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Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies and Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres), Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, 11 May 1966, Journal des Tribunaux, 10 December 1966, No. 4553, 121

Pierre Schmitt

Relevance of the case

This 1966 case, brought by a Belgian citizen—Mr Manderlier—against the UN and the Belgian State before the Brussels Civil Tribunal (the Tribunal) is particularly interesting because it is one of the first cases in which UN immunity from jurisdiction was challenged. Most of the legal questions raised by the plaintiff in relation to the scope of the UN’s immunity are still debated nowadays before domestic jurisdictions. Among these questions, the Tribunal examined whether the UN’s immunity was conditional upon the latter’s respect of art. VIII, Section 29 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN). Moreover, the Tribunal assessed whether the immunity could be rejected in favour of a human rights argument based on the right of access to justice and whether it could only be invoked in relation to actions or situations that were necessary for the UN to achieve its goals. Finally, it evaluated whether the UN had waived its immunity in this particular case. Secondly the Tribunal also discussed whether the UN had legal personality under domestic law necessary to appear before it.

I. Facts of the case

On 5 December 1961, Mr Manderlier, a Belgian citizen settled in the Congo, saw his flat extensively damaged in the course of fighting involving UN troops situated there. He lodged a first claim on 15 February 1962 against the UN for compensation of the damage that he estimated at 336,710 Belgian francs (i.e. more than 8,000 euros). In December 1962, his property was looted and burnt by UN troops and he was victim of acts of violence committed upon his person. He lodged a second claim for compensation for the loss on 10 January 1963 against the UN through the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade for the compensation of a damage that he estimated at 3,799,675 Belgian francs (i.e. almost 100,000 euros).

Mr Manderlier’s situation was not unique. Many Belgians settled in the Congo launched similar claims for compensation of damages to persons and properties that they considered as attributable to the UN. They turned towards their state—Belgium— to exercise diplomatic protection. Most of these claims—in total, there were 1,298 files brought against the UN—were centralised by the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and transmitted to the UN seat in New York.[1]

The UN disputed the facts but after intercessions by the Belgian Government it declared itself prepared to ‘accept financial liability where the damage is the result of action taken by agents of the United Nations in violation of the laws of war and the rules of international law’.[2] After selecting those cases in which individuals had been victims of internationally wrongful acts by the UN, the UN considered that approximately 580 claims were entitled to compensation. The UN Secretary- General agreed that, ‘without prejudice to the privileges and immunities which the United Nations enjoys, he will pay the Belgian Government the sum of one million five hundred thousand United States dollars ($1,500,000) in an outright and final settlement of all claims’[3] filed against the UN by Belgians for damage to persons and property caused by the UN Force in the Congo. This agreement was incorporated in an exchange of letters of 20 February 1965 between the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the UN Secretary-General[4] and enacted in a Belgian Law of 7 May 1965.[5]

A list was drawn up by the UN of individual claims for which the UN accepted liability. The Belgian Government divided this lump sum and informed the victims of their right to receive part of the UN settlement payment. Acceptance of this sum would not prevent them from receiving any further compensation from the Belgian State but would waive any further rights of action against the UN. The Government proposed an amount of 140,000 Belgian francs (i.e. approximately 35,000 euros) out of the financial contribution by the UN. In addition, the Government declared that the material damage of Mr Manderlier could lead to a complementary contribution by the Belgian State. Yet, Mr Manderlier considered the amount too low and brought an action before the Belgian courts against both the UN and the Belgian State, claiming a total sum of 6,119,350 Belgian francs (i.e. approximately 150,000 euros). The UN pleaded its immunity from the jurisdiction of the Belgian Tribunal.

II. The legal question

The arguments raised by the plaintiff engendered several legal questions to be assessed by the Tribunal. A preliminary issue examined by the Tribunal focused on the legal personality of the UN to appear before the Brussels Civil Tribunal. The other legal questions analyzed mainly concerned the nature and the scope of the UN immunity from jurisdiction:

  • 1) Is the UN’s immunity from jurisdiction absolute or functional?
  • 2) Is the UN’s immunity conditional upon the respect by the latter of art. VIII, Section 29 of the CPIUN?
  • 3) Is the UN’s immunity conditional upon the respect by the latter of the United Nations Declaration for Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights?
  • 4) Did the UN waive its immunity from jurisdiction in this case?

In addition, the plaintiff put the question of the extent of the diplomatic protection exercised by the state to the Tribunal.

III. Excerpts

The United Nations was set up by the San Francisco Charter of 26 January 1945, approved in Belgium by the Law of 14 December 1945. By Article 104 of the Charter the Organization enjoys in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary to it. The defendant is consequently competent to appear in legal proceedings in Belgium. Nevertheless, by Article 105 of the Charter the Organization enjoys in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

The defendant, while competent to appear in legal proceedings in Belgium, rejects the jurisdiction of this Court, invoking the immunity from jurisdiction accorded to it by Section 2 (Article II) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, approved by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946. In effect, under these provisions the U.N. enjoys immunity from jurisdiction, except in so far as it has expressly waived it in a particular case. This provision is both general and absolute. It follows necessarily that the Organization is an independent entity which places itself above the nations, acting according to its own free will, without being subject to any national, judicial, or other authority. [...]

Section 29 of the Convention lays down that the Organization is to provide for appropriate methods of settlement for disputes of a private law character to which it may be a party. It would normally follow that the defendant was bound to draw up regulations to govern its relations in private law and set up courts to decide disputes arising from the latter.

It is true that the U.N. has set up certain courts of special jurisdiction, such as the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations. However, it is an undisputed fact that it has not set up any court with a general or unlimited jurisdiction. In fact, no independent and impartial court has been set up, before which the plaintiff could bring the defendant to have the claim decided which he has brought before the present Court.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, it is true, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948, (published in the Moniteur belge of 31 March 1949). In Article 10 this Declaration lays down the principle that everyone is entitled to a public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him. In spite of this provision of the Declaration which the U.N. proclaimed on 10 December 1948, the Organization has neglected to set up the courts which it was in fact already bound to create by Section 29 of the Convention [on Privileges and Immunities] of 13 February 1946.

However, the Universal Declaration does not have the force of law. Its sole aim is to express the common ideal to be attained by all peoples and all nations, in order that by instruction and education respect for these rights and freedoms may be developed and that measures may be taken progressively to ensure that they are recognized and universally and effectively applied in the future. The principles of the Universal Declaration are already contained in general in the Belgian Constitution of 7 February 1831. The Declaration, which is merely a collection of recommendations, without binding force, has not been submitted for approval to the Belgian legislature.

The plaintiff invokes in vain Article 10 of the Universal Declaration in order to claim that in the absence, within the framework of the U.N., of an international court qualified to hear him and to judge his claim, he must be entitled to bring the defendant before a national court qualified to do so. From this the plaintiff makes bold to argue that Article 10 made the immunity from jurisdiction decreed by Section 2 of the Convention of 13 February 1946 conditional.

That immunity is unconditional, and has been so since the conclusion of the Convention in 1946. It was not abrogated, either conditionally or finally, by the Declaration of 1948. It is true that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concluded at Rome on 4 November 1950, contains in Article 6 a provision more or less similar to that of Article 10 of the Universal Declaration. The Law of 13 May 1965 approved the Rome Convention and decided that it should have full and complete effect; the Convention has thus been incorporated into Belgian Law. However, that Convention was concluded between fourteen European States only, and cannot be applied to and imposed upon the United Nations. Section 2 of the Convention [on Privileges and Immunities] of 13 February 1946 is binding and has full force, even though no court has been set up in pursuance of Section 29.

The defendant considers quite wrongly that the previously mentioned Agreement, reached between the U.N. and Belgium on 20 February 1965, constitutes the appropriate method of settlement provided for by Section 29. The defendant had the claims addressed to it, and in particular those of the plaintiff, examined by its own authorities, without argument of any kind. It then took a unilateral decision by which, according to its letter of 20 February 1965, it believed itself bound to limit its spontaneous intervention. The defendant has thus in reality been judge in its own case. Such a procedure in no sense constitutes an appropriate method of settlement for deciding a dispute.

Be that as it may, it is for the United Nations, and for it alone, to set up the courts which would produce an appropriate method of settlement for the disputes which it may have with third parties. Immunity from jurisdiction has been conferred upon it, however inconvenient may be its results for litigants.

In the Senate, on 8 April 1965, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that the U.N. had waived its immunity from jurisdiction. But the Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot bind the United Nations, nor its Secretary-General, through declarations he makes in the Belgian Legislative Chamber. His view of the situation cannot bind the judge in his interpretation of international law. The plaintiff has not produced proof that the defendant has expressly waived its right to invoke immunity from jurisdiction in this particular case in which they are opposed.

Article 105 of the San Francisco Charter of 26 June 1945 accords the United Nations only those privileges and immunities that are necessary to it for the fulfilment of its purposes. Those purposes, as enumerated in Article I of the Charter, do not include acts against private citizens such as are the subject of the plaintiff’s complaints. The provisions of Section 2 of the Convention [on Privileges and Immunities] of 13 February 1946 are wider than those of Article 105 of the Charter. They grant a general immunity from jurisdiction and do not limit it to what necessity strictly demands for the fulfilment of the defendant’s purposes. These two international conventions have equal force, and the less widely drawn one of 26 June 1945 cannot restrict the field of application of the more widely drawn one of 13 February 1946.

The United Nations Organization is not a sovereign power. It has neither territory nor population. It follows that it cannot invoke rights of sovereignty different from the similar, but partial, rights which the Conventions have expressly and with limited effect given to it. Immunity from jurisdiction is the absolute privilege of whoever enjoys it. It can be withdrawn only by a properly effected change in the law which granted it; and the courts are not judges of when it is expedient for the beneficiary to invoke it. [...]

The plaintiff in addition levels charges against the Belgian State apart from the actual acts committed in the Congo. He accuses it in particular of not having properly defended his interests. [...]

In fact, to protect its nationals and their property, the second defendant negotiated with the first defendant in a way that was partially successful, and arrived at the Agreement of 20 February 1965, approved by the Law of 7 May 1965. That Agreement and the Law approving it are an act of the legislature, which neither the executive nor the judiciary can sanction, modify or squash. It cannot avail the plaintiff to attack the executive on account of the acts of the legislature. [...]

It is equally unavailing for the plaintiff to attack the defendant for not having brought the case before the International Court of Justice. The procedure provided for by Section 30 of the aforementioned Convention of 13 February 1946 is not intended to cover actions brought by private individuals; it concerns only disputes which have arisen between the United Nations and one of its Member States. The plaintiff has no personal right to compel the second defendant to embark upon proceedings in international law against the first defendant. No agreement of any kind was concluded between the plaintiff and the second defendant, and the latter did not undertake any express obligation towards the plaintiff with a view to obtaining on his behalf full compensation for his loss. [...]

It is open to the plaintiff not to accept the benefit of the international Agreement of 20 February 1965 and the Law of 7 May 1965 and to act directly against the U.N.; but in the absence of any appropriate court set up in pursuance of Section 29 of the Convention of 13 February 1956,[6] then, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs has most judiciously pointed out, one cannot see where the U.N. could be sued, nor how, nor on what legal basis (Annales parlementaires, Chambre, 6 April 1965, p. 4), so long as it shelters behind its immunity from jurisdiction.

For these reasons the Court:

Declares that the plaintiff’s claim is inadmissible before the present court in so far as it is brought against the first defendant, the United Nations Organization, which invokes the immunity from jurisdiction acknowledged by Belgium and by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, approved by the Law of 28 February 1948;

Declares that the plaintiff’s claim against the second defendant, the Belgian State, is admissible but that the claim fails;

Accordingly dismisses the plaintiff’s claim;

Orders him to pay the costs of the action.[7]

IV. Commentary

This is one of the first cases in which a national court was confronted with the argument of UN immunity from jurisdiction in a dispute relating to peacekeeping operations.[8] The decision of the Tribunal as to the absolute character of UN immunity is still valid nowadays, as is its cautious approach in accepting waivers of such immunity and verifying whether these are expressly made by the competent organ, that is in the case of the UN, the Secretary-General.

Among the legal questions analyzed by the Tribunal, the first one concerned the legal personality of the UN. The Tribunal noted that the UN was set up by the UN Charter, as approved by Belgian law.[9] Given that art. 104 of the UN Charter granted such legal capacity as may be necessary for the UN in the territory of each of its members, the defendant was competent to appear in legal proceedings in Belgium. The question of UN legal personality has similarly been discussed in other cases before national jurisdictions in the 1950s. In another Belgian case of 1952, United Nations v B, the UN brought an action against a former employee to recover undue money paid to the dissolved UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The employee counter-argued that both UNRRA and the UN did not have legal personality. However, the Civil Tribunal of Brussels dismissed this argument on the basis that both the Washington Agreement setting up UNRRA and the UN Charter were ‘ratified’ (sic) by Belgian Laws—respectively of 3 August 1944 and of 14 December 1945.[10] In 1954, the Canadian Superior Court of Montreal analyzed the UN’s legal personality in United Nations v Canada Asiatic

Lines Limited.11 It decided that the UN possessed legal personality and had the right to institute legal proceedings. Nowadays, the legal personality of the UN is generally accepted by national jurisdictions. As noted by August Reinisch, ‘[although they usually stop short of de-recognizing or failing to recognize the legal personality of international organizations, [the courts’] reasoning clearly demonstrates the essential importance of the personality of an international organization in order to enable a domestic court to adjudicate the underlying dispute’/2

One of the core legal questions examined in the Manderlier case concerned the scope of the immunity from jurisdiction of the UN and the distinction between functional and absolute immunity. It is recalled that the immunity of the UN and its personnel is governed by two main sources: art. 105 of the UN Charter and the CPIUN. The former provides that the UN and its officials shall enjoy in the territory of its member states such privileges and immunities as necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. The ‘necessity’ standard expresses the UN’s functional immunity, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.13 Furthermore, the CPIUN, and more specifically its art. II, Section 2, provides that ‘[t]he United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.’ The Tribunal recalled that according to art. 105 of the UN Charter, the UN only enjoys privileges and immunities which are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes enumerated in art. 1 of the Charter. This does not comprise acts against private citizens. The Tribunal’s statement could be taken as a hint that it would not have granted immunity if it had applied functional immunity, given that it qualified the disputed acts of the UN as outside of its functions/4 However, the Tribunal added that the provisions of Section 2 of the CPIUN ‘grant a general immunity from jurisdiction and do not limit it to what necessity strictly demands for the fulfilment of the defendant’s purposes’.

Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that art. II, Section 2 and art. VIII, Section 29 of the CPIUN were closely linked in the way that the UN’s immunity from jurisdiction should be conditional upon the availability of an appropriate method of settlement for disputes of a private law character. Given that no appropriate method of settlement had been established, the plaintiff argued that the Tribunal could not grant immunity to the UN. The Civil Tribunal of Brussels rejected the argument raised by the plaintiff and affirmed the general and absolute character of the immunity granted by art. II, Section 2 of the CPIUN, except for an express waiver by the UN itself. The Tribunal noted that ‘[i]mmunity from jurisdiction is the absolute privilege of whoever enjoys it’. [11] [12] [13] [14]

It is remarkable that the Tribunal did not examine the question whether the UN is bound by the CPIUN and bears an obligation to set up appropriate methods of settlement for disputes of a private law character prior to analyzing the question whether the UN’s immunity is conditional upon the availability of an appropriate method of settlement for disputes of a private law character. The UN is not a party to the CPIUN, which has been ratified so far by 160 states. Hence, it has no direct obligations stemming from the convention. Nonetheless, in its Advisory Opinion in Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, the ICJ noted that claims against the UN ‘shall not be dealt with by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with the appropriate modes of settlement that “[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for” pursuant to Section 29’.15 Thus, the ICJ recognized the obligation of the UN under Section 29 of the CPIUN to establish appropriate methods of settlement for disputes of a private law character, which was implicitly taken for granted in the Manderlier case by the Civil Tribunal of Brussels.

While considering that the UN’s immunity was absolute, the Tribunal seemed uncomfortable with its decision and recognized that ‘it is an undisputed fact that it has not set up any court with a general and unlimited jurisdiction. In fact, no independent and impartial international court has been set up, before which the plaintiff could bring the defendant to have the claim decided which he has brought before the present Court.’ This observation of a deficiency led the Tribunal to analyze the following legal argument raised by the plaintiff, namely a violation of art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and art. 6 of the ECHR, which both consecrate the right of access to justice, that is the right to a public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations. The Tribunal considered that these provisions were not binding on the UN since the Universal Declaration was merely a ‘collection of recommendations’ and the European Convention on Human Rights ‘was concluded between fourteen European states only, and cannot be applied to and imposed upon the United Nations’. Such argumentation—as to the legal status of the right of access to justice—would probably be more questionable nowadays/6 Indeed, most legal systems include the right of access to independent dispute-settlement mechanisms providing fair hearings to plaintiffsi7 and numerous observers assert that the right of access to justice could be considered as customary law/8 Dinah Shelton, for whom the right of access to [15] [16] [17] [18]

justice constitutes the procedural aspect of the right to an effective remedy, stated that ‘[i]t is clear that the obligation to provide effective remedies is an essential component of international human rights law’.19

Another important legal question discussed in the Manderlier case concerned the waiver of immunity by the UN. The plaintiff contended that the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared on 8 April 1965 in the Senate that the UN had waived its immunity from jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaintiff argued that this waiver permitted the Brussels Civil Tribunal to decide on the case. The Tribunal however found that the Minister ‘cannot bind the United Nations, nor its Secretary-General, through declarations he makes in the Belgian Legislative Chamber ... His view of the situation cannot bind the judge in his interpretation of international law’. This view is in conformity with both art. II, Section 2 and art. V, Section 20 of the CPIUN which respectively require all waivers to be express and grant the discretion to waive the immunity to the Secretary-General. This case illustrates the prudence of national jurisdictions in accepting waivers of immunity by international organizations and verifying whether these are expressly made by the competent organ. Another example of such a cautious approach may be found in the Mendaro v World Bank case, where the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit held in 1983 that ‘[t]his policy underlying the immunity of an international organization also suggests that the court should be slow to find an “express” waiver ... Courts should be reluctant to find that an international organization has inadvertently waived immunity when the organization might be subjected to a class of suits which would interfere with its functions’.20

This case is also interesting because it refers to a specific practice for settlement of claims by the UN, namely the compensation of victims for the damages caused during UN operations through the payment of a lump sum. The UN considered that approximately 580 claims were entitled to compensation and a lump-sum agreement of 1,500,000 US dollars was agreed. The Belgian Government distributed the sum among the claimants. The choice of a lump sum as a mode of settlement seems to have been based on political considerations in 1965. Indeed, a majority of states within the General Assembly would not have accepted compensation of Belgian citizens, as they were considered by many as principally responsible for the situation in Congo. Consequently, the agreement reached between the Secretary-General and Belgium— based on the international responsibility of the UN—appeared to be a pragmatic2i though not ideal solution. It does not guarantee an effective right of access to justice to customary law’. L. Doswald-Beck, ‘ILO: The Right to a Fair Hearing Interpretation of International Law’, in L. Doswald-Beck and R. Kolb, Judicial Process and Human Rights: United Nations, European, American and African Systems: Text and Summaries of International Case-Law (2004), pp. 119 ff. Theodor Meron noted that the ‘right to be tried by a competent independent and impartial tribunal established by law as customary law’. T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1989), pp. 96-7.

  • 19 cf. D. Shelton (n. 17), p. 8.
  • 20 cf. Mendaro v World Bank, US Court of Appeals, 27 September 1983, DC Cir, 717 F2d 610 (DC Cir 1983).
  • 21 Case note by J. Salmon, ‘De quelques problemes poses aux tribunaux belges par les actions de citoy- ens belges contre l’O.N.U. en raison de faits survenus sur le territoire de la Republique democratique du Congo’ Journal des Tribunaux (1966), p. 713.

individuals. ‘Claimants are therefore likely to prefer remedies which they are entitled to pursue in their own name, whether under an individual complaints mechanism or at the international level or through civil litigation.’[19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24]

Mr Manderlier appealed the decision, which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Brussels on 15 September 1969” Notwithstanding its decision, the Court of Appeal recognized that ‘in the present state of international institutions there is no court to which the appellant can submit his dispute with the United Nations’, which ‘does not seem to be in keeping with the principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights’.

Given that the Manderlier case dates from 1966, one may wonder whether it is still relevant today. Indeed, recent cases—notably rendered by Belgian jurisdictions— have engendered a new perspective in favour of the right of access to courts24 inspired by the ECtHRs’ Waite and Kennedy jurisprudence, in which the Court considered it a ‘material factor’ in determining whether granting an international organization immunity from domestic jurisdiction was permissible under the Convention, ‘whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention’” Nevertheless, this evolution of jurisprudence has mainly occurred in cases concerning staff- related disputes. Moreover, a review of national cases involving the UN demonstrates that its immunity is still considered unconditional and absolute, except for an express waiver” This has notably been confirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court on 13 April 2012 in a case brought by a group called the ‘Mothers of Srebrenica’ against the UN before Dutch jurisdictions to hold the UN responsible for its failure to prevent the massacre in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and to obtain financial com- pensation.27 The lawyers brought the case before the ECtHRs, arguing the violation of the right of access to justice and the right to a remedy. A decision of inadmissibility was rendered unanimously on 11 June 2013 against the Mothers of Srebrenica on the basis of UN’s immunity.28 The Court decided that the granting of immunity to the UN served a legitimate purpose and it could not bring military operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter within the scope of national jurisdictions because this would allow states, through their Courts, ‘to interfere with the key mission of the UN [to secure international peace and security], including with the effective conduct of its operations’. Furthermore, the Court explained that a civil claim did not override immunity for the reason that it was alleging a particularly grave violation of international law, even a norm of jus cogens. The particular mission of the UN and the nature of applicants’ claims justified the differentiation of this case from the Waite and Kennedy jurisprudence. Hence, the view of the Brussels Civil Tribunal in the 1966 Manderlier case qualifying the UN’s immunity as absolute seems to be still valid nowadays.

The Netherlands and the UN (Appeal), Court of Appeal in The Hague, 200.022.151/01, 30 March 2010; The Association of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica v The Netherlands and the UN (Incidental Proceedings), District Court in The Hague, 295247/HA ZA 07-2973, 10 July 2008.

28 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others against The Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights, 11 June 2013, App. No. 65542/12. See ch. 7.10.

  • [1] cf. Belgian House of Representatives, Documents parlementaires, session 1964-65, 1009, no. 2,Annex 3. For further information, see J. Salmon, ‘De quelques problemes poses aux tribunaux belges parles actions de citoyens belges contre l’O.N.U. en raison de faits survenus sur le territoire de la Republiquedemocratique du Congo’, Journal des Tribunaux (1966), p. 713.
  • [2] cf. Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres),Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 May 1966, (1972) 45 ILR 446-55, 465.
  • [3] cf. Manderlier case (n. 2), p. 465.
  • [4] Exchange of letters constituting an Agreement between the United Nations and Belgium relating tothe settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian nationals: New York,20 February 1965, United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1965) p. 39; 1 Revue belge de droit international(1965) p. 558.
  • [5] Loi du 7 Mai 1965 portant approbation des actes internationaux suivants: 1° Accord entre le Royaumede Belgique et l’Organisation des Nations-Unies, relatif au reglement des comptes nes de l’administrationpar les Nations-Unies des anciennes bases militaires belges au Congo; 2° Accord entre le Royaume deBelgique et l’Organisation des Nations-Unies relatif au reglement du probleme des reclamations introduces aupres de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies par des ressortissants belges, ayant subi des dom-mages au Congo, conclus par echanges de lettres, datees a New York, le 20 fevrier 1965, Moniteur Belge,29 July 1965, 9069.
  • [6] Sic. Although the date of 13 February 1956 is mentioned in the English translation of the decisionprovided in Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres),Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 May 1966, (1972) 45 ILR 446-55, the correct date of the Convention is 13February 1946. This footnote has been added and does not appear in the original version of the decision.
  • [7] Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et I’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres),Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 May 1966, (1972) 45 ILR 446-55. The French version of the decision is available at Pasicrisie Belge, 1966, II, 103 and Journal des Tribunaux (1966) p. 721.
  • [8] See J. Salmon (n. 1), at 713.
  • [9] cf. Loi du 14 Decembre 1945 approuvant la Charte des Nations Unies et le Statut de la CourInternationale de Justice, signee a San Francisco le 26 Juin 1945, Moniteur Belge, 1 January 1946, 1.
  • [10] See also UNRRA v Daan, Cantonal Court Amersfoort, 16 June 1948, District Court Utrecht, 23February 1949, Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) of The Netherlands, 19 May 1950, (1951) NJ 150; (1955) 82Journal de droit international (Clunet) 855-87; (1949) 16 ILR 337-8.
  • [11] Superior Court Montreal, 2 December 1952, Rapports de Pratique du Quebec (1954) 158-60; (1954)48 AJIL 668; (1958 II) 26 ILR 622.
  • [12] cf. A. Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts (Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press 2000), p. 39.
  • [13] ICJ, 11 April 1949, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep 174.
  • [14] cf. A. Reinisch (n. 12), p. 346.
  • [15] Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission onHuman Rights, Advisory Opinion, [1999] ICJ Rep 62, para. 66. See also A. Reinisch, ‘The Immunity ofInternational Organizations and the Jurisdiction of their Administrative Tribunals’, (2002) 7(2) ChineseJournal of International Law 285-306, 289.
  • [16] cf. A. Reinisch and U.A. Weber, ‘In the Shadow of Waite and Kennedy: The Jurisdictional Immunityof International Organizations, the Individual’s Right of Access to the Courts and AdministrativeTribunals as Alternative Means of Dispute Settlement’, (2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review59, 77.
  • [17] cf. D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press2005), p. 8.
  • [18] In relation to art. 14 of the ICCPR, art. 6 of the ECHR, art. 8 of the ACHR, and arts 7 and 26of the African Charter, L. Doswald-Beck states ‘[t]hese texts are very similar and, even more significantly, so is the jurisprudence of the treaties’ supervisory bodies. Therefore, we can speak of principles of
  • [19] M.C. Zwanenburg, Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations andNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers2004) p. 273; C. Wickremasinghe and G. Verdirame, ‘Responsibility and Liability for Violations ofHuman Rights in the Course of UN Field Operations’, in C. Scott (ed.), Torture as Tort: ComparativePerspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford, Hart 2001), pp.465-90, p. 465.
  • [20] 23 Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres), Courtof Appeal of Brussels, 15 September 1969, (1969) 69 ILR 139; case note by P. De Visscher, ‘De l’immunitede juridiction de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et du caractere discretionnaire de la competence deprotection diplomatique’, (1971) 25 Revue critique de jurisprudence belge 456, 460.
  • [21] Western European Union v Siedler, Belgian Court of Cassation, 21 December 2009, Cass. No.S.04.0129.F, ILDC 1625 BE 2009; see also General Secretariat of the ACP Group v Lutchmaya, BelgianCourt of Cassation, Cass. Nr. C.03.0328.F, ILDC 1573 BE 2009. Judgments of the Court of Cassationand selected decisions of other Belgian courts are available at http://www.belgiumlex.be/. See also J.Wouters, C. Ryngaert, and P. Schmitt, ‘Case-Note to Belgian Court of Cassation, Western EuropeanUnion v. Siedler; General Secretariat of the ACP Group v. Lutchmaya; General Secretariat of the ACPGroup v. B.D.’, (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 560.
  • [22] 25 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, European Court of Human Rights, 18 February 1999, App. No.26083/94, para. 68; Beer and Regan v Germany, European Court of Human Rights, 18 February 1999,App. No. 28934/95, para. 59. See ch. 7.2 in this book.
  • [23] 26 J. Wouters and P. Schmitt, ‘Challenging Acts of Other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary Organsand Officials’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), Challenging Acts of International Organizations before National Courts(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) pp. 77-110.
  • [24] The Association of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica v The Netherlands and the UN (Appeal), DutchSupreme Court, 10/04437, 12 April 2012. See also The Association of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica v
 
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