1. See, for example, the excellent volume Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal: At the Limits of Human Experience, ed. Corinne Painter and Christian Lotz (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007).
2. Corinne Painter, “Appropriating the Philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein: Animal Psyche, Empathy and Moral Subjectivity,” in Painter and Lotz, Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal, 97-115.
3. Arun Iyer, “Transcendental Subjectivity, Embodied Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism,” in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, ed. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian Luft (London: Continuum, 2010), 66-76, at 71-72. Though I do not agree with Husserl’s view of animals, I do find his extension of empathy to animals very useful for this discussion.
4. Dermot Moran, Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 132.
5. Christiane Bailey, “Kinds ofLife: On the Phenomenological Basis ofthe Distinction between ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ Animals,” Environmental Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2011): 47-68.
6. Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. W. Stein (Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1989), 10; hereafter parenthetically cited as Emp.
7. When Stein speaks of bringing to mind something given to consciousness, she is referring to an act of consciousness where one focuses on the content of what appears in consciousness in order to clarify the content’s nature or essence. To understand what appears in consciousness, we make the content into an object that can be observed from the viewpoint of subjective consciousness, that is, the consciousness of an embodied I/ego or person.
8. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Springer, 1990); hereafter parenthetically cited as Ideas II.
9. The material body refers to the body as perceived as having extension in space; that is, it is perceived as occupying a certain amount of space and having certain dimensions. The lived body is the experience of my own body, as I live or experience it as my own body. Here, the body is not observed like an external object; rather, the body is experienced from within one’s own embodiment. In early phenomenological literature, the foregoing distinction was understood as external versus internal perception.
10. Reiterated empathy or reflexive sympathy is not connected with the field of sensations, but is merely an empathizing that takes place with already-experienced empathic experience. For example, my brother and I felt great joy at the birth of our new nephew. We understood each other’s feeling ofjoy. When we recollect this memory in present circumstances, we both experience the joy of that day. The joy we experience together and understand in common is drawn from a re-presented or recollected past experience of empathy—hence the phrase, an “empathy of empathized acts” (Emp., 18).
11. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat: Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil: 1905-1920, in Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, ed. Iso Kern (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1972), 13:401-2.
12. Edith Stein, Einfuhrung in die Philosophic (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), 219.
13. David Morris, “Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 (2005): 49-72.
14. Ibid. 60-61.
15. See the work of the Memorial University Canine Research Unit at http://dogs- body.psych.mun.ca/cru/Canine_Research_Unit_2016/CRU_Home.html.
16. Lydia Ottenheimer Carrier, Amanda Cyr, Rita E. Anderson, and Carolyn J. Walsh, “Exploring the Dog Park: Relationships between Social Behaviours, Personality and Cortisol in Companion Dogs,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 146, no. 1-4 (2013): 96-106; see also http://dogsbody.psych.mun.ca/cru/CRU_Summer_ 2014/Publications_files/M.S.c%20talk%20summer%202014-website%20 short%20refs.pdf.
17. Olin E. Myers, Jr., Carol D. Saunders, and Erik Garrett, “What Do Children Think Animals Need? Aesthetic and Psycho-social Conceptions,” in Environmental Education Research 9, no. 3 (August 2003): 305-25, at 323.
19. Olin E. Myers Jr., Carol D. Saunders, and Erik Garrett, “What Do Children Think Animals Need? Developmental Trends,” Environmental Education Research 10, no. 4 (November 2004): 545-62.