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Whether the lamb will flee the wolf without perceiving that there is something harmful in it.
Further one asks whether the lamb will flee the wolf without perceiving that there is something harmful in it.
It seems not, because, just as there is an intellective power in the human, so too is there a sensitive power in a brute beast. But the human intellect apprehends nothing that was not sensed first. Therefore, all the more is it the case that the beast apprehends nothing that is not sensed first, and, as a consequence, this is also true for something harmful. As a result, the lamb flees the wolf because it was sensed first.
To the contrary: A lamb perceives nothing in the wolf other than color and common sensibles. But it frequently perceives things that are poorly colored or shaped in an unbecoming fashion, but does not flee from them. Therefore, it perceives nothing harmful before it flees.
One must respond that the estimative power in a beast proceeds by operating in three ways: by way of apprehension, by way of experience, and by way of analogy. It operates by way of apprehension, just as a child seeks and suckles at the breast, which it has not seen before. Similarly, a lamb flees the wolf, which it has never seen before. While the color and shape of the wolf move the exterior sense and after that the interior sense, the interior sense naturally apprehends its hostile intent. Thus, an apprehension of the harmful or injurious precedes its flight. Sometimes it proceeds along the path of experience, as when a bird flees someone who is threatening to throw a rock or is holding or moving a stick. This is because it often happens that it was deceived or it suffered some trouble through movements of this sort. An indication of this is that a young bird does not fear this until it has experienced for itself some evil like this, or because it was taught by its mother and father to flee, etc. [The estimative power is proceeding along] the path of analogy when a bird flees scarecrows, a painted picture of a person, or a figure made in the likeness of one holding a bow.
Through these things the answer to the arguments is clear.
Whether art or craft is present in beasts.
Further one asks about art or craft in animals. First it is asked whether art or craft is present in beasts. And it seems not. Art is a representative gathering together of certain things to create a resemblance to certain preceding things. But such gathering does not occur without comparison. Since comparing pertains to reason and not to sensation, art will not be present in brute beasts.
Besides, according to the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, there are five intellectual virtues, of which art is one. Since intellect is not present in beasts, neither will art be present.
In the text the Philosopher indicates the contrary.
For it must be said that art is a proper understanding of things capable of being made, as is clear from the sixth book of the Ethics? Making [factio] is, however, an operation that carries over into something exterior, and this is different from action [actio], which is an operation that does not carry over into something exterior. Therefore, art is not present, properly speaking, in those in whom reason is not present. But reason is not present in beasts. Therefore, art is not in them. Now truly, although they do not have art, they nevertheless do have something that resembles art. For a weaver cannot produce a weave without art any more than a tailor can make a tunic or a carpenter a house, but a spider weaves a web and an ape makes a tunic and a beaver makes a house as if possessing an art by which they are guided. Likewise, the swallow builds a nest.
Thus, one may say in brief that brute animals make works of art, but nevertheless do not do so by art but rather by nature. And this is why they always act in a uniform way, as nature does, unless they are impeded by something external. Thus, every spider makes a web just like every other spider, and swallows similarly make their nests alike. But this is not the way that every weaver works, or every builder of houses, because these use art, which allows for variation. Those which always act in a uniform way are working by nature, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Physics. But not every builder makes the same house as another builder, nor does the weaver produce the same weave. Still, some doubt remains with respect to some animals, like bees, and more about this will be revealed below.
From this a solution to the arguments is clear. For these proceed from art as it is properly understood, and this is true. But the Philosopher intends that art be understood here metaphorically and considered by means of analogy. And in the same way for the other.
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