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Clark and Chalmers

  • 1. We are to think of the extended mind as extending into the environment through causal couplings, so when I play Tetris on a computer, my mind extends to the screen. But suppose, unbeknown to me, there is no causal coupling; the shapes just move randomly on the screen—by chance, moving just as I intend. Does this mean that my thought processes are the same as when there is a causal coupling? If so, does this show that thought processes are internal?
  • 2. We are to understand that Otto has beliefs in his notebook as part of his mind. Are Clark and Chalmers right about this? Are Otto’s beliefs just as much in his notebook as in his head? If he loses his notebook, does he lose part of his mind? If Inga breaks into his house during the night when Otto is sleeping and writes in his notebook, with perfect forgery skills “I love Inga and no one else” all over it, does this mean that Otto loves her and no one else? If so, does he start to love her the moment she writes the words, or only when he consults his notebook?
  • 3. What is the role of Otto’s brain for his mind? Suppose Otto’s brain deteriorates to the point where he becomes comatose; does he still believe what is in his notebook? How might Clarke and Chalmers respond?
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