Generalized Microeconomics -

FOREWORD THE GENERALIZED PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY ALTERNATIVES TO THE HOMO ECONOMICUS PARADIGM MINIMIZATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC EXTINCTION PARETO DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FIRST-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION SECOND-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION GENERAL PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION MODELLING RISK AND HEDGING AGAINST IT PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR INCOME AS A RANDOM VARIABLE FOR MULATION OF THE LENINGRAD CASINO PROBLEM MODEL OF THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL ADVERSE SELECTION MORAL HAZARD APPLICATION OF GENERALIZED MICROECONOMICS: MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL THREAT TO THE AGENT DUE TO EXTINCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL MORAL HAZARD IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL COMPARISON OF THE STANDARD HOMO ECONOMICUS WITH A SURVIVAL-PROBABILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENT THE DEMAND FUNCTION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET: COMPARISON OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL WITH THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN EU THEORY AND KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY PROSPECT THEORY INSURANCE IN THE MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF AN AGENT'S PARETO PROBABILITY OF (ECONOMIC) SURVIVAL INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INCOME (EU THEORY)INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY MODEL (PROSPECT THEORY, PT)COMPARISON OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS OF MODELS A, B, AND C (FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE SECTIONS)MODELLING NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: THE UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOUR UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION BEHAVIOUR OF A FIRM IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY- THE HOMO SE ASSECURANS MODEL SET OF FEASIBLE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY THE INDEX PLANNING METHOD AND THE CRITERION OF A PRODUCER IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY MAXIMIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE RESERVE MAXIMIZATION OF THE RELATIVE RESERVE (I.E. MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN A CPE)MODEL OF AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD CORPORATE INSOLVENCY THE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY INSOLVENCY MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD SECONDARY INSOLVENCY MODEL A: MINIMAX STRATEGY MODEL B: MINIMUM EXTINCTION RISK STRATEGY THE PRODUCER'S OPTIMUM UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE MODEL A: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PRICE MODEL B: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY MODEL C: NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY MODELS OF MARKET ALLOCATION OF EXTERNALITIES, GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKET THE COASETHEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES THE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF TWO PRODUCERS THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION THE COASE THEOREM FOR THE CASE WHERE A PRODUCER HARMS A CONSUMER THE COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AGENTS MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY SINGLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDER MODEL MULTIPLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDERS MODEL EFFICIENCY OF ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENTS THAT DEPEND ON EACH OTHER TO SURVIVE MODEL A: INFORMATION EFFECT = INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST MODEL B: INFORMATION EFFECT < INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST ALTRUISM AND REDISTRIBUTION INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALS ALTRUISM AND BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY REDISTRIBUTION THE SUPPLY SIDE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE WILLINGNESS TO FOR GO PART OF ONE'S PERSONAL PROSPERITY) DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS' PREFERENCES THE WILLINGNESS TO REDISTRIBUTE IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC GOODS (THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION)HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDISTRIBUTION THE "DEMAND SIDE" OF REDISTRIBUTION: THE INFORMATION PROBLEM EFFICIENCY OF REDISTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO THE DONOR'S PREFERENCES ALTRUISTIC ALLOCATION MODELS MODEL OF ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY MODEL OF MINIMIZATION OF THE RISK OF SIMULTANEOUS EXTINCTION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS: CRUEL ALTRUISM THE STATE IN THE ROLE OF DONOR SOME DEBATABLE PRINCIPLES/RULES OF THE DONOR ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE RESULT OF NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF A SUBSIDY TO THE NEXT PERIOD-OPTIMAL SUBSIDYTIMING MODEL PRESCRIBED SUBSIDY USE STRUCTURE