Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), International Court of Justice,
Advisory Opinion,  ICJ Rep 151
Jan Wouters and Jed Odermatt
Relevance of the case
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Certain Expenses’ or ‘opinion’) is a landmark case in the history of the Court, although the Court defined its task narrowly and avoided delving into deeper issues of international law. On the face of it, the opinion is confined to the specific issue of the UN General Assembly’s authority regarding the budget and expenses of the United Nations (UN), especially those related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet Certain Expenses has wider consequences: it provides rich jurisprudence for international law and the law of international organizations, including the powers of UN organs, treaty interpretation, the doctrine of ultra vires, and the Court’s relationship with other UN organs.
I. Facts of the case
The request for an advisory opinion from the UN General Assembly (UNGA) came as part of a wider political and legal dispute about the funding of two UN peacekeeping missions. The UNGA had authorized the creation of the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF) in the wake of the Suez crisis, and UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) related to the conflict in Central Africa. Partially as a result of these missions, the UN experienced a severe deterioration in its financial condition, and it became clear that it was facing ‘imminent bankruptcy’ if its financial issues could not be brought under control. One of the main issues was the unpaid obligations of various member States, including the Soviet Union, who had refused to accept certain special expenditures related to these two operations. The UNGA had treated these expenditures as normal expenses of the UN, which are apportioned to the various members of the organization according to art. 17(3) of the UN Charter. Certain member States had doubts regarding the legality of the UNGA’s actions in the Middle East and Congo, and as such refused to pay for expenditures related to these operations. The request for an advisory opinion was an attempt to help resolve some of these legal issues regarding the UNGA’s power to incur expenses related to peace and security.
II. The legal questions
The UNGA essentially asked whether certain expenses related to operations in the Congo and in the Middle East constituted ‘expenses of the Organization’ under art. 17(2) of the UN Charter. In order to define ‘expenses of the Organization’ it faced the question of whether there is a distinction to be made between a ‘regular’ (‘administrative’) and an ‘operational’ budget.
The Court was also asked to decide, indirectly, on the legality of the expenses incurred by the UNGA. The Court discussed whether it should take into account the rejection of a French amendment to the question which would have specifically asked the Court to judge whether certain expenses were ‘decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and, if so, do they constitute expenses of the Organization’. Did the rejection of this amendment preclude the Court from examining the legality of the UNGA resolutions concerned under the UN Charter?
The Court was called upon to decide on questions of jurisdiction, especially whether there were any compelling reasons why it should refuse to give an opinion in this instance. One argument put forward in this regard was that the question was essentially not a ‘legal question’ given the political nature of the dispute.
 The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived from Article 65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character [...]...
 The Court finds no ‘compelling reason’ why it should not give the advisory opinion which the General Assembly requested by its resolution 1731 (XVI). It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of things it could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision.
 The question on which the Court is asked to give its opinion is whether certain expenditures which were authorized by the General Assembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo (hereinafter referred to as ONUC) and of the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (hereinafter referred to as UNEF), ‘constitute “expenses of the Organization” within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.’
 The rejection of the French amendment does not constitute a directive to the Court to exclude from its consideration the question whether certain expenditures were ‘decided on in conformity with the Charter’, if the Court finds such consideration appropriate. It is not to be assumed that the General Assembly would thus seek to fetter or hamper the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions; the Court must have full liberty to consider all relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to it for an advisory opinion. Nor can the Court agree that the rejection of the French amendment has any bearing upon the question whether 
the General Assembly sought to preclude the Court from interpreting Article 17 in the light of other articles of the Charter, that is, in the whole context of the treaty. If any deduction is to be made from the debates on this point, the opposite conclusion would be drawn from the clear statements of sponsoring delegations that they took it for granted the Court would consider the Charter as a whole.
 Turning to the question which has been posed, the Court observes that it involves an interpretation of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. On the previous occasions when the Court has had to interpret the Charter of the United Nations, it has followed the principles and rules applicable in general to the interpretation of treaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is a multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics. In interpreting Article 4 of the Charter, the Court was led to consider ‘the structure of the Charter’ and ‘the relations established by it between the General Assembly and the Security Council’; a comparable problem confronts the Court in the instant matter. The Court sustained its interpretation of Article 4 by considering the manner in which the organs concerned ‘have consistently interpreted the text’ in their practice (Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 8-9).
 The text of Article 17, paragraph 2, refers to ‘the expenses of the Organization’ without any further explicit definition of such expenses. It would be possible to begin with a general proposition to the effect that the ‘expenses’ of any organization are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out its purposes, in this case, the political, economic, social, humanitarian and other purposes of the United Nations. The next step would be to examine, as the Court will, whether the resolutions authorizing the operations here in question were intended to carry out the purposes of the United Nations and whether the expenditures were incurred in furthering these operations. Or, it might simply be said that the ‘expenses’ of an organization are those which are provided for in its budget. But the Court has not been asked to give an abstract definition of the words ‘expenses of the Organization’. It has been asked to answer a specific question related to certain identified expenditures which have actually been made, but the Court would not adequately discharge the obligation incumbent on it unless it examined in some detail various problems raised by the question which the General Assembly has asked.
 It is perhaps the simple identification of ‘expenses’ with the items included in a budget, which has led certain arguments to link the interpretation of the word ‘expenses’ in paragraph 2 of Article 17, with the word ‘budget’ in paragraph 1 of that Article; in both cases, it is contended, the qualifying adjective ‘regular’ or ‘administrative’ should be understood to be implied. Since no such qualification is expressed in the text of the Charter, it could be read in, only if such qualification must necessarily be implied from the provisions of the Charter considered as a whole, or from some particular provision thereof which makes it unavoidable to do so in order to give effect to the Charter.
 In the first place, concerning the word ‘budget’ in paragraph 1 of Article 17, it is clear that the existence of the distinction between ‘administrative budgets’ and ‘operational budgets’ was not absent from the minds of the drafters of the Charter, nor from the consciousness of the Organization even in the early days of its history.
In drafting Article 17, the drafters found it suitable to provide in paragraph I that ‘The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization’...
 Actually, the practice of the Organization is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the text. The budget of the Organization has from the outset included items which would not fall within any of the definitions of ‘administrative budget’ which have been advanced in this connection.
 It is a consistent practice of the General Assembly to include in the annual budget resolutions, provision for expenses relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Annually, since 1947, the General Assembly has made anticipatory provision for ‘unforeseen and extraordinary expenses’ arising in relation to the ‘maintenance of peace and security’.
 In the light of what has been stated, the Court concludes that there is no justification for reading into the text of Article 17, paragraph 1, any limiting or qualifying word before the word ‘budget’.
 Turning to paragraph 2 of Article 17, the Court observes that, on its face, the term ‘expenses of the Organization’ means all the expenses and not just certain types of expenses which might be referred to as ‘regular expenses’. An examination of other parts of the Charter shows the variety of expenses which must inevitably be included within the ‘expenses of the Organization’ just as much as the salaries of staff or the maintenance of buildings.
 Passing from the text of Article 17 to its place in the general structure and scheme of the Charter, the Court will consider whether in that broad context one finds any basis for implying a limitation upon the budgetary authority of the General Assembly which in turn might limit the meaning of ‘expenses’ in paragraph 2 of that Article.
 The general purposes of Article 17 are the vesting of control over the finances of the Organization, and the levying of apportioned amounts of the expenses of the Organization in order to enable it to carry out the functions of the Organization as a whole acting through its principal organs and such subsidiary organs as may be established under the authority of Article 22 or Article 29.
 [...] [I]t has been argued before the Court that one type of expenses, namely those resulting from operations for the maintenance of international peace and security, are not ‘expenses of the Organization’ within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, inasmuch as they fall to be dealt with exclusively by the Security Council, and more especially through agreements negotiated in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.
 The argument rests in part upon the view that when the maintenance of international peace and security is involved, it is only the Security Council which is authorized to decide on any action relative thereto. It is argued further that since the General Assembly’s power is limited to discussing, considering, studying and recommending, it cannot impose an obligation to pay the expenses which result from the implementation of its recommendations. This argument leads to an examination of the respective functions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council under the Charter particularly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security.
 The responsibility conferred is ‘primary’, not exclusive. This primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, as stated in Article 24, ‘in order to ensure prompt and effective action’. To this end, it is the Security Council which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance if for example it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. It is only the Security Council which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor.
 The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security. Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to ‘recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. The word ‘measures’ implies some kind of action, and the only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do so. Thus while it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with ‘decisions’ of the General Assembly ‘on important questions’. These ‘decisions’ do indeed include certain recommendations, but others have dispositive force and effect. Among these latter decisions, Article 18 includes suspension of rights and privileges of membership, expulsion of Members, ‘and budgetary questions’. In connection with the suspension of rights and privileges of membership and expulsion from membership under Articles 5 and 6, it is the Security Council which has only the power to recommend and it is the General Assembly which decides and whose decision determines status; but there is a close collaboration between the two organs. Moreover, these powers of decision of the General Assembly under Articles 5 and 6 are specifically related to preventive or enforcement measures.
 By Article 17, paragraph 1, the General Assembly is given the power not only to ‘consider’ the budget of the Organization, but also to ‘approve’ it. The decision to ‘approve’ the budget has a close connection with paragraph 2 of Article 17, since thereunder the General Assembly is also given the power to apportion the expenses among the Members and the exercise of the power of apportionment creates the obligation, specifically stated in Article 17, paragraph 2, of each Member to bear that part of the expenses which is apportioned to it by the General Assembly. When those expenses include expenditures for the maintenance of peace and security, which are not otherwise provided for, it is the General Assembly which has the authority to apportion the latter amounts among the Members. The provisions of the Charter which distribute functions and powers to the Security Council and to the General Assembly give no support to the view that such distribution excludes from the powers of the General Assembly the power to provide for the financing of measures designed to maintain peace and security.
 The Court accordingly finds that the argument which seeks, by reference to Article 11, paragraph 2, to limit the budgetary authority of the General Assembly in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security, is unfounded.
 [...] In determining whether the actual expenditures authorized constitute ‘expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter’, the Court agrees that such expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of the United Nations in the sense that if an expenditure were made for a purpose which is not one of the purposes of the United Nations, it could not be considered an ‘expense of the Organization’.
 The purposes of the United Nations are set forth in Article 1 of the Charter. The first two purposes as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2, may be summarily described as pointing to the goal of international peace and security and friendly relations. The third purpose is the achievement of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian goals and respect for human rights. The fourth and last purpose is: ‘To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.’
 The primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition. These purposes are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate them are unlimited. Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action. But when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.
 If it is agreed that the action in question is within the scope of the functions of the Organization but it is alleged that it has been initiated or carried out in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions among the several organs which the Charter prescribes, one moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. If the action was taken by the wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the expense incurred was not an expense of the Organization. Both national and international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires act of an agent.
 In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security Council, for example, adopts a resolution purportedly for the maintenance of international peace and security and if, in accordance with a mandate or authorization in such resolution, the Secretary-General incurs financial obligations, these amounts must be presumed to constitute ‘expenses of the Organization’.
 This resolution, which was adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority, must have rested upon the conclusion that the expenses of UNEF were ‘expenses of the Organization’ since otherwise the General Assembly would have had no authority to decide that they ‘shall be borne by the United Nations’ or to apportion them among the Members. [...]
 [...] Consequently, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the question submitted to it in General Assembly resolution 1731 (XVI) must be answered in the affirmative.
 For these reasons, The Court is of opinion, by nine votes to five, that the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions [. ] constitute ‘expenses of the Organization’ within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Court’s answer was that expenses authorized by the UNGA in relation to the ONUC and UNEF constituted ‘expenses of the Organization’ within the meaning of art. 17(2) of the UN Charter. Although the immediate outcome of the opinion was to clarify this legal question regarding the UNGA’s budgetary authority, the opinion continues to have relevance in defining the powers of the UN organs, clarifying the Court’s approach to treaty interpretation, the legal issue of ultra vires acts of international organizations, and the role of the Court in giving advisory opinions.
A. Powers of the UN organs
While the legal issue in this case is related to the relatively narrow question of the meaning of ‘expenses’, the dispute stemmed from a wider disagreement over the UN’s increasing role in international peace and security, in particular by the UNGA. It has been noted that the opinion allowed, ‘for the first time, express judicial approval of the practical transfer of responsibility for maintenance of peace from the Security Council to the General Assembly’. The opinion acknowledges that while the UN Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter, this role is not exclusive. The Court points out that the Charter provides a role for the UNGA relating to international peace and security which is not limited to giving recommendations—‘they are not merely hortatory’.4
The Court found that there was nothing in the distribution of powers among the UNSC and UNGA that precluded the latter from financing measures designed to maintain peace and security. The UNGA could exercise its powers in the field of peace and security, except where it was expressly precluded from doing so by an exclusive power of the Security Council. It is to these enforcement actions that the restrictive clause of art. 11(2) of the UN Charter applies. Yet upon examining the nature of the UNEF and ONUC operations the Court determined that they were not enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In effect, the Court authorized a wider role for the UNGA in international peace and security. This is particularly significant since the UN Security Council was often unable to act due to the exercise of veto powers by that body’s permanent members, particularly during the superpower rivalries of the Cold War.
B. Treaty interpretation
The case is also notable in that it further illustrates the Court’s approach to treaty interpretation, particularly of the UN Charter. The Court confirmed that the UN Charter is a multilateral convention, albeit one with certain special characteristics, and as such customary international law techniques of treaty interpretation apply. The Court found that expenditures could only be considered ‘expenses of the organization’ where they were carried out in order to fulfil the purposes of the UN. The Court examined the plain meaning of the text and found that expenses means ‘the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out its purposes, in this case, the political, economic, social, humanitarian and other purposes of the United Nations’. The Court could not find any reason to differentiate between expenses of a ‘regular’ or ‘administrative’ nature. In coming to this conclusion, the Court found it relevant that art. 17(3) does use the limiting term ‘administrative’ whereas art. 17(2) does not. If the drafters had intended to limit the expenditure in art. 17(2) to administrative expenses only, they would have used similar limiting language.
The Court also analysed art. 17 in a wider context, taking into account the broader UN structure, and found that there was no limitation to the term ‘expenses’. A distinction between ‘administrative’ and ‘regular’ expenses could only be made ‘if such qualification must necessarily be implied from the provisions of the Charter considered as a whole, or from some particular provision thereof which makes it unavoidable to do so in order to give effect to the Charter’. There is nothing in the Charter, particularly in the distribution of functions and powers to the UNSC and to the UNGA, to imply that the latter did not have power for the financing of measures related to peace and security.
To support this conclusion, the Court also took into account ‘the manner in which the organs concerned “have consistently interpreted the text” in their practice’.8 In particular, it noted that ‘[i]t is a consistent practice of the General Assembly to include in the annual budget resolutions, provision for expenses relating to the maintenance of international peace and security’.9 The Court therefore relied upon the practice of the UN organs as a subsidiary means to support its conclusion. The opinion has been criticized for its reliance on the practice of UN organs as ‘subsequent practice’ of the parties in interpreting the UN Charter, especially by Judge Spender in his separate opinion. 
This raises the question of the probative value of ‘organ practice’ within the United Nations, and in international organizations generally. Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that subsequent practice may be taken into account as a means of interpretation if it ‘establishes the agreement of the parties’. Yet when using ‘organ practice’ the Court did not examine the extent to which the practice of the UN organs actually reflected the consent of UN member States. The UNGA practice to which the Court referred did not represent unanimous decisions; on the contrary, some were strongly opposed by member States. The question is not whether organ practice should be used as an interpretive tool, but the weight that should be given to it. Here ‘organ practice’ was used as a subsidiary, supporting reason, rather than a primary tool of treaty interpretation."
C. Ultra vires
Some states had argued that the operations authorized by the UNGA violated the UN Charter and should therefore be considered ultra vires. The Court had to determine whether it should examine the validity of the expenditures. In particular, the Court examined whether the French amendment to the text of the question constituted a relevant limit on the jurisdiction of the Court. The French amendment to the question, a proposal that was eventually defeated in the UNGA, would have requested the Court to answer whether the expenses were ‘decided upon in conformity with the provisions of the Charter’.
The question of validity did arise through the Court’s examination of art. 17(2) of the UN Charter. The expenditures under consideration could only be regarded as ‘expenses of the organization’ if they were to fulfil one of the goals of the UN, as set out in the UN Charter. The Court analysed whether the expenditures were undertaken in order to fulfil the purposes of the Organization. Since the expenditures were made in pursuance of an objective of the UN, namely the maintenance of peace and security, the expenditures were considered ‘expenses of the Organization’ according to art. 17(2) of the UN Charter.
The Court opined on the legal implications of a finding that the action was not in pursuance of the objectives and purposes of the UN, that is, a finding of ultra vires. The Court held that ‘when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization’." Even if action was carried out by the wrong organ, this does not mean that the expenses incurred would not be considered as expenses of the organization." There is, according to the Court, a difference between the validity of the UN’s financial distribution among member States and the legal validity of the UN action. The resolutions authorizing budgetary expenses could be valid even if the operations concerned were not, since they had been taken by the wrong organ. The Court’s narrow approach to the legal question put before it meant that the Court did not go into depth on these issues, leaving many important legal questions unanswered.  
One of the legal issues that one not addressed pertained to the UNGA’s role in the field of collective security, particularly since the adoption of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution. Under this resolution, when Security Council action in the maintenance of international peace and security is blocked by the veto of a permanent member, the UNGA shall consider the matter, and may make recommendations to member states, to restore international peace and security. A question that arises is whether the UN Security Council is the sole UN organ competent to act in the field of collective security. Supporters of the resolution argued that the UNSC has a ‘primary responsibility’ for the maintenance of peace and security (as indicated in art. 24(1) of the UN Charter), but not an exclusive one. The UNGA may exercise tasks in that field where the UNSC is unable to fulfil that function. Moreover, since this interpretation allows the UN to fulfil one of its main purposes, the maintenance of peace and security, the UN Charter should be read in a way that allows these aims to be achieved. The Court did not elaborate on the extent of the General Assembly’s powers, particularly whether it could recommend coercive measures/5 The opinion does not seem to prevent the UNGA from recommending such measures.
Certain Expenses is also an important opinion insofar as it relates to the limits of
the ‘implied powers’ of international organizations. In determining whether the costs could be qualified as ‘expenses of the organisation’, the Court examined primarily whether they fit within the purposes of the UN. The Court acknowledged that these purposes are broad, but not unlimited. For instance, the exercise of powers must not affect the distribution of functions between UN organs. Nonetheless, by making a link between the purposes of the organization and legal powers, the Court can be criticized for developing an overly broad approach to implied powers. As President Winiarski points out in his dissenting opinion, ‘[t]he fact that an organ of the United Nations is seeking to achieve one of those purposes does not suffice to render its action lawful’/6
D. Role of the Court
The opinion also further elaborates on the role of the Court, especially its relationship with the other UN organs. Some UN member States had argued that the Court should decline to give an opinion since it was essentially a political, rather than a legal question. The Court notes that in most instances where it is requested to interpret the UN
Charter, political questions necessarily arise; however, this does not deprive the question from its essentially juridical character. In principle, the Court will not refuse to give an opinion unless there is a ‘compelling reason’ for it not to do so.   Having found no such compelling reason, it proceeded to answer the question before it. In doing so, however, it interpreted the question before it in a narrow manner. It limited its opinion to the interpretation of art. 17 of the UN Charter^ and did not elaborate on the related legal questions that arose from the underlying dispute.
The Court noted that there is no explicit power of judicial review for the Court in the UN Charter or the ICJ statute/9 A proposal made at the San Francisco Conference to include such a power of judicial review in the Court’s mandate was rejected. Nor was the Court given a general power to interpret the Charter in a manner like a domestic constitutional court. However, it has been recognized that the Court may play an incidental role in judicial review through exercising its judicial function and in its role as the principal judicial organ of the UN. By narrowly interpreting the question in this case, and by not ruling on the legality of the conduct of the other organs, the Court can be seen as respecting the division of powers of the Charter.
-  The numbers between brackets before each paragraph have been added to the text. They are the sameas in the reprint of the advisory opinion in Reports of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
-  J. Fergusson Hogg, ‘Peace-Keeping Costs and Charter Obligations—Implications of the InternationalCourt of Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of the United Nations’, (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review1236, 1238.
-  Certain Expenses, Opinion, para. 43. 4 Ibid., para. 44.
-  J. Arato, ‘Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in InternationalOrganizations’, (2013) 38 Yale Journal of International Law 318: ‘What is extraordinary is the Court’smethod of interpretation.’
-  Certain Expenses, Opinion, para. 24. 7 Ibid., para. 25. 8 Ibid., para. 20.
-  9 Ibid., para.30.
-  Certain Expenses, Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender, para. 55.
-  J. Arato (n. 5), 295. i2 Certain Expenses, Opinion, para. 57. ” Ibid., para. 58.
-  K.R. Simmonds, ‘The UN Assessments Advisory Opinion’, (1964) 13 International and ComparativeLaw Quarterly 854, 890.
-  N. D. White, The Law of International Organisations (2nd edn, Manchester, Manchester UniversityPress 2005) p. 103.
-  Certain Expenses, dissenting opinion of President Winiarski, p. 230.
-  Certain Expenses, Opinion, para. 12. i® Ibid., para. 22. i9 Ibid., para. 59.
-  20 D. Akande, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial
-  Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’, (1997) 46 International and
-  Comparative Law Quarterly 331.