Philosophy of Science: An Introduction to the Central Issues - Philosophy of Science: An Introduction to the Central Issues -

What is philosophy of science?From the personages to the issues The central issues of philosophy of science The structure of the book The significance of philosophy of science Note From scientific philosophy to philosophy of science Logical atomism Logical positivism Logical empiricism Critical rationalism Historicism Postmodernism The new wave Notes Logic and argument Propositional logic Syllogism Quantificational logic Axiomatic system of first-order logic Logic and language analysis Note Criteria of cognitive significance Proposing the criteria of meaning Testability criteria The verification principle The falsifiability criterion The confirmability criterion The translatability criterion The requirement of definability The requirement of reducibility The rise of holism Empirical significance of the meaning criterion Summary Notes Induction and confirmation Inductive methods Enumerative induction Statistical syllogism The argument from authority Arguments from anti-authority Analogical inference J. S. Mill’s inductive methods The hypothetico-deductive method Hume and the problem of induction Justifications of induction Inductive justification of induction Argument from the uniformity of nature Popper’s elimination of induction Strawson’s dissolving justification of induction Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification Hempel’s studies in the logic of confirmation Nicod’s criterion of confirmation The prediction criterion of confirmation The satisfaction criterion of confirmation Carnap’s inductive logic Goodman’s new riddle of induction Bayesianism Bayes’ theorem The subjective interpretation of probability Bayesianism and the problem of confirmation Summary Note Scientific explanation models and their problems Introduction Hempel’s scientific explanation models The DN model of scientific explanation The IS model of scientific explanation Supplementary specification of scientific explanation Variations of scientific explanations Problems of scientific explanation Explanation and prediction Asymmetry thesis The irrelevance objection Requirement of maximal specificity Van Fraassen: Pragmatics of scientific explanation Salmon: Causality and explanation Explanation: Global and local The DNP model of scientific explanation Summary Theories about the growth of scientific knowledge Logical positivists’ accumulation model Popper’s theory of continuous revolutions Kuhn’s historicism and relativism Lakatos’ scientific research programmes Feyerabend: Anything goes Newton-Smith’s reconstruction of the rationality of science Laudan’s non-holistic picture Summary Notes Demarcation between science and pseudoscience Historical background The logical criterion Logical positivists’ verification criterion Popper’s falsificationism Relative criterion Kuhn’s blurred criterion Lakatos’ demarcation criterion Dissolving demarcation criteria Pluralist criterion Thagard’s three elements criterion Bunge’s ten-tuple criterion Summary Note Scientific realism Introduction Historical clues Maxwell’s challenge to the observational–theoretical dichotomy Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism Theory and observation Inference to the best explanation Microstructural explanations and scientific realism Limits of the demand for explanation Darwinian explanation of the Ultimate Argument Laudan’s confutation of convergent realism Hacking’s experimental realism Fine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude”Musgrave’s defense of realism Summary Philosophy of scientific experimentation The view of experimentation in the traditional philosophy of science Logical empiricists’ view of experimentation Popper’s view of experimentation Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend New experimentalism Theory-oriented or experiment-oriented Which comes first, theory or experiment?Experimentation has a life of its own Pluralist relation Observation and experimentation Experiments create phenomena Experimentation and scientific realism Social analysis of scientific experimentation Summary Science and values Objective values in the ancient world Hume’s dichotomy Objectivism and its criticism Values in science Rudner: The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments Hempel: Scientific knowledge needs valuational presuppositions Kuhn: Value judgment and theory choice Summary New developments in philosophy of science The changes of textbooks in philosophy of science The sin of logical positivism and relativism “New age” philosophies of science Constructivism Feminism Postmodernism Summary: A personal point of view Bibliography