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Philosophy of Action: A Contemporary Introduction
What Is the Problem of Action?
Activity and Passivity
Goal-Directedness
Attributability
“Actish” Phenomenal Quality
Voluntary Action
Rational Action, or Acting for Reasons
Practical Knowledge
Intentional Action
Intention
Autonomy, Identification, and Self-Governance
Further Choice Points
a Which Cases Are Paradigmatic?
b Questions About Action: Conceptual or Ontological?
Conclusion
Suggested Reading
Action Explanation
Guises of Rationalizing Explanation
Reasons for Action: Motivating vs. Normative
More on the “Why?” Question
Action Explanation: Four Views
a The Rational Interpretation View
b The Causal Theory of Action Explanation
c Teleological Realism
d Naïve Action Theory
Arational Action
Summary
Suggested Reading
The Ontology of Action
Which Things in the World Can Be Actions?
Under a Description
Basic Actions
a Bodily Movements
b Volitions
c Beyond the Body
The Accordion Effect
How Many Actions?
The Causal Theory of Action
a Objection I: Deviant Causal Chains, Redux
b Objection 2: The Disappearing Agent
Alternatives to the Causal Theory
a Quietism
b Agent-Causation and Causal Powers
c Formal Causation
d An “Actish" Phenomenal Quality
Omissions
Mental Actions
Summary
Suggested Reading
Intention
Methodological Priority: Present or Future?
Goal States and Plan States
Reductive Accounts of Intention
a Predominant Desire
b Predominant Desire Plus Belief
c Evaluative Judgment
Plan States and Plan Rationality
Cognitivism About Intention
A Distinctively Practical Attitude
Intending and Intentional Action
Summary
Suggested Reading
Practical Knowledge
What Do We Mean by “Practical Knowledge?”
a Knowledge Without Observation
b Knowledge Without Inference
c Mistakes Are in the Performance, Not the Judgment
d The Cause of What It Understands
le Contradicted by Interference
The Scope and Object of Practical Knowledge
Accounts of Practical Knowledge
a Cognitivism About Intention
b Imperfective Knowledge
c The Inferential Account
Summary
Suggested Reading
Does Action Have a Constitutive Aim?
The Guise of the Good
The Aim of Self-Understanding
The Aim of Self-Constitution
The Will to Power
No Constitutive Aim
Implications for Ethics and Metaethics
Summary
Suggested Reading
Identification and Self-Governance
Frankfurt on Identification
Watson’s Objection and Platonic Alternative
Frankfurt Redux: Wholeheartedness
Bratman on Self-governing Policies
Skepticism About Self-Governance: A Genealogical Worry
Self-Governance and Plan Rationality
Summary
Suggested Reading
Temptation, Weakness, and Strength of Will
Is Synchronic Akrasia Even Possible?
A Failure of Reasoning?
A Divergence Between Evaluation and Motivation?
Is Akrasia Necessarily Irrational?
Weakness of Will Over Time
Self-Control
Summary
Suggested Reading
Collective Agency
Questions and Constraints
Group Agents
Collective Intentions
a Tuomela and Miller
b Searle
c Bratman
d Velleman
e Gilbert
Acting Together
Summary
Suggested Reading
Concluding Thoughts
Bibliography
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