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Notes

  • 1. The GDN project was conducted between 2010 and 2013. Together with the project concept note, four background papers (three on the selected sectors and one on political economy issues related to service delivery) guided the research approach of the case studies. One of them is published in this volume (Chap. 2) and the rest are available at www. gdn.int/gov
  • 2. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/ Progress2014/English2014.pdf
  • 3. Governance is a term usually related to state’s ability to enforce laws. In the GDN project we use it in a more general sense, relating to the group of institutions through which different actors come to decide upon changes in the policy realm and affect its implementation, and, in particular, through which citizens and other actors hold the state and service providers accountable. Institutions, following North, are defined as the formal and informal rules and enforcement mechanisms that constrain and affect the behavior of all actors participating in the service delivery chain.
  • 4. Making Services Work for the Poor, World Development Report, World Bank (2004).
  • 5. See, for example, Besley and Ghatak (2003), Dixit (2002), Keefer and Khemani (2005), Gauthier and Reinnika (2007), Gauthier (2002), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Laffont and Martimort (2002), Mookherjee (2006), Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2006), Marschak and Radner (1972), Tirole (1986) and Wantchekon and Weltman (2007).
  • 6. Castelar and Schneider (2015), Chap. 2.
  • 7. Hegedus et al. (2013), Effects of Governance Models on Affordability, Sustainability and Efficiency of the Water Services in Three Transition Countries, GDN.
  • 8. Balu et al. (2009), GDN Education Issues Paper, GDN Working Paper Series No. 10.
  • 9. Straub (2009). Governance in Water Supply, Global Development Working Paper Series No. 11.
  • 10. Engel et al. (2009), On the Efficient Provision of Roads, GDN Working Paper Series No. 12.
  • 11. The World Bank Development Report (2004) differentiated between the “long route” of service delivery (where citizens delegate policy decisions to policy makers and these delegate service delivery to specialized—public or private—agents) and “short routes” through which citizens or users directly delegate and hold accountable the service providers. Full or partial examples of the latter are parents or community participation in autono?mous School Boards, community-managed provision of water or road maintenance, parents or users choice of schools or service provision when there is competition in provision and possibility of choice (e.g. through payment or vouchers).
  • 12. Hegedus et al. (2013), Effects of Governance Models on Affordability, Sustainability and Efficiency of the Water Services in Three Transition Countries, GDN. See, in particular, the case of Hungary.
  • 13. Straub (2009).
  • 14. See, for example, Castelar and Schneider (2015), Chap. 2 in this volume.
  • 15. Burki et al. (1999), Manor (1999), Faguet (2012), Brosio and Jimenez (2012), Ahmed et al. (2005) and Ahmad and Brosio (2009).
  • 16. Tumushabe, G. et al., Public Service Delivery in Uganda: Assessing Governance aspects in the Water and Roads sector, GDN (2012).
  • 17. Linz and Stepan (1996), Dalton (2000), Heller (2001) and Peters (2001).
  • 18. Mancebo et al. (2013).
  • 19. In reading and science, though not in mathematics.
  • 20. This is a plausible result, as school progression is likely to have an impact on acquired cognitive skills.
  • 21. However, autonomy on curriculum and content was not found to be associated with better performance in terms of students’ tests. In any case, the influence of teachers on course content and assessment practices is more frequent in private schools in both countries and in public schools in Chile, though not in Uruguay.
  • 22. As the authors warn, reverse causality may be an issue that could not be dealt with due to limited time observations and lack of appropriate instruments.
  • 23. The authors measure local fiscal effort as the ratio of local taxes to total taxes, instrumented by the updating of local cadastres (which is the main way in which local authorities can increase local land tax revenues).
  • 24. Neither land concentration nor poverty rates were found to be related to cadastral updates, as could have been expected. Municipal GDP’s per capita and the percentage of urban population in the municipality do influence cadastral updates.
  • 25. Joshi and Nagarajan (2013).
  • 26. The case study on the educational quality assurance system in six countries of Southeast Europe shows that, though School Boards exist today in all the countries in the sample, actual parents participation is very weak. Actual participants end up being mostly teachers or public officials that act more in that capacity than as parent representatives, or else limit themselves to inquire about their own children. Slovenia, which had for long a culture of local participation under the former Yugoslav regime, was the exception to this general finding.
  • 27. This applies also to minority groups.
  • 28. Jaramillo and Alcazar (2013) and Kuncoroet al. (2012).
  • 29. Linz and Stepan (1996).
  • 30. The authors’ preferred index of participatory budgeting intensity was the fraction of the local public investment budget allocated through the participatory meetings, but they also used other indexes directly based on intensity of participation (e.g. number of meetings and actors participating).
  • 31. However, the authors found evidence of some municipalities adapting to these circumstances and implementing, for example, itinerant PB workshops to make sure that most rural communities are included.
  • 32. The GDN project Philippines case study found that, in the end, the Civil Society Organizations that participate are closely related to local leaders, and to a large extent follow in practice national government priorities. Thus, current mechanisms of local citizen participation by large simply legitimize decisions which are basically determined centrally.
  • 33. Hirschman (1970).
  • 34. However, when multiple providers can compete for local or regional water, local authorities (though not directly citizens) can exercise some choice on behalf of their citizens, as the GDN case study on Hungary showed.
  • 35. Even in cases of local community management of service delivery, as the GDN Ugandan case study showed.
  • 36. The authors emphasize that they cannot assess causality, due to impossibility of dealing with endogeneity problems in essentially cross-school comparisons (Mancebo et al. 2013).
  • 37. Evidence from the African case studies is, again, mixed: Uganda, Sierra Leone at one end and Senegal at the other.
  • 38. Castelar and Schneider (2015), Chap. 2 in this volume.
  • 39. Mancebo et al. (2013).
  • 40. The study also found that the use of achievement data to compare the school to district or national performance is positively related to school progression, though in this case no direct association with average students test scores was found.
  • 41. Joshi and Nagarajan (2013), Jaramillo and Alcazar (2013), Torres and Pachon (2013), Mancebo et al. (2013) and Kabore et al. (2013).
  • 42. See Careaga and Weingast (2003), Besley and Persson (2009) and Cardenas (2010).
  • 43. Torres and Pachon (2013).
  • 44. See Perry and Olivera (2009); Gadenne (2011) and Economia Urbana (2012).
  • 45. Hegeduset al. (2013).
  • 46. Linz and Stepan (1996), Dalton (2000) and Peters (2001).
  • 47. Irnazarov et al. (2012), Effective Governance Perspectives in Central Asia: The Case of Transport Sector in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, GDN Research Report.
  • 48. Jaramillo and Alcazar (2013).
  • 49. Aceron et al. (2013).
  • 50. While surprisingly infrequent in other private schools.
 
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