF THE STANDARD HOMO ECONOMICUS WITH A SURVIVAL-PROBABILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENT
THE DEMAND FUNCTION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET: COMPARISON OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL WITH THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN EU THEORY AND KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY PROSPECT THEORY
INSURANCE IN THE MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF AN AGENT'S PARETO PROBABILITY OF (ECONOMIC) SURVIVAL
INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INCOME (EU THEORY)
INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY MODEL (PROSPECT THEORY, PT)
COMPARISON OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS OF MODELS A, B, AND C (FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE SECTIONS)
MODELLING NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: THE UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR
AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOUR
UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION
BEHAVIOUR OF A FIRM IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY- THE HOMO SE ASSECURANS MODEL
SET OF FEASIBLE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY
THE INDEX PLANNING METHOD AND THE CRITERION OF A PRODUCER IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY
MAXIMIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE RESERVE
MAXIMIZATION OF THE RELATIVE RESERVE (I.E. MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN A CPE)
MODEL OF AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
THE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY INSOLVENCY
MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD SECONDARY INSOLVENCY
MODEL A: MINIMAX STRATEGY
MODEL B: MINIMUM EXTINCTION RISK STRATEGY
THE PRODUCER'S OPTIMUM UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
MODEL A: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PRICE
MODEL B: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY
MODEL C: NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY
MODELS OF MARKET ALLOCATION OF EXTERNALITIES, GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM
EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKET
THE COASETHEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
THE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF TWO PRODUCERS
THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
THE COASE THEOREM FOR THE CASE WHERE A PRODUCER HARMS A CONSUMER
THE COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AGENTS MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY
SINGLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDER MODEL
MULTIPLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDERS MODEL
EFFICIENCY OF ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENTS THAT DEPEND ON EACH OTHER TO SURVIVE
MODEL A: INFORMATION EFFECT = INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST
MODEL B: INFORMATION EFFECT < INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST
ALTRUISM AND REDISTRIBUTION INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALS
ALTRUISM AND BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY
REDISTRIBUTION
THE SUPPLY SIDE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE WILLINGNESS TO FOR GO PART OF ONE'S PERSONAL PROSPERITY) DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS' PREFERENCES
THE WILLINGNESS TO REDISTRIBUTE IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC GOODS (THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION)
HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDISTRIBUTION
THE "DEMAND SIDE" OF REDISTRIBUTION: THE INFORMATION PROBLEM
EFFICIENCY OF REDISTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO THE DONOR'S PREFERENCES
ALTRUISTIC ALLOCATION MODELS
MODEL OF ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY
MODEL OF MINIMIZATION OF THE RISK OF SIMULTANEOUS EXTINCTION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS: CRUEL ALTRUISM
THE STATE IN THE ROLE OF DONOR
SOME DEBATABLE PRINCIPLES/RULES OF THE DONOR ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE
RESULT OF NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF A SUBSIDY TO THE NEXT PERIOD-OPTIMAL SUBSIDYTIMING MODEL
PRESCRIBED SUBSIDY USE STRUCTURE
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