Desktop version

Home arrow Philosophy

  • Increase font
  • Decrease font


Philosophy of Science: An Introduction to the Central Issues

What is philosophy of science?From the personages to the issuesThe central issues of philosophy of scienceThe structure of the bookThe significance of philosophy of scienceNoteFrom scientific philosophy to philosophy of scienceLogical atomismLogical positivismLogical empiricismCritical rationalismHistoricismPostmodernismThe new waveNotesLogic and argumentPropositional logicSyllogismQuantificational logicAxiomatic system of first-order logicLogic and language analysisNoteCriteria of cognitive significanceProposing the criteria of meaningTestability criteriaThe verification principleThe falsifiability criterionThe confirmability criterionThe translatability criterionThe requirement of definabilityThe requirement of reducibilityThe rise of holismEmpirical significance of the meaning criterionSummaryNotesInduction and confirmationInductive methodsEnumerative inductionStatistical syllogismThe argument from authorityArguments from anti-authorityAnalogical inferenceJ. S. Mill’s inductive methodsThe hypothetico-deductive methodHume and the problem of inductionJustifications of inductionInductive justification of inductionArgument from the uniformity of naturePopper’s elimination of inductionStrawson’s dissolving justification of inductionReichenbach’s pragmatic justificationHempel’s studies in the logic of confirmationNicod’s criterion of confirmationThe prediction criterion of confirmationThe satisfaction criterion of confirmationCarnap’s inductive logicGoodman’s new riddle of inductionBayesianismBayes’ theoremThe subjective interpretation of probabilityBayesianism and the problem of confirmationSummaryNoteScientific explanation models and their problemsIntroductionHempel’s scientific explanation modelsThe DN model of scientific explanationThe IS model of scientific explanationSupplementary specification of scientific explanationVariations of scientific explanationsProblems of scientific explanationExplanation and predictionAsymmetry thesisThe irrelevance objectionRequirement of maximal specificityVan Fraassen: Pragmatics of scientific explanationSalmon: Causality and explanationExplanation: Global and localThe DNP model of scientific explanationSummaryTheories about the growth of scientific knowledgeLogical positivists’ accumulation modelPopper’s theory of continuous revolutionsKuhn’s historicism and relativismLakatos’ scientific research programmesFeyerabend: Anything goesNewton-Smith’s reconstruction of the rationality of scienceLaudan’s non-holistic pictureSummaryNotesDemarcation between science and pseudoscienceHistorical backgroundThe logical criterionLogical positivists’ verification criterionPopper’s falsificationismRelative criterionKuhn’s blurred criterionLakatos’ demarcation criterionDissolving demarcation criteriaPluralist criterionThagard’s three elements criterionBunge’s ten-tuple criterionSummaryNoteScientific realismIntroductionHistorical cluesMaxwell’s challenge to the observational–theoretical dichotomyVan Fraassen’s constructive empiricismTheory and observationInference to the best explanationMicrostructural explanations and scientific realismLimits of the demand for explanationDarwinian explanation of the Ultimate ArgumentLaudan’s confutation of convergent realismHacking’s experimental realismFine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude”Musgrave’s defense of realismSummaryPhilosophy of scientific experimentationThe view of experimentation in the traditional philosophy of scienceLogical empiricists’ view of experimentationPopper’s view of experimentationKuhn, Lakatos, and FeyerabendNew experimentalismTheory-oriented or experiment-orientedWhich comes first, theory or experiment?Experimentation has a life of its ownPluralist relationObservation and experimentationExperiments create phenomenaExperimentation and scientific realismSocial analysis of scientific experimentationSummaryScience and valuesObjective values in the ancient worldHume’s dichotomyObjectivism and its criticismValues in scienceRudner: The scientist qua scientist makes value judgmentsHempel: Scientific knowledge needs valuational presuppositionsKuhn: Value judgment and theory choiceSummaryNew developments in philosophy of scienceThe changes of textbooks in philosophy of scienceThe sin of logical positivism and relativism“New age” philosophies of scienceConstructivismFeminismPostmodernismSummary: A personal point of viewBibliography

Related topics